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FOREWORD

Klara Hallik

The present collection of articles is already the second publication in which shifts that have taken place in the views and attitudes of the representatives of various nationalities living in Estonia during the implementation of the national program "Integration in Estonian society 2000-2007" are examined. The aim of the monitoring which was initiated and financed by the Integration Foundation, was not so much the evaluation of the fulfilment of the projects planned under the above program, but the description of the integration readiness in the society. The monitoring data helps to perfect the assessment criteria for sub-programs and serves as reference material for the initiation of new projects. The publication of the research results is also expected to partly compensate for the lack of official statistics on inter-ethnic relations.

The articles were written on the basis of the data collected in the course of the public opinion survey. The survey was conducted by the Saar Poll company in the spring of 2002. Altogether 1002 inhabitants were interviewed in Estonia, among them 660 Estonians and 342 representatives of other nationalities. The sample was representative for Estonians as well as for other ethnic groups. The breakdown of the respondents by age, gender, education, nationality and citizenship was the following:

	Age (years)	Estonian	Non-Estonian
	15 – 19	9,7%	10,6%
	20 – 29	20,3%	14,0%
	30 – 39	17,1%	18,7%
	40 – 49	18,1%	19,5%
	50 – 59	14,8%	16,2%
	60 - 74	20,0%	21,0%
Total		100%	100%

	Gender	Estonian	Non-Estonian
	Male	47,1%	45,0%
	Female	52,9%	55,0%
Total		100%	100%

	Education	Estonian	Non-Estonian
	Basic	35,4%	24,8%
	Secondary	51,5%	58,7%
	Higher	13,1%	16,5%
Total		100%	100%

	Nationality	Estonian	Non-Estonian
	Estonian	100%	
	Russian		80,1%
	Ukrainian		8,2%
	Belorussian		5,3%
	Other		6,4%
Total		100%	100%

	Citizenship	Estonian	Non-Estonian
	Estonian	99,7%	46,2
	Russian	0,1	19,9%
	Other	0,1	2,3%
	Stateless	0,1	31,6%
Total		100%	100%

The results of the survey presented in this publication indicate that Estonia's stable and ethnic conflict-free development over the past decade has created a social environment that enables to design and carry out a comprehensive integration strategy. Earlier concepts of integration as primarily an one-way language-based assimilation of the minorities into the Estonia society have now evolved into an understanding that the key to the successful integration is mutual respect, equal opportunities to all members of the multiethnic society and their participation in the creation of common good. The present monitoring focused mostly on the analysis of general integration-related attitudes of Estonians and other nationalities, socio-economic conditions and political integration. The analysis of the integration impeding factors and the typology of tolerance showed that ethnic attitudes are relatively stable and manifest themselves in a variety of spheres. Estonians exhibited them primarily by stressing the linguistic and cultural space as well as political differentiation. Non-Estonians' subjective integration willingness was suppressed by a strong feeling of inequality, but also by the conflict of competing identities. The monitoring data confirmed that non-Estonians' position on the labour market was not equal and this fact lead to the conclusion that non-Estonians, especially young people, should be treated as a target group for the active labour market policy measures. The main obstacle to the political integration lies yet in the fact that the majority of non-Estonians do not have the Estonian citizenship, thus the assessment to the citizenship policy by both ethnic groups has not changed. On the other hand, as socialisation of Estonians and other nationalities living in Estonia is taking place in a more or less similar political environment, their general political values have become closer and this process can be regarded as a "pre-citizenship" integration. The realisation that it is not expedient to keep non-Estonians away from politics is gradually becoming stronger in the Estonian community and this development should facilitate the adoption of further decisions aimed at the improvement of the integration policy.

INTEGRATION INHIBITING ATTITUDES AND DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS FOR ETHNIC RELATIONS

Jüri Kruusvall

Integration in ethnic relations is a social process, which is neither subject to central management nor quite independent either. Besides national programme also objective economic factors (living standard, rate of inequality, rate of unemployment, etc.), interstate relations (Estonia's accession to the European Union and NATO, relations with Russia, etc.), changed international environment (fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, drug addiction and HIV) influence these relations. The human factor should not be overlooked either – the speed and depth of integration is largely dependent on how much process-involved people want to integrate and are ready for integration-related concessions, trade-offs and agreements.

While in the previous integration monitoring survey we primarily focused on people's understanding of integration and what is thereby to a larger or smaller extent significant¹, in the current monitoring we focus on integration-inhibiting attitudes. As Estonians and non-Estonians still hold a widely different understanding of integration, also the questions used to measure integration, are different. While in the case of Estonians integration inhibitors are excessive disturbance, intolerance and feeling of being threatened, in the case of non-Estonians - overly criticism towards Estonian integration policy and non-understanding of ethnic and national interests of the Estonians. In order to avoid hasty conclusions based on responses to single questions, it is necessary to measure inhibiting attitudes with several questions covering various aspects of integration. Only factor-based aggregate attributes (indices) allow us to clarify the strength of actual attitudes. Using data from Integration Monitoring 2002 we try to construct indices of integration-inhibiting attitudes (IIA) and study what kind of social factors these attitudes depend on.

1. Integration-inhibiting attitudes in Estonians' minds

Previous studies have shown that primarily three kinds of attitudes reduce the Estonians' readiness for integration: cultural tolerance (an attitude towards people with different behaviour/thinking/life style), linguistic tolerance (the attitude towards the use of other languages besides Estonian) and national tolerance (the attitude towards the residence of other people in Estonia). In order to compile an IIA index we have selected for each of the above attitudes responses to two questions (see Table 1.1).

¹ Kruusvall, J. (2000). Integratsiooni arusaamine Eesti ühiskonnas. In Lauristin, M. and Vetik, R. (eds.), *Integratsioon Eesti ühiskonnas*, Tallinn: Institute of International and Social Studies and Integration Foundation.

Table 1.1. Answers counted to comprise the IIA index of Estonians

Answers to questions	% of the respondents	Correlation with the index
Considers his lifestyle and frame of mind “fully” or “rather” different from that of Russians	60	0,57
In case of Russians the different behaviour or lifestyle is “strongly” or “slightly” disturbing	46	0,59
In case of Russians the lack of Estonian-language competency is “strongly” or “slightly” disturbing	75	0,55
Large non-Estonian population in Estonia is “definitely” a threat to the survival of Estonians as a nation	35	0,62
Large non-Estonian population in Estonia is “definitely” or “rather” a threat to the development of the state of Estonia	51	0,55
Two official languages would “definitely” pose a threat to the survival of the Estonian language	48	0,53

46% (including 18% fully different) of Estonians considered their way of life and frame of mind different from that of Russians in 2002. The different behaviour and lifestyle of Russians disturbs 46% (including 11% strongly) of Estonians. In comparison, according to the 1996-data 66% (including 13% “very disturbed” and 25% “moderately disturbed”) of Estonians were disturbed by non-Estonians’ different behaviour and thinking. We can to some extent concede that over the years Estonians’ cultural tolerance has slightly increased (about 20%).


Three quarters of Estonians are still disturbed by the deficiency of the Estonian-language competence among Russians (including 35% strongly disturbed if they have to communicate with a person not speaking Estonian). In 1996 there were even more people disturbed (81%, including 33% “very” disturbed and 28% “moderately” disturbed). We can admit that over seven years the general tolerance to the Estonian-language competence has grown by about 6% whereas the share of strongly disturbed has remained the same. 80% of Estonians considers dangerous and 48% “definitely” dangerous the establishment of two official languages as wished by non-Estonians. Thus, less than half of the Estonians have a very rigid attitude towards the use of the Estonian language, the rest are less disturbed by the use of the Russian language and are not sure of its dangerousness to the Estonian language.

71% (including 34% who “definitely” see the danger) of Estonians considers the living of non-Estonians in Estonia as a threat to the survival of the Estonian nation. This attitude has not changed over the years: in 1996 the large number of non-Estonians in Estonia disturbed 72% of Estonians (including 27% “very disturbed” and 24% “moderately disturbed”). Non-Estonians are considered less dangerous for the development of the state of Estonia – 51% of Estonians sees this threat (including 18% who considers a large number of non-Estonians “very dangerous” for the state). We underline that this is an attitude towards the large quantity of non-Estonians, not intolerance against people of other nationality.

Cultural and linguistic disturbance and feeling of being ethnically threatened are, however, relatively stable attitudes, confirming Estonians’ vision of integration taking place in purely Estonian cultural space and through the Estonian language. These attitudes do not let other aspects (economic, social, etc.) of integration emerge and achieve a trade-off with non-Estonians in understanding integration.

In order to measure Estonians’ IIA a new index variable was compiled, showing how many times the respondent gave the answers listed in Table 1.1 to six questions asked. The value of the index varied from 0 to 6 whereas the lower value indicates a weaker IIA, the higher value a stronger IIA. This indicator-based distribution dynamics of Estonians surveyed in 2002 is as follows (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1. The distribution of Estonians and non-Estonians on the scale of indices of integration-inhibiting attitudes (IIA)



The index dynamics manifests that among Estonians there are both people with weak IIA (26%) and with very strong IIA (the index value 5 or 6 points – 13%). The average IIA index for Estonians is 2.75 points. The IIA-index correlation with underlying responses as a basis for the index is high (see Table 1.1). Consequently the index may express a dimension common to all of them.

Hereinafter we try to identify factors, which weaker or stronger IIA of Estonians could depend upon (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.2. The link of the IIA index of Estonians with other factors

Integration-inhibiting attitude (average = 2.75)	Weak = 0	Strong = 6
Inter-ethnic conflicts are inevitable	Disagree 2,12*	Agree 3,10*
“Ethnic Estonia” as a preference	Ranks 2-6 - 2,01*	Ranks1 - 2,96*
Nations with different culture enrich society	Agree 2,50*	Disagree 3,30*
Should we teach Russian literature and culture in Estonian schools	Yes, rather yes 2,54*	Not necessary 3,46*
Index of political tolerance	High r = 0,24*	Low
Index of perception of threat arising from Russia	Low r = 0,20*	High
Inflow of labour from Russia should be	Encouraged 2,43*	Discouraged 3,12*
Residence	Elsewhere in Estonia 2,61*	in Tallinn 3,52*
Employed in transport, communication, commerce, police and rescue service	No 2,62*	Yes 3,52*
Non-Estonians among colleagues	Over a quarter 2,60*	Less/no 2,91*
Russian TV channels	Watch 2,58*	Do not watch 2,84*
Employed as a service provider, midlevel specialist or specialist with subordinates	Yes 2,64*	No 3,17*


*Mean difference is significant at the level $p < .05$

As revealed in previous studies, Estonians’ attitudes in the field of national relations do not depend on demographic indicators: the average of the IIA index does not differ between men and women, people with different level of education, age. Also the indicators characterising economic situation and subsistence are not related to IIA in case of Estonians (there is no link between income per member of family, evaluation of family’s subsistence and index of unsatisfied needs – see Table 1.1 in Appendix).

Among objective variables IIA is subject to residence – the average IIA for Estonians living in Tallinn is higher (3.52) than for Estonians living elsewhere in Estonia (2.61). The difference between averages is statistically significant. Consequently, among Estonians living in Tallinn there are more people with integration-inhibiting attitudes than elsewhere in Estonia (see Figure 1.2).

Estonians’ IIA is also related to work and work-related position (see Table 1.2). Employment in transport, communication, commerce, police or rescue service and the job of service-provider, mid-level specialist or specialist with subordinates forecasts a stronger IIA than other fields of work or jobs. These are fields and jobs in which the Estonian is more likely to meet with negative traits of non-Estonians (be they clients or colleagues/subordinates). In the category of colleagues we see that Estonians’ IIA is weaker if they have more non-Estonian colleagues.


Figure 1.2. Distribution of the IIA index of Estonians and non-Estonians by residence



Estonians' IIA is related to their contacts and attitude towards Russia. Those who watch Russian TV broadcasts have the IIA slightly weaker than non-viewers.

The index reflecting the threat arising from Russia (see Table 1.2 in Appendix) is in positive correlation with IIA index ($r = .20$), i.e. the higher the threat some Estonians anticipate from Russia, the stronger their IIA index. Figure 1.3 displays that although Estonians perceive the Russia-emanated threat bigger, a large part of non-Estonians does not deny a potential threat of Russia to Estonia either. A stronger IIA is also linked to Estonians' wish to restrict the inflow of fresh labour from Russia – being disturbed by a large resident non-Estonian population already, they are also against an additional influx from Russia.

Figure 1.3. The perception of Russia-emanated threat by Estonians and non-Estonians




The attitude towards other nations' culture is also related to Estonians' IIA index. Those who think that nations with different culture enrich the society have a weaker IIA compared to the Estonians who disagree with the statement. Estonians are also split in their attitudes towards teaching Russian literature and culture in Estonian schools. Those 21% of Estonians who think that this is not necessary have a significantly stronger IIA than the 71% who consider teaching Russian literature and culture necessary.

Estonians who consider inter-ethnic conflicts in a multinational society inevitable (and there is more than 60% of them) have a stronger IIA than those who do not consider the conflicts inevitable (34% of Estonians).

Also the index of political tolerance (see Table 1.3 in Appendix, $r = .24$) is in correlation with the IIA, measuring Estonians' attitude to the employment of non-Estonians in state governance and state agencies. The more restrictions they wish to set here, the stronger their IIA. Estonians' attitudes to political tolerance are clearly polarized (see Figure 1.4), while 32% of Estonians do not want to limit the share of non-Estonians in political governance below 10%, 26% have preferred maximum restrictions.

Figure 1.4. Distribution of Estonians' political tolerance/intolerance index



2. Integration-inhibiting attitudes in non-Estonians' minds

The attitude towards the use of the Estonian language is also one of non-Estonians' IIA components, being quite controversial to Estonians' attitude (see Table 1.3). 56% of non-Estonians are of the opinion that two state languages in Estonia would "definitely" not threaten the survival of the Estonian language. About half (49%) of non-Estonians (and only 4% of Estonians) "fully" support the amendment of the Election Act to abolish the language requirement for candidates to the Riigikogu and local governments. *The other* IIA component is about the attitude towards Estonia's integration and citizenship policy. 58% of non-Estonians consider the current integration in Estonian society "fully" or "rather" unsuccessful, 71% considers citizenship policy in Estonia too stringent, harassing human rights (merely 6% of Estonians shares this opinion).

Table 1.3. Answers to questions counted to compile the index of non-Estonians' integration-related attitudes

Answers to questions	% of respondents giving this answer	Correlation with index
Integration in Estonian society has been "fully" or "rather" unsuccessful	58	0,55
Estonian citizenship policy is too stringent, harassing human rights	71	0,60
Estonia entered the Soviet Union in 1940 "fully" or "rather" voluntarily	44	0,55
Comparison by V.Putin of the situation of Estonian Russians to Albanians' situation in Macedonia was "fully" or "generally" correct	40	0,64
Supports "fully" the amendment of the Election Act in Estonia to abolish candidate's language requirements	49	0,53
Two official languages would "definitely" not threaten the survival of the Estonian language	56	0,52

The third IIA component is associated with non-Estonians' attitude to the state of Estonia and its historic development. 44% of non-Estonians are of the opinion that Estonia joined the Soviet Union in 1940 "fully" or "rather" voluntarily, 40% considers that the comparison of Russians' situation in Estonia to that of Albanians in Macedonia by V.Putin is "fully" or "rather" correct.

Reasons why a large part of non-Estonians expresses attitudes, which can be treated as inhibiting integration, vary. It could be both a protest against the citizenship policy and language requirements (they cannot or will not meet) or a psychological protection against the pressure to be integrated pursuant to the Estonian model. Definitely also ignorance and little clarification of facts and Estonian views over the Russian-language media play a role here.

Figure 1.1 displays the outcome of counting six response options, i.e. the distribution of the index of non-Estonians' IIA. Judging by the index, 19% of non-Estonians comprise a group with a higher IIA and 27% with a lower IIA. The index shows that the average non-Estonians' IIA is 3.17. Hereby we should admit that the indices of Estonians' and non-Estonians' IIAs should not be compared as they are compiled of different components and it is also possible to compile different indices, which could yield different results.

As seen in Table 1.3 non-Estonians' IIA index is also in high correlation with its components and is likely to measure something in common.

Non-Estonians' IIA index is linked to certain demographic indicators (see Table 1.4). There is a correlation with age ($r = .12$) – the younger have slightly weaker IIA than the older. Non-Estonians with higher or specialised secondary education have IIA on the average stronger (the value of the index is higher – 3.52) than those with basic and general secondary education (2.87). Two different reasons can explain the stronger IIA of the group with more education. The highest level of unsatisfied needs (see index in Table 1.1 in Appendix) characterises non-Estonians with specialised secondary education (compared to other groups of education) and may express itself in a stronger IIA. Tangible needs of non-Estonians with higher education may be better satisfied but they are often dissatisfied with their position in the Estonian society and more critical and have higher expectations of the national ethnic policy.²

Table 1.4. The link of the IIA index of non-Estonians with other factors

IIA (average 3,17)	Weak = 0	Strong = 6
Index of perceived economic inequality	Low $r = 0,38^*$	High
Residence	Elsewhere in Estonia 2,31*	in Tallinn or Ida-Virumaa 3,52*
“Russian Estonia” as a preference	Ranks 5-6 - 2,50*	Ranks 1-4 - 3,59*
Dissatisfaction of needs	Low $r = 0,24^*$	High
Political orientation	Rightest $r = 0,22^*$	Leftist
Education	Other general education 2,87*	Higher or special secondary education 3,44*
Citizenship	Estonian 2,74*	Not Estonian 3,54*
Communicates in Estonian	Well/so-so 2,86*	little/cannot 3,43*
Talks in Estonian	Each week 2,83*	Seldom/cannot speak 3,48*
Age	Younger $r = 0,12^*$	Older
Born in Estonia	Yes 2,96*	No 3,34*
Contacts with Estonians	In several fields $r = 0,19^*$	Few

*Mean difference is significant at level $p < .05$;
correlation reliable at level $p < .01$

The income per member of the family is not related to non-Estonians' IIA, although the IIA index is in correlation with the index of unsatisfied needs (see Table 1.1 in Appendix), $r = .24$. There is a certain tendency that the more unsatisfied the needs, the higher the IIA index of the individual is.

By residence we have, on one hand, non-Estonians from Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa with a stronger IIA and, on the other hand, from other regions of Estonia with a weaker IIA (see also Figure 1.2). As could be assumed, non-Estonian Estonian citizens have the weakest IIA, followed by stateless persons and Russian citizens have the strongest IIA (see Figure 1.5). Individuals with strong IIA (the value of the index 5 or 6) constitute 17% of Estonian citizens, 29% of stateless persons and 45% of Russian citizens. The lack of Estonian citizenship is both the reason (attitudes prevent from meeting citizenship requirements) and consequence (favours deepening of such attitudes) of the stronger IIA.

The IIA of non-Estonians born in Estonia is weaker than of those born outside.

Contacts with Estonians (see Table 1.4 in Appendix), opportunities to speak Estonian and the ability to communicate in Estonian have also a certain impact on the evolution of a weaker IIA.

² Kruusvall, J. (1997). *Rahvusprobleemid rahva pilgu läbi 1996*. – Järve, P. (ed). *Vene noored Eestis: sotsioloogiline mosaiik*. University of Tartu, Avita, Tallinn, 149.

The index of political orientation (see Table L1.5 in Appendix) is in correlation ($r = .22$) with non-Estonians IIA index – political rightism is associated with weaker and leftism with stronger IIA.

Figure 1.5 Non-Estonians' IIA by citizenship






Figure 1.6 Perception of ethnic inequality by citizenship



Non-Estonians perceive national inequality in Estonia higher than Estonians (see Figure 1.6). Russian citizens and stateless persons perceive inequality more, non-Estonian Estonian citizens slightly less.

Also higher political leftism (see Figure 1.7), linked to IIA ($r = .37$) is characteristic of Russian citizens. Stateless persons have rather prevailing unsatisfied needs (linked to IIA $r = .33$). Estonians' leftism and unsatisfied needs remain below that of non-Estonians.

Figure 1.7 Dependence on citizenship of unsatisfied needs and leftist political orientation



3. Preconception of further development of ethnic relations in Estonia

Deeper integration in the society is expected to become apparent in preferences of different forms of ethnic relations. Already three times since 1994 respondents have had to rank six models of provided ethnic relations (see Table 1.7 in Appendix). The described models are: “Ethnic Estonia” – meaning assimilating, “Multinational Estonia” – integrative, “Russian Estonia” – “Soviet” with Russian accent, “Divided Estonia” - separatist, “New Estonia” – American melting pot and “Westernised Estonia” – European development. We could argue how applicable the wording of the options is in the modern societal context but for the sake of comparison it was not possible to change the wording. The Table (see Table 1.8 in Appendix) provides comparison of the 1994 and 2002 results of the evaluation of different types of ethnic relations (figures indicate the percentage of respondents ranking the type as the first, second, third, etc.).


Already a superficial glance at the data in the table shows that preferences have not significantly changed over the last eight years. Estonians still prefer “Ethnic Estonia” and rank the second/third integrative “Multinational Estonia” or “Westernised Estonia” associated with new immigration. There is a slight decline in the preference of the two former options whereas the latter has somewhat increased. Estonians still prefer separatist “Divided Estonia” to “Russian Estonia” that ranks last by 60% of the respondents. Figure 1.8 displays this well presenting average preferences of different types of ethnic relations based on three surveys.

The first preference of non-Estonians is integrative “Multinational Estonia” (the support to this option has increased by more than 10%), the second is increasingly Estonian-Russian mixed culture born in “New Estonia” and also Estonia as a nation state.

All in all preferences favour integrative development, this is the first preference for Estonians and the second for non-Estonians (“Westernised Estonia” can also be considered integrative, although *esprit de corps* between Estonians and non-Estonians is born from the so-called external factors – new immigration).

However, preferences have remained unchanged for years indicating, on one hand that preconditions for integrative development, existing in people’s minds have not been used up. On the other hand, the actual integration process has not been able to change attitudes rooted in people’s minds (e.g. preference of nation state by Estonians).

Figure 1.8 Average preference of development options of ethnic relations



As seen above, about 80% of Estonians considered “Ethnic Estonia” and 2/3 of non-Estonians “Multinational Estonia” as the best option for Estonia. Studying both the first and the second preference, we draw a more diversified typology of orientations. Among Estonians we see four types (see Table 1.5), three of which are connected to preferring “Ethnic Estonia” as a first or second preference. However, combined with another orientation we get a slightly differently tinted ethnic option.

Table 1.5 Types of ethnic relations preferred by Estonians’ (based on the first and second preference)

Types of ethnic relations	1994	%	1997	%	2002	%
1. Ethnic - multinational	53		49		47	
2. Ethnic - Westernised	26		29		33	
3. Ethnic – Other options	16		13		11	
4. Other options	5		9		9	
Number of respondents	664	100%	674	100%	660	100%

More than half of Estonians (47%) visualises also an integrative development, characterised by “Multinational Estonia”, alongside building of a nation state. A third of Estonians sets “Westernised Estonia” next to the ethnic option characterised by cultural globalisation, the English language and Afro-Asian immigration. 11% of Estonians preferring “Ethnic Estonia” associate it with other types of ethnic relations (primarily “New Estonia” or “Divided Estonia”) and 9% do not have “Ethnic Estonia” as two first preferences. Over the years the proportions of the types have remained relatively stable whereas ethnic-multinational orientation has slightly declined and ethnic-westernised increased.

Table 1.6 provides comparison of types preferred by Estonians.

Tallinn is more frequently (30%) the place of residence for Estonians who do not have “Ethnic Estonia” as one of the two preferences. Those Estonians who prefer nation state in combination with other (excluding multinational and westernised) orientations live mostly elsewhere in Estonia (83%) and less in Tallinn.

Estonians in North-East Estonia have relatively more frequently preferred the first and fourth, i.e. ethnic-multinational or other “non-ethnic” combinations.

Table 1.6 Types of ethnic relations preferred by Estonians as linked to place of residence, age and non-Estonian acquaintances

	Ethnic-multi-national %	Ethnic-westernised%	Ethnic-others %	Other options%	Total %
Tallinn	24	21	12	30	22
North-East - Estonia	16	7	5	12	12
Other Estonia	60	72	83	58	66
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
Respondents	311	218	73	60	662
Average age in years	44	41	41	38	42
Non-Estonians among friends, average (1-majority, 4-none)	3,4	3,5	3,6	3,2	3,4

On the average the oldest people carry ethnic-integrative orientation, the youngest non-ethnic orientations. The latter has the largest number of contacts with non-Estonians (both among acquaintances, as well as relatives and colleagues). There are less contacts with non-Estonians in case of the third orientation, "ethnic" combined with other options.

These types are not linked with gender, education, income and knowledge of Russian. We can conclude that visions of ethnic relations suitable for Estonia are largely associated with attitudes whereas Estonians' attitudes are not much connected with socio-demographic background variables.

In the case of **non-Estonians** the first and second preference allow to distinguish four major orientation types (see Table 1.7).

Most frequently (1/3 of non-Estonians) "Multinational Estonia" is linked with "New Estonia", characterised by a new population of Estonian-Russian mixed culture. A third of non-Estonians considers nation state as a good option besides integrative ethnic relations. Equally 13% support alongside "Multinational Estonia" either "Russian Estonia" or "Westernised Estonia". 20% of non-Estonians have "others" as two preferred options whereas only 3% represent integrative development.

Table 1.7 Types of ethnic relations preferred by non-Estonians (based on the first and second preference)

Types of ethnic relations	1994	%	1997	%	2002	%
1. Multinational -New (mixed culture)	32		35		33	
2. Multinational - (Estonian) ethnic	32		24		22	
3. Multinational -Russian	8		8		13	
4. Multinational -Westernised	5		5		13	
5. Multinational - Other options	3		4		3	
6. Other options	20		24		17	
Number of respondents	364	100%	485	100%	342	100%

The structure of non-Estonians' orientations (based on two preferences) studied has remained relatively stable during eight years. Preference of "Ethnic Estonia" accompanying "Multinational Estonia" has shrank whereas the share of "Russian" and "Westernised" co-orientation has gone up.

Studying non-Estonians' preferences by citizenship (see Table 1.8), we see that citizenship is more represented in the case of the second and fourth types (Ethnic and Westernised orientation), stateless persons are less ethnically oriented, Russian citizens prefer more often Russian and less Westernised orientation in ethnic relations.

Table 1.8 Types of ethnic relations preferred by non-Estonians by citizenship, per cent

Citizenship	Multi-national – new %	Multi-national – ethnic %	Multi-national – Russian %	Multi-national – Westernised %	Multi-national - other options %	Other %	Total %
Non-Estonian, holding Estonian citizenship	42	63	34	59	27	42	47
Stateless person	35	20	36	30	64	36	32
Russian citizen	23	17	30	11	9	23	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total respondents	111	71	44	44	11	53	334

By regions there are less non-Estonians in favour of (Estonian) nation state in Tallinn and more elsewhere in Estonia (see Table 1.9). However, in other regions of Estonia “Russian Estonia” is preferred less. There are more non-Estonians from Ida-Virumaa (40%) among those not preferring multinational Estonia (as the first or second choice).

Table 1.9 Types of ethnic relations preferred by non-Estonians by regions

Region	Multinational – new %	Multinational – ethnic %	Multinational – Russian %	Multinational – Westernised %	Other %	Total %
Tallinn	45	32	49	43	38	43
Ida-Virumaa	25	31	33	24	40	29
Other regions	30	37	18	33	22	28
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100

Non-Estonians who prefer alongside multinational Estonia “Russian Estonia” but also favour ethnic Estonia are on the average older (see Table 1.10). Thus, we see that slightly older people are more nation-oriented. Non-Estonians of “Western” orientation have income slightly above average. Among non-Estonians preferring Estonian nation state there are 72% women (who more often have friends/acquaintances among Estonians) and also people mastering the Estonian language better. Among non-Estonians who do not prefer integrative development of ethnic relations (“Others”) 61% are men and people mastering the Estonian language the worst.

Table 1.10 Types of ethnic relations preferred by non-Estonians by age, income, gender and language proficiency


Citizenship	Multi-national - new	Multi-national - ethnic	Multi-national - Russian	Multi-national – Westernised	Multi-national - other options	Other	Total
Average age in years	41	45	49	40	40	42	43
Income per member of family (average score)	3,6	3,7	4,1	4,5	5,2	4,1	3,9
Share of men among respondents %	47	28	50	48	36	61	45
Estonian communication skills, average score (1-good, 4-none)	2,5	2,4	2,8	2,6	2,6	3,0	2,6

In the above three surveys the respondents were also asked to point out the **most likely** type of ethnic relations to realise in future. According to Figure 1.9 the number of Estonians believing in “Ethnic Estonia” has significantly dropped during the last five years (however, it is still the most frequent response given in 2002 – 38%) whereas the share of “Westernised Estonia” has increased (2002 – 33%). The support to “Multinational Estonia” has also slightly dropped over the years (2002 – 20%).

Already in 1994-1997 non-Estonians shredded a significant number of people who believed that “Ethnic Estonia” could be realised whereas the share of people forecasting integrative “Multinational Estonia” has grown. In 2002 the percentages were 20 and 42, respectively. During the last five years the number of non-Estonians believing in the realisation of “New Estonia” has shrank and that of believing in “Westernised Estonia” gone up (13% and 20%, respectively, in 2002).

However, prognosis of the most likely option of ethnic relations has undergone larger changes than preferences. This confirms once more that changes in the mind are slower than changes in real life (and forecasting is largely based on reality).

Figure 1.9 Which development option of ethnic relations is most likely



In conclusion, let us see how types preferring different ethnic relations forecast the development of ethnic relations. Preferences are generally reflected also in expectations. In the case of Estonians (see Table 1.11) the “Ethnic-Multinational” type forecasts more often multinational but also ethnic Estonia, the “Ethnic-Westernised” type westernised development (53%) and the “Ethnic-Others” combination “Ethnic Estonia” (54%).

Table 1.11 Estonians’ preferences of ethnic relations vis-à-vis likely realisation, per cent

Most likely option	Ethnic-multinational	Ethnic-westernised	Ethnic-others	Other options	Total
Ethnic Estonia	43	35	54	5	38
Multinational Estonia	31	7	8	27	20
New Estonia	3	3	4	18	5
Westernised Estonia	20	53	24	40	33

Out of non-Estonians’ preference types “Multinational-Russian” forecasts frequently the multinational option, as “Russian Estonia” is probably unlikely (Table 1.12). The “Multinational-Westernised” type is, as anticipated, noted its preferences, just like the “Multinational-Ethnic” type. It is interesting to note that the “Other-options” type has forecasts more often “Westernised Estonia” (30%).

Table 1.12 Non-Estonians' preferences of ethnic relations vis-à-vis likely realisation, per cent

Most likely option	Multinational -new	Multinational - ethnic	Multinational -Russian	Multinational – Wester-nised	Other options	Other
Ethnic Estonia	14	37	11	7	26	20
Multinational Estonia	47	46	56	51	11	42
New Estonia	17	5	20	9	16	13
Westernised Estonia	18	12	13	31	30	20

However, we can say that although forecasts are more based on real developments of the society than preferences, the latter nevertheless influences forecasts quite strongly.

4. Connections of integration-inhibiting attitudes with preferred type of ethnic relations

Estonians' IIA index has the strongest link to the preference of "Ethnic Estonia" ($r = .25$), non-Estonians' IIA to the preference of "Russian Estonia" ($r = .32$). The stronger the national orientation, the stronger the IIA – this applies both to Estonians and non-Estonians (see also Tables 1.2 and 1.4).

Mean values of IIA indices of the types of ethnic relations preferred by Estonians (based on the first and second preference) were as follows:

Table 1.13 The mean IIA of Estonians preferring different types of ethnic relations

Estonians' orientation to types of national relations	Mean value of IIA
1. Ethnic-multinational	2,64**
2. Ethnic-westernised	3,15**
3. Ethnic- others	2,85*
4. Other options	1,67***

*The number of asterisks shows the significant difference ($p < 0,05$) of this type from other types

Estonians who apart from supporting "Ethnic Estonia" would also prefer the development of "Westernised Estonia" have the strongest IIA and those whose first preference is not "Ethnic Estonia" (4) have the weakest. Persons who prefer besides "Ethnic Estonia" "Multinational Estonia" (1) have the IIA relatively weaker as well.

IIA values of the types of non-Estonians are in Table 1.14. Both the preference of "Russian" and "New" Estonia together with "Multinational Estonia" are connected to a stronger IIA. Preference of "Ethnic Estonia" together with "Multinational Estonia" (2) leads to a weaker IIA and so does the type of other options, which does not include "Multinational Estonia" as a preference (6).

Table 1.14 The mean IIA of non-Estonians preferring different types of ethnic relations

Estonians' orientation to types of national relations	Mean value of IIA
1. Multinational -New (mixed culture)	3,72***
2. Multinational - (Estonian) ethnic	2,52**
3. Multinational -Russian	3,76***
4. Multinational -Westernised	2,96**
5. Other options	2,71**

*The number of asterisks shows the significant difference ($p < 0,05$) of this type from other types

In conclusion we can say that while in the case of Estonians ethnic (Estonian) orientation was more closely related to stronger IIA, in the case of non-Estonians this reveals weaker IIA.

This finds confirmation also in the connection of the choice of the most likely type of ethnic relations to IIA index (see Table 1.15). The likelihood of "Ethnic Estonia" indicates the strongest IIA in the case of Estonians and the weakest IIA in the case of non-Estonians.

Table 1.15 The mean value of IIA index of Estonians preferring the likelihood of different development options of ethnic relations

Most likely option in ethnic relations	Mean IIA of Estonians	Mean IIA of non-Estonians
Ethnic Estonia	2,96**	2,61**
Multinational Estonia	2,42*	3,43*
Westernised Estonia	2,65*	3,09
New Estonia	2,92	3,22*

*The number of asterisks shows the significant difference ($p < 0,05$) of this type from other types

5. Linear model of IIA dependence

Using a linear regression method, we compile an IIA dependency model comprised of above factors both for Estonians and non-Estonians. The IIA index as a dependent variable is a counting result; independent variables used are also counting results or dichotomous estimated variables. However, they should correspond to the requirements of regression analysis. The regression model assigns to each significant independent variable a weight – a β -coefficient, with which it affects the dependent variable. “Adjusted R square” is characteristic of the model, showing to what extent the model can explain the variability of the dependent variable. Here the regression analysis method Enter has been used.

Results of the IIA regression analysis for Estonians are in Table 1.16 and for non-Estonians in Table 1,17.

Table 1.16 Linear dependence of Estonians’ IIA on other factors (Regression analysis method Enter, Adjusted R square = .30)

IIA	Weak	Strong	Beta coefficient
Inter-ethnic conflicts are inevitable	Disagree	Agree	0,19*
Nations with different culture enrich society	Agree	Disagree	0,16*
Should we teach Russian literature and culture in Estonian schools	Yes, rather yes	No need	0,16*
“Ethnic Estonia” as a preference	Ranks 2-6	Ranks 1	0,15*
Index of political tolerance	High	Low	0,15*
Residence	Elsewhere In Estonia	in Tallinn	0,14*
Index of perception of threat arising from Russia	Low	High	0,13*
Inflow of labour from Russia should be	Encouraged	Discouraged	0,12*
Employed in transport, communication, commerce, police and rescue service	No	Yes	0,11*
Non-Estonians among fellow-workers	More than a Quarter	Less/No	0,07*
Russian TV channels	Watches	Does not watch	0,04
Employed as a service provider, midlevel specialist or specialist with subordinates	No	Yes	0,05

*beta coefficient reliable at the level $p < 0,05$

The higher IIA of Estonians is characterised by a higher preparedness for ethnic conflicts, little cultural and political tolerance, ethnic orientation in ethnic relations’ preference and higher perception of threat arising from Russia as well as adverse attitude towards immigration from Russia. Objective variables include residence in Tallinn and employment in the field of transport, communication, commerce, and police and rescue service.

Table 1. 17. Linear dependence of non-Estonians' IIA on other factors (Regression analysis method Enter, Adjusted R square = .33)

IIA	Weak	Strong	Beta coefficient
Perception of national equality index	Low	High	0,25*
Residence	Elsewhere In Estonia	in Tallinn or Ida-Virumaa	0,21*
"Russian Estonia" as a preference	Ranks 5-6	Ranks 1-4	0,16*
Dissatisfaction of needs	Low	High	0,16*
Political orientation	Rightist	Leftist	0,15*
Education	Other general education	Higher or secondary special	0,16*
Citizenship	Estonian	Not Estonian	0,14*
Communicates in Estonian	Well/so-so	little/cannot	0,09
Talks in Estonian	Each week	Less frequently/ Does not speak	0,04
Age	Younger	Older	0,05
Born in Estonia	Yes	No	0,02
Contacts with Estonians	In several Spheres	Few	0,03

*beta coefficient reliable at the level $p < 0,05$

Higher perception of ethnic inequality, low satisfaction of needs and leftist political orientation forecast a stronger IIA in the case of non-Estonians.

Carriers of a stronger IIA often prefer the Russian-Soviet model as a preferred type of ethnic relations and rather live in a monolingual Russian environment (in Tallinn or Ida-Virumaa).

Knowledge of Estonian, frequency in the use of Estonian and contacts with Estonians are not significant factors influencing non-Estonian's IIA whereas specialised education and Estonian citizenship are.

6. Summary and conclusions

Integration-inhibiting attitudes express, on one hand, collective (distinguished by an ethnic or linguistic variable), group (by a socio-economic interest) and individual interests of people belonging to different ethnic groups. On the other hand, the IIA expresses individual knowledge and experience as well as social representation, i.e. collective preconceptions and attitudes. Therefore IIAs are relatively constant and appear in multiple respondents.

IIAs comprise a system; they are interrelated and subject to other attitudes. However, there are also objective factors, which facilitate persistence of such attitudes: more in the case of non-Estonians, less in the case of Estonians. On one hand, IIA affects the nature of the integration process; on the other hand it is an output. While Estonians' IIAs originate largely from the days of "singing revolution" and were empowered through the ideology of 1990s, non-Estonians assess events of recent past. Out of factors, which influence IIA, Estonians single out indicators of cultural and political tolerance, non-Estonians dissatisfaction of needs and perception of inequality. Citizenship (holding/not holding of Estonian citizenship) is a stronger factor in non-Estonians' IIA model than Estonian-language competence or communication in Estonian. This confirms the conclusion made already in previous studies that citizenship as political capital mediates real capitalisation of integration and integration awareness in the case of non-Estonians.³

IIAs are more strongly associated with preferring domination of own culture in ethnic relations (preference of "Ethnic Estonia" in the case of Estonians and "Russian-Soviet Estonia" in the case of non-Estonians). While nothing much has changed over the years in the preferred types of ethnic relations for Estonians and non-Estonians, changes can be seen in forecasting the most likely development option, namely towards increasing choice of "Westernised Estonia". This can be taken as a prointegrative attitude (see Table 1.6 in Appendix). In the case of Estonians the number of respondents forecasting "Multinational Estonia" and "Westernised Estonia" totals above the number of respondents forecasting "Ethnic Estonia". The above combination prevails also in non-Estonians' forecasts. In conclusion, the population of Estonia is more integration-favoured than in their attitudes.

The strong IIA primarily hinders understanding of the interests of other ethnic groups and finding trade-offs in integration policy, to a lesser extent such attitudes inhibit individual contacts with peoples of other nationalities (as seen above, IIA is weakly linked to contacts between Estonians and non-Estonians).

Shrinking average IIA strength and number of strong IIA carriers can be treated as a positive integration outcome but also as a necessary prerequisite for further successful integration. Even the slightest shifts in softening rigid attitudes indicate that integration is also deepening and cohesion is spreading in inter-group relations as well. Reduction of integration-inhibiting attitudes is especially important in socialising the younger generation as collective preconceptions are frequently reproduced through upbringing and education. As seen above IIA is not really dependent on age – there are persons with a high IIA both among the old and the young.

General ideological orientation towards tolerance in ethnic relations, a call for awareness and understanding of each other's positions and problems would help to reduce integration-inhibiting attitude. In altering collective perceptions mass media plays a significant role, both through attitudes expressed and topics discussed or not discussed.

³ Kruusvall, J.(2002). Social Perception and Individual Resources of the Integration Process. In: M. Lauristin & M. Heidmets (eds.) *The Challenge of the Russian Minority*, Tartu: Tartu University Press.

APPENDIX 1

Table 1.1. Answers counted to comprise the index of unsatisfied needs

Your family does not have enough money to:	Estonians %	Non-Estonians %
Buy more-or-less proper food	14	14
Subscribe newspapers	40	51
Buy clothes	37	52
Recover health	29	44
Go in for sports	36	42
Pay for housing	12	29
Support and help close relatives	49	64
Furnish or renovate the apartment	55	72
Buy or replace durable goods	52	68
Entertainment and hobbies	45	53
Buy a car	62	67
Self-improvement	43	49
Travel	68	72
Provide good education for children	28	38
Provide developing activities for children	23	35
Purchase new housing	55	64
Purchase other real estate	58	64

Table 1.2. Answers counted to comprise the index of perception of threat arising from Russia

Russia is a source of “large” or “certain” threat to ...	Estonians
Estonia’s independence	50
Estonia’s economic development	68
Estonia’s accession to the European Union	45
Estonia’s joining of NATO	58
Non-Estonians’ integration into Estonian society	45
Non-Estonians’ image and reliability in the eyes of Estonians	40

Table 1.3. Answers counted to comprise the political tolerance index

Future state agencies should have up to 10% of non-Estonians or not at all	Estonians %
In the <i>Riigikogu</i> (Estonian Parliament)	60
In the Government	64
In local governments	56
In police	48
In defence forces	47
As CEOs in state-owned enterprises	53

Table 1.4. Answers counted to comprise the index of

Do not have non-Estonians/Estonians ...	Estonians %	Non-Estonians %
...among relatives	70	79
...among friends, close acquaintances	36	54
...among colleagues and fellow students	48	64
...among neighbours	38	57
...among business and co-operation partners	73	77

Table 1.5. Answers counted to comprise the index of political orientation

Answers counted to comprise the index of political orientation	% of Estonians giving this response	% of non-Estonians giving this response
State should "definitely" secure a job for each member of the society able to work	38	59
University education should "definitely" be free of charge	50	66
State should "definitely" secure adequate pension for the old	54	66
Persons with higher income should pay more taxes	67	71
State or local governments should fully own ...		
Large enterprises	38	55
Mineral resources	85	91
Land	26	52
Power plants	82	88
Railway	79	89
Ports	71	83
Schools	61	71
Hospitals	60	73
Large apartment houses	21	40

Table 1.6. Answers counted to comprise the index of ethnic inequality

In case of similar prerequisites non-Estonians have no ("mostly" + "more frequently") equal opportunities to achieve the following objectives	Non-Estonians %
Get a professional job	64
Get a job in a state agency	75
Get a management job	77
Achieve success in business	36
Achieve success in politics	76
Get higher education	39
Get a higher salary for the same job	73
Get social benefits	28

Appendix 1.7 Would you tell us what should Estonia as a state look like by mid-century. Rank the following options.

- A. Ethnic Estonia:** Estonia is an independent nation state; people of other nationalities have either learned the Estonian language and culture or returned to their homeland. There are no ethnic problems, new immigrants are obliged to acquire the Estonian language and culture and become Estonians.
- B. Multinational Estonia:** Estonia is an independent state with a large share of non-Estonians. Most people speak both Estonian and Russian. Estonians and non-Estonians live and work side by side, both develop ethnic culture and are tolerant towards each other.
- C. Russian Estonia:** Estonia is a CIS member state with a prevailing non-Estonian population. Russian is the prevailing language of communication whereas each ethnic group can develop its culture and be educated in its mother tongue. Exists formal and state-controlled peoples' friendship.
- D. Divided Estonia:** Estonian society is split into two by ethnicity, exist Estonian and non-Estonian communities opposing each other – there are “Estonian” and “Russian” housing districts, companies, schools, houses of culture in cities. Narva region has become autonomous. Relations are strained; conflicts rise in governing the entire state as well as local administrative units (cities, municipalities).
- E. New Estonia:** new mixed Estonian-Russian culture has developed in Estonia, containing components of both cultures. Estonians speak Russian-like Estonian, non-Estonians Russian mixed with Estonian loan words. There are many mixed marriages, mixed companies, signs of new culture there. People feel themselves increasingly as one nation.
- F. Westernised Estonia:** Estonia is an independent EU Member State with prevailing “western” Euro-American culture. The English language has become dominant in economy and culture. The accession to the European Union and opening of the borders brings numerous immigrants to Estonia. Estonians and local non-Estonians share cohesion as representatives of the “white” race, opposing themselves to “coloured” immigrants.

ESTONIANS AND NON-ESTONIANS: A TYPOLOGY OF TOLERANCE

Iris Pettai

1. TOLERANCE: FROM REJECTION TO SOCIAL COHESION

Changes that have taken place over the last decade in the inter-ethnic relations in Estonia are quite positive. If in the early 1990s non-Estonians were given unveiled hints to leave Estonia, then to date numerous institutions and organisations under the leadership of the state are engaged in merging non-Estonians into Estonian society.

Mutual tolerance between Estonians and non-Estonians has increased rapidly in the past ten years. In 1993 two-thirds of Estonians and three-quarters of non-Estonians had said that inter-ethnic relations were tense. By 2002 conflicts on the grounds of ethnicity had practically abated. In recent years only 3 to 4 per cent of the inhabitants have personally experienced such conflicts. Mutual tolerance has grown - this is demonstrated by the affinity of mentality and lifestyles as was acknowledged by half of non-Estonians and one-fifth of Estonians. Every year adds more Estonian language speakers. 44 per cent of non-Estonians consider their knowledge of Estonian to be adequate in order to get along with life in Estonia (in 1994 - 24%).

However, it would be premature to say that in Estonia tolerance between Estonians and non-Estonians is sufficient for Estonia to become a stable welfare society. According to tolerance theoreticians, for a nation-state like Estonia to ensure stability, it is necessary to achieve mutual recognition between different ethnic groups.¹ Unfortunately, ethnic relations in Estonia have not reached the mutual appreciation phase yet, meaning that isolation persists.

The Estonian and the Russian communities continue to live and act in isolation and have very few contact points. Estonians continue to work at predominantly Estonian companies, non-Estonians at Russian companies. Such multiethnic companies where non-Estonians are represented in the workforce proportionally to their rate in the population and local residents are few. Many non-Estonians are still outside Estonia's information system, failing to comprehend what kind of society they live in and why life is arranged here as it is.

Development of tolerance can be treated as a five-phase process:

- I Rejection, negation**
- II Passive tolerance**
- III Internalised tolerance**
- IV Active tolerance**
- V Social cohesion**

Results of the recent monitoring surveys allow us to say that both Estonians and non-Estonians have in principle passed through the mutual rejection phase of distrust and conflicts. But it is difficult to define which of the tolerance phases Estonians and non-Estonians have reached by 2002 without the help of the tolerance typology analysis. Tolerance thresholds of people vary significantly and thus Estonians and non-Estonians are positioned across the entire tolerance spectrum (Fig.1).

Rejection phase - 19 per cent of Estonians (characteristic type: radical nationalist) and 14 per cent of non-Estonians (characteristic type: exclusionary non-Estonian) are in this phase. Both types have their own reasons to distrust and to distance themselves from other nationalities. Radical nationalists are concerned about and feel responsible for the preservation of the Estonian nation. Exclusionary non-Estonians have not managed (wanted) to accommodate to the Estonian society and Estonians.

Passive tolerance phase - 28 per cent of Estonians (characteristic type: less-tolerant Estonian) and 21 per cent of non-Estonians (characteristic type: less-tolerant non-Estonian) are in this

¹ Walzer, M. (1998). *Sallivus* (Tolerance), Open Estonia Foundation, 47.

phase. The passive tolerance phase is the first step in the evolution of tolerance and in many aspects resembles reciprocal tolerance, but the distance between the ethnic groups is still significant. Relations are limited to sparse unavoidable contacts. Although in their external behaviour less-tolerant Estonians have managed to overcome their negative and indifferent attitude towards non-Estonians, in their mind they have remained distrustful and cautious. Less-tolerant Estonians believe that too much tolerance is dangerous and that Estonians should preserve their dominance.

Less-tolerant non-Estonians have managed to adjust to the demands imposed by the state only formally (superficially): to learn Estonian, to acquire the Estonian citizenship etc. However, they are still rather cautious and distrustful of Estonians and Estonia's progress.

Internalised tolerance phase - 33 per cent of Estonians (characteristic type: pragmatic Estonian) and 19 per cent of non-Estonians (characteristic type: pragmatic non-Estonian) are in this phase. Internalised toleration is a qualitatively new phase, underpinned by mutual understanding and empathy. Pragmatic Estonians are considerably less cautious and distrustful of non-Estonians than the exclusionary and less-tolerant types. They are ready for compromises and concessions in the aliens policy. But as their negative attitudes and fears are yet too strong, their openness to non-Estonians is still inadequate and superficial.

Pragmatic Estonians interact with non-Estonians if it is useful and beneficial for them. Pragmatic non-Estonians live in a better harmony with the Estonian society and Estonians than the exclusionary and less-tolerant types. They are better informed about developments and events in Estonia and do not consciously try to distance themselves from Estonians. This type represents a pragmatic orientation and engages in communication with Estonians only if it is fully beneficial.

Active tolerance phase - 20 per cent of Estonians (characteristic type: emphatic Estonian) and 33 per cent of non-Estonians (characteristic type: emphatic non-Estonian) have reached this phase. The precondition for active toleration is mutual respect and esteem, underpinned by mutual value attachment. For emphatic Estonians attachment of value to non-Estonians means granting of fundamental rights to the latter (economic, social, political), regardless of their citizenship status. Emphatic Estonians have much less disturbing stereotypes and prejudices against other nationalities than other Estonians; they are open to communication and co-operation on an equal footing.

Emphatic non-Estonians have smoothly integrated into the Estonian society and have no barriers in communication with Estonians. Emphatic non-Estonians support Estonia's development priorities.

Social cohesion phase - only non-Estonians have reached this phase. The characteristic type: strongly assimilated non-Estonian - 13 per cent. Many representatives of this type have adopted the Estonian way of thinking and conduct and can thus be regarded practically assimilated with Estonians. This type holds the values and development priorities of the Estonian society in high esteem.

Among non-Estonians tolerance has developed quicker than among Estonians as more than half of non-Estonians have reached the ultimate phases (active tolerance and social cohesion), whereas only one-fifth of Estonians are in the active tolerance phase. The majority of Estonians are positioned either in the passive (less-tolerant Estonians - 28%) or internalised tolerance phases (pragmatic Estonians - 33%). The monitoring of ethnic relations conducted two years ago produced an analogous tolerance typology for Estonia. Thus we can conclude that stable tolerance types have evolved in Estonia and any further changes will be slow to come (See Figure 1).

In the following parts a more comprehensive overview of the Estonians' and non-Estonians' typology will be given.

2. TOLERANCE TYPOLOGY - ESTONIANS

For the description of the tolerance typology I used the following identification criteria:

- **Openness to communication** - readiness to work in a multiethnic workplace, to live in the same town/house with non-Estonians, live in an ethnically mixed family.
- **Empathy with non-Estonians** - willingness to understand non-Estonians' problems, desire to help them.
- **Appreciation of non-Estonians** - treatment of non-Estonians as equals and as people necessary for the country.
- **Apprehension and barriers** - degree of trust and confidence in people from other ethnic groups.
- **Readiness to grant fundamental rights (economic, social, political) to all inhabitants of Estonia.**

Proceeding from these tolerance criteria, the Estonian community can be broadly divided into two major subgroups: tolerant - 53 per cent and exclusionary - 47 per cent. Leading types with clearly distinctive attributes have emerged in both groups. They represent either a tolerant or exclusionary way of thinking and associated behaviour. In addition, there are the so-called transition types whose tolerance or negation is softer and considerably more superficial.

TOLERANT ESTONIANS² Can be divided into two subcategories:

- | | | | |
|----------|----------------------------|---|-------------|
| A | Emphatic Estonians | - | 20 per cent |
| B | Pragmatic Estonians | - | 33 per cent |

Both types:

- Have managed to overcome the rejection barrier in their relations with non-Estonians;
- Are open to communication and collaboration;
- More than half of them have a good knowledge of Russian;
- Compared with exclusionary Estonians, support more strongly involvement of non-Estonians in state administration;
- Compared with exclusionary Estonians, support more strongly the granting of fundamental economic, social and political rights to all people living in Estonia.

Type A. Emphatic Estonian – 20 per cent.

Display a considerably more positive attitude towards the aliens than other types. Characterised by openness and high communication readiness.

Characteristic features.

- Total readiness to work or study together with non-Estonians.
- 2/3 are ready to live in the same town (municipality) with the non-Estonians, only 11 per cent one tenth of type will never concede to it. Half of them will agree to live in an ethnically mixed family, whereas over 14 per cent will never consent to live an ethnically mixed family.
- Compared with other types, 2-3 times more Estonians who are in favour of granting fundamental rights to all inhabitants.
- Compared with less-tolerant types, 2 times more Estonians who support non-Estonians participation in state administration.
- Despite active tolerance, this type will not abandon the Estonian language proficiency requirement for the citizenship applicants: 58per cent are of the opinion that granting of the Estonian citizenship to the aliens without the language examination endangers the survival of the Estonian language;
- One half is afraid that the presence of non-Estonians fosters crime and drug abuse, one-third perceives in them a threat of growing prostitution. Nevertheless, this type's apprehension of

² Corresponding tables in Annex 2.1.

non-Estonians is not as strong as with other types. Only 16 per cent are of the opinion that aliens pose a threat to the development of the State of Estonia, 24 per cent think that non-Estonians are a threat to the survival of the Estonian nation.

Social and demographic profile.

- This type is representative of younger people, more than half of them are under 40.
- Better educational background. Only one-third has basic education. Every sixth representatives has higher education.
- Few pensioners, they comprise only 13 per cent of the type. 50 per cent are employees, 37 per cent - workers, 47 per cent – managers and professionals. All in all, white-collar workers account for 45 per cent.
- 2/3 live in towns, half of them in big cities.
- Average income levels, half of the representatives have enough money for normal life.

Summary.

Emphatic Estonians display active toleration and appreciation of non-Estonians. Their readiness for collaboration is high. The type is open to and tolerant of non-Estonians not only in the readiness to work with or live in the same neighbourhood with other nationalities, but also in the willingness to grant the fundamental rights (economic, social, political) to all those living in Estonia, regardless of their citizenship status. Nevertheless, type A is not an exemplary model of tolerance because of its apprehension of the aliens, although to a considerably lesser degree than in other types. Toleration is based on positive personal experience (working in an ethnically mixed work collective and intensive interaction with non-Estonians). Although some barriers and apprehension remain, positive attitudes outweigh them.

Type B. Pragmatic Estonian - 33%.

This type is practical and deliberate. Ready to interact with non-Estonians if it is profitable and useful. So far this type has had no motivation to be more tolerant and open. People of this type do not like confrontation (don't drive aliens back directly), at the same time see no reason for active tolerance and empathy.

Characteristic features

- Representatives of this type are prepared to work in a multiethnic collective only on favourable conditions: half of them have non-Estonian friends, business or work colleagues; half of them will agree to live in the same town with the other nationalities on favourable conditions, 15 per cent will never concede to it. One-third will agree to live in an ethnically mixed family, one-fourth will never agree to it.
- Demand language proficiency from citizenship applicants much more strictly than emphatic Estonians: 73 per cent think that granting of the Estonian citizenship to the aliens without the Estonian language examination jeopardises the survival of the Estonian language.
- Apprehension of the aliens is stronger than with emphatic Estonians. Half of them associate aliens with the threat of increased incidence of crime, drug abuse and prostitution.
- 28 per cent are willing to grant the fundamental rights to all of Estonia's inhabitants, ranking second after emphatic Estonians in this issue. This type supports more than the less-tolerant types the participation of non-Estonians in state administration.

Social and demographic profile

- The age profile of the type is youngish. 53 per cent are younger than 40, one-fifth are over 50.
- Good educational background. 17 per cent have higher education, 50 per cent - secondary or secondary-vocational education, 28 per cent - basic education.
- High rate of managers and professionals - 47 per cent, whereas 37 per cent are workers.
- By engagement resembles type A: few pensioners, many students, half are employees.
- 60 per cent live in towns, 43 per cent in big cities.

- Above the average income levels. 53 per cent can afford a normal living standard.

Summary

Although this type displays greater tolerance of non-Estonians in comparison with exclusionary Estonians, negative attitudes and apprehension are still so strong in this group that openness to other nationalities is superficial. The latter are treated with caution and any collaboration with them is subject to rational considerations and favourable conditions. In this type the empathy threshold is considerably lower than in type A. Pragmatic Estonians are prepared to interact or live with other nationalities on an equal footing. This type can be defined as a transition type - having overcome the rejection barrier, pragmatic Estonians are currently in no hurry to establish more open and friendly relations with non-Estonians. Tolerance will grow if nourished by positive communication experience.

EXCLUSIONARY ESTONIANS

Can be divided into two subcategories:

C	Less-tolerant Estonians -	28 per cent
D	Radical nationalists -	19 per cent

Both types:

- Perceive non-Estonians as a threat to the survival of the Estonian language and culture.
- Attempt to keep a clear distance from other nationalities, to stay away from them as far as possible.
- Favour a rigorous and strict treatment of non-Estonians in Estonia.
- Support the idea that Estonians should have more rights and possibilities in Estonia than non-Estonians.
- Have a considerably inferior knowledge of Russian in comparison with the tolerant types.

Type C. Less-tolerant Estonian – 28 per cent

This type displays rather negative attitudes towards non-Estonians, but unlike radical nationalists, rejection is not so transparent and unequivocal. While radical nationalists will at no cost agree to work together with the aliens, less-tolerant Estonians might concede to it only if the worse comes to the worst.

Characteristic features

- Little willingness for any contacts with non-Estonians: 37 per cent will never agree to live in the town (municipality) where the majority of the residents are non-Estonians; 55 per cent will concede to it only in the dire extremity. One-third will never agree to live in a family where several family members are non-Estonians, whereas half of them will concede to it only in case of great necessity.
- Consideration that granting of the citizenship without the Estonian language skills is dangerous: 67 per cent are of the opinion that granting of the citizenship to the aliens without the Estonian language examination is a threat to the survival of the Estonian language.
- Apprehension of non-Estonians is strong. 2/3 are afraid that the presence of non-Estonians is conducive to the increased incidence of crime, drug abuse and prostitution.
- Only 15 per cent of the representatives in this type are willing to grant the fundamental rights to all inhabitants (3 times less than in type A and twice less than in type B).
- 48 per cent think that there should be no non-Estonians in the government, one-fourth - in the Riigikogu and one-third - not even in local governments.

Social and demographic profile

- The age profile of this type is youngish, 39 per cent are in the under 29 and 25 per cent in the 30-49 age group. All in all, 2/3 are aged under 49.
- Low educational level, 34 per cent have basic education, only 11 per cent have higher education.

- The ratio of white-collar employees in this type is high. Half of them are office workers, whereas managers and professionals comprise 42 per cent, pensioners - 14 per cent.
- 47 per cent live in the countryside (more than in types A and B), one-third live in big cities.
- Highest income levels. 2/3 can afford a normal living standard.

Summary

This type repels non-Estonians and wishes to maintain a solid distance from them, but unlike radical nationalists does not preclude the possibility of working and living together with other ethnic groups in case of extreme necessity. Representatives of this type are unable to appreciate the value of other nationalities, they overdramatize the threat emanating from non-Estonians and are concerned about the survival of the Estonian nation and deterioration of the quality of the living environment. Although this type of people are not as ethnocentric as radicals are, they nevertheless think that too much tolerance is dangerous and Estonians should preserve their dominance.

Type D. Radical nationalist - 19 per cent

Representatives of this type idealise ethnically pure Estonia where only Estonians should live.

Characteristic features

- This type displays active intolerance for other nationalities living in Estonia: tries to completely avoid any contact with them.. At no cost will agree to work together with the aliens in the same workplace. 80 per cent will never agree to live in towns (municipalities) where the majority of residents are non-Estonians. 91 per cent will never agree to live in the same house (neighbourhood or village) with the people of other ethnic origin. 90 per cent will never agree to live in an ethnically mixed family.
- Despite their exclusionary attitudes, every third has either work or business partners among non-Estonians. However, only 2-4 per cent have closer contacts with non-Estonians.
- Typically perceive a great danger in granting the citizenship without the knowledge of Estonian. 3/4 think that granting the citizenship without the Estonian language examination jeopardises the survival of the Estonian language.
- Apprehension of non-Estonians is stronger than in other types. 3/4 consider the presence of non-Estonians conducive to the increased incidence of crime and drug abuse, 2/3 associate it with prostitution.
- Half of the representatives in this type support the idea that economic, social and political rights in Estonia should belong only to Estonians.
- 46 per cent think that non-Estonians should not participate in state administration; one-third would leave non-Estonians out of the Riigikogu as well as local governments.

Social and demographic profile

- This type represents an older age group. 2/3 of the representatives are middle-aged or older (over 40). Those under 25 account for only one-fifth in this type.
- Mediocre educational level, 50 per cent have only basic education and only every tenth representative has higher education.
- The ratio of pensioners and unemployed high. 37 per cent are pensioners, one-third are employees, 49 per cent of economically active persons are blue-collar and 51 per cent are white-collar workers.
- 47 per cent live in the countryside, only one-third in big cities.

Summary

Radical nationalists are distinguishable from other types by their clearly negative attitude to the aliens. Unlike less-tolerant Estonians (C), this type's interest is to achieve complete distance from other nationalities. Representatives of this type would prefer to treat non-Estonians harsh and hard and are prepared to deprive the latter of many fundamental rights while living in Estonia.

CONCLUSIONS

The tolerance typology of Estonians illustrates the evolution of toleration in Estonia. The fact that radical nationalists among Estonians account for only one-fifth implies that the tolerance threshold is relatively high.

Radical nationalists are idealistically minded people who are concerned about and consider themselves responsible for the survival of the Estonian language and culture, but also for Estonia's national security. In this type's view only ethnic Estonians should live in Estonia as this is the only way to sustain loyalty to Estonia and Estonian. Ethnonationalists favour hierarchy - in Estonia the indigenous population (Estonians) should have considerably more rights and better possibilities for self-realisation and organisation of their life than other nationalities.

The opposite of radical nationalists are emphatic Estonians with a positive attitude towards other nationalities (20%). This group helps to stabilise ethnic relations in Estonia and to find compromise solutions for the citizenship and integration policies. Emphatic Estonians uphold the principle of equal treatment, try to respect all individuals, regardless of their nationality, citizenship status and language proficiency.

Several transition types fit in-between the above two types. Less-tolerant Estonians (28%) display rather negative, not-so-tolerant attitudes to non-Estonians. The less-tolerant Estonian is passive and indifferent to ethnic problems: 'I live my life, let aliens live theirs'. They are unwilling to communicate with "others", would do so only in the situation of extreme need. They perceive in non-Estonians an imminent threat to Estonia's national security, the Estonian language and culture and therefore support a "firm hand" policy and imposition of strict demands on citizenship applicants.

The second transition type - pragmatic Estonian (33%)- displays more tolerant, not-so-negative attitudes towards non-Estonians. The type is guided by rational considerations: is prepared to work, live etc. with non-Estonians on favourable conditions.

Further progress of the tolerance process depends on the dynamics of the transition types - towards greater empathy or stronger ethno-nationalistic views. If the current integration ideology is sustained, aiming at bringing Estonians closer to non-Estonians and lessening of Estonians' feelings of threat, we can predict that the number of the pragmatic type representatives will increase at the expense of the less-tolerant Estonians. In the long run, the share of idealistically minded types (emphatic Estonians and extreme nationalists) will remain stable.

3. TOLERANCE TYPOLOGY - NON-ESTONIANS

For the description of the tolerance typology I used the following criteria:

- **Openness to communication** - readiness to work in a multiethnic workplace, to live in the same town/house with Estonians.
- **Actual contacts with Estonians** - having Estonian friends, fellow workers or fellow students, business or co-operation partners, neighbours.
- **Empathy with Estonians** - understanding of Estonians' way of life and thinking, seeing similarities in it with their own ways.
- **Willingness to adjust to the demands of the state** - learn Estonian, pass the citizenship examination.
- **Readiness to recognise Estonians' aspirations** - preservation of their culture and language, preservation of Estonia as an independent and sovereign state.
- **Readiness to recognise Estonia's priorities on the international arena** - membership in the European Union and the NATO.

- **Willingness to live in a multicultural environment** - perception of the positive influence of other cultures on their own culture.

Openness to communication was chosen as a decisive criterion for the elaboration of the typology because readiness to work together with Estonians in a multiethnic work collective helps to better distinguish between various tolerance categories.

As the result of type determination, the non-Estonian community can be divided into five types:³

A	Strongly assimilated non-Estonians	-	13 per cent
B	Emphatic non-Estonians	-	33 per cent
C	Pragmatic non-Estonians	-	19 per cent
D	Less-tolerant non-Estonians	-	21 per cent
E	Exclusionary non-Estonians	-	14 per cent
			Total 100 per cent

Within this typology it is possible to bring out the so-called polar leading types: type A - strongly assimilated and type E - exclusionary non-Estonians. The strongly assimilated type is an exemplary model of toleration, whereas its direct opposite - the exclusionary type - tries to keep a clear distance from Estonians. Transitional types (B, C, D) fit in-between the polar types as their toleration or negation of Estonians is softer. Tolerant non-Estonians comprise 2/3 and represent the first three types (A, B, C). The share of less-tolerant and exclusion-oriented non-Estonians is 1/3 and they represent types D and E.

Type A. Assimilated non-Estonian - 13 per cent

This type has practically no barriers in communication with Estonians, is extremely open and cooperative. This type is so closely associated with Estonians that it can, in fact, be considered fully assimilated.

Characteristic features

- Compared with other types, knows Estonian much better. 80 per cent have a good or average knowledge of Estonian.
- 71 per cent think that their way of life and thinking is similar to that of Estonians'. 11 per cent of the representatives even consider themselves to be Estonians, 39 per cent - Estonian Russians, 29 per cent - Balts, 20 per cent Northerners.
- This type comprises the highest amount of Estonian citizens, their children also have Estonian citizenship more often than is the statistical average for non-Estonians
- 91 per cent have good friends or acquaintances, 85 per cent have business partners among Estonians; in the social circle of every second representative Estonians account for at least one half.
- Support to Estonia's development priorities. 2/3 support Estonia's accession to the European Union, 1/3 (the biggest share) - NATO membership. 87 per cent are in favour of Estonia remaining a sovereign state. Only 5-11 per cent think that Estonia should join the CIS or Russia.
- Strong western-orientation. 45 per cent would like to live in the future for some time in a western country, 7 per cent would like to settle in the West permanently.

Social and demographic profile

- More than half of the representatives were born in Estonia (57%), one-third have lived in Estonia for a long time.
- The youngest type: 54 per cent are under 40, the greatest share of up to 29-years-old representatives among all types - 37 per cent.

³ Corresponding tables in Annex 2.2.

- By education this type belongs to the medium category: one-third have basic education, 52 per cent - secondary or secondary vocational.
- The lowest share of pensioners (only 7%); employees 53 per cent, white-collar workers 46 per cent, blue-collar workers 50 per cent. Relatively many students and schoolchildren - 17 per cent.
- Predominantly city-dwellers, 59 per cent live in Tallinn.
- Highest income levels - 36 per cent earn monthly more than 2000 kroons per person.
- 2/3 of the representatives can afford to live a relatively normal life - this is the highest ratio in comparison with other types,

Summary

This type has best accommodated to Estonians. One of the premises has been a good knowledge of Estonian. The type has many good friends, acquaintances, fellow workers among Estonians. The representatives of this type are almost completely assimilated - 71 per cent think and behave like Estonians and raise their children in the same spirit. 50 per cent would like their children to adopt Estonian culture and customs. Thanks to good adjustment ability, this type has achieved a better financial status and has become integrated in a broad social network which includes both Estonian and Russian businessmen, managers, professionals etc.

Type B. Emphatic non-Estonian - 33 per cent

This type has smoothly integrated into the Estonian society and experiences no barriers in communication with Estonians. Is actively establishing contacts with Estonians in various spheres of life. Emphatic non-Estonians have a positive attitude to Estonia's future and support Estonia's development priorities.

Characteristic features

- Representatives of this type have a better than average knowledge of Estonian. One-third have no problems whatsoever with the Estonian language and half of the representatives are able to read and write in Estonian.
- 67 per cent identify themselves as Russians or Estonian Russians, one-fourth as representatives of some other nationality, every third as Balts and 12 per cent as Europeans.
- This type ranks second after type A by the amount of Estonian citizens among adults and children.
- Fewer contacts with Estonians than type A, but much more than other types. Only one-fourth have neither friends, acquaintances nor colleagues among Estonians. 16 per cent have closer contacts with Estonians.
- This type has accommodated well with Estonians and 41 per cent think that their way of thinking and living is similar to that of Estonians'.
- Support to Estonia's development priorities. 66 per cent (the greatest share) support accession to the European Union, 18 per cent to the NATO. 81 per cent think that Estonia should remain an independent and sovereign state. Only 7-8 per cent are of the opinion that Estonia should join the CIS or Russia.
- Strong western-orientation. 33 per cent would like to live for some time in a western country, 9 per cent would like to settle down permanently in the West.

Social and demographic profile

- About half of the representatives were born in Estonia, 37 per cent have lived in Estonia for over 20 years.
- The youngish type: 58 per cent are under 40.
- Above the average educational level. Persons with basic education are in minority (17%), 68 per cent have secondary or secondary vocational education.
- Few pensioners (9%). Employees account for 46 per cent, white-collar employees - 46 per cent and blue-collar workers - 50 per cent This type is known for a high ratio of the unemployed and economically inactive persons (25%).

- More or less equally distributed between Tallinn (43%) and towns in Northeast Estonia (49%).
- Compared with other types, income levels are close to the average. 43 per cent have enough money for a more or less normal existence.

Summary

Emphatic non-Estonians are broad-minded and open to interaction with Estonians. They are on the lookout for Estonian friends, acquaintances, business and work partners. This type is well integrated into the Estonian society, has a positive attitude to life and is only marginally influenced by the Russian ideology. Unlike strongly assimilated non-Estonians, representatives of this type are more interested in the preservation of their ethnic identity and are slightly less open to Estonians.

Type C. Pragmatic non-Estonian - 19 per cent

This type is rational and prefers to work and interact with Estonians only if it is profitable or useful. In comparison with types A and B, pragmatic non-Estonians do not seek actively relations with Estonians and are less open.

Characteristic features

- This type has an average knowledge of Estonian and its language skills are slightly inferior to type B. One-third can manage well in Estonian, 41 per cent are able to communicate, 44 per cent to read and write.
- 2/3 identify themselves as Russians or Estonian Russians, one quarter as representatives of another nationality, every third as Europeans (the greatest share among all types), one-fourth as Balts.
- Average position among the types for the number of Estonian citizens (adults and children). Values highly the Estonian citizenship, prefers it to the Russian citizenship.
- This type has less contacts with Estonians than types A and B. 35 per cent have neither friends, acquaintances nor Estonian work colleagues. One-fourth have closer contacts with Estonian colleagues and business partners.
- 47 per cent consider their way of thinking and living similar to Estonians', 45 per cent think that it differs.
- Support to Estonia's priorities: accession to the European Union (60%), above average is the number of the NATO membership supporters (21%). Unlike types A and B, one-fifth support the idea of Estonia joining the CIS and Russia.
- More than other types communicates with businessmen and executives (32%).
- 39 per cent of the representatives have a western orientation. One-fourth would like to live for some time in a western country, 12 per cent would like to settle down permanently in the West.

Social and demographic profile

- More than half of the representatives (57%) were born in Estonia, 16 per cent have lived in Estonia for over 20 years.
- This type is represented predominantly by middle-aged and older non-Estonians, 55 per cent are older than 40.
- Average educational level, one-fourth has basic education, 61 per cent - secondary or secondary-vocational.
- Few pensioners (10%). Employees (56%) and students (18%) prevail. 2/3 are blue-collar, 1/3 white-collar workers.
- Prevalent in towns of Northeast Estonia (50%) and Tallinn (38%).
- Average income levels. Every other representative has enough money for a normal life.

Summary

The pragmatic type has more or less adjusted to the Estonian society; openness to communication with Estonians is considerably more limited than in case of types A and B.

Pragmatism is reflected also in its orientation to the east and west at the same time. However, this type is not so strongly influenced by the Russian ideology as the less-tolerant or exclusionary types. The pragmatic type is often driven by commercial interests, attempts to make use of Estonia's favourable location between the east and the west. It is remarkable that one-third of the representatives already identify themselves as Europeans, 12 per cent as Northerners.

Type D. Less-tolerant non-Estonian - 21 per cent

This type is considerably less adjusted to Estonia and Estonians than types A, B and C. Representatives of this type mistrust Estonians and try to keep distance from them. If absolutely necessary, it is capable of working together or living in the same house with Estonians etc.

Characteristic features

- Below average knowledge of Estonian, only every sixth representative is able to communicate in Estonian without any difficulty, every seventh - to write in Estonian.
- 62 per cent identify themselves as either Russians and Estonian Russians, 24 per cent as Balts. It is noteworthy that 16 per cent (the greatest share) consider themselves to be Soviets.
- The number of Estonian citizens among adults and children is below the average .
- Conscious attempts to distance themselves from Estonians. Only one half have friends, acquaintances, fellow workers or students among Estonians. Only every eighth representative has closer contacts with Estonians.
- 54 per cent think that their way of thinking and living is different from Estonians' way.
- The predominant part of less-tolerant non-Estonians think that in the 1940s Estonia voluntarily joined the Soviet Union. Only one-fourth think that Estonia was occupied.
- Every other representative in this type supports Estonia's accession to the European Union, 17 per cent support NATO membership. Although 81 per cent think that Estonia should remain an independent and sovereign state, 30 per cent are of the opinion that Estonia should join the CIS and 18 per cent that Estonia should become a part of Russia. Every fifth prefers the restoration of the socialist regime in Estonia.
- One-fifth would like to live for some time in the future in a western country, only 2 per cent would like to settle permanently in the West.

Social and demographic profile

- Every second representative was born in Estonia. One quarter have lived in Estonia for over 20 years.
- This type is represented primarily by older people, 58 per cent are over 40, every fifth representative is beyond 60 years of age.
- Below average educational level. Every third has basic education. Compared with other types, there are proportionally less people with higher education (18%).
- By the ratio of pensioners ranks second after the exclusionary type. More or less equal representation of white-collar and blue-collar workers.
- Prevalent in the towns of Northeast Estonia (50%), 38 per cent live in Tallinn.
- Below average income levels. 55 per cent admitted having financial difficulties and not enough money for staples and clothes.

Summary

The less-tolerant type has serious problems with adaptation to Estonia and Estonians. These adaptation difficulties are largely caused by the old Soviet mentality and attitudes. The less-tolerant type follows with caution and from a distance Estonians' activities and, if possible, tries to avoid direct contacts or communication with the latter. The type mistrusts many developments in Estonia and in western countries.

Type E. Exclusionary non-Estonian - 14 per cent

This type's adjustment to independent Estonia and Estonians has been the worst. The type idealises the kind of Estonia that was subjected to the rules of the Soviet empire, is mistrustful and defensive and tries to avoid any closer contacts with Estonians.

Characteristic features

- Poor knowledge of Estonian. Only every tenth knows Estonian well. Only 6 per cent are able to write in Estonian.
- 37 per cent identify themselves as Russians living in Estonia, 28 per cent as Estonian Russians. None consider themselves to be Estonian. 12 per cent perceive themselves as Soviets, 3-4 per cent as Europeans or Northerners.
- Few have Estonian citizenship. Russian citizens are in majority. Among this type of non-Estonians the share of children with Estonian citizenship is the lowest.
- The exclusionary non-Estonians try deliberately to keep a distance from Estonians. Half of the representatives have no contacts whatsoever with Estonians and only 16 per cent stated having many Estonian friends and acquaintances. Despite limited contacts, 40 per cent of the representatives stated that their way of life and thinking was similar to Estonians' way.
- Considerably fewer representatives support Estonia's international aspirations, 43 per cent support Estonia's accession to the European Union, but only 6 per cent support NATO membership. One-third would like Estonia to be a part of the CIS or Russia.
- This type represents the Soviet imperial mentality. 60 per cent think that Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily and only 25 per cent think that it was occupied. 43 per cent of the representatives think that the socialist regime should be restored in Estonia. 29 per cent would prefer Estonia to be a CIS member and 30 per cent - a part of Russia.

Social and demographic profile

- Only 22 per cent were born in Estonia. 3/4 have lived in Estonia for over 20 years.
- The type is represented mostly by older people, 3/4 are over 50 years of age.
- Diverse educational levels. On one hand, the share of people with basic education in this category is high (33%), on the other hand, the proportion of people with higher education is the highest of all types (20%).
- The greatest number of pensioners (56%). Employees merely 29 per cent, whereas blue-collar workers prevail among the economically active group, white-collar workers form a third.
- Mostly town-dwellers from the towns in Northeast Estonia (60%):
- Lowest income levels. Only one-fourth have enough money for normal existence.

Summary

The exclusionary type has neither wanted nor managed to integrate into the Estonian society or to adjust to Estonians due to many barriers - from poor language skills to scarce contacts with Estonians, but also due to the adherence to the Soviet mentality. Although the vast majority (73%) favours independent and sovereign Estonia and many support Estonia's accession to the European Union (43%), most of the representatives have not managed to keep pace with changes in Estonia and continue to idealise Soviet Estonia.

CONCLUSIONS

The tolerance typology of non-Estonians is a tool for the assessment of non-Estonians adaptation to the demands set by the Estonian government, on one hand, and Estonian culture and lifestyle, on the other hand. Non-Estonians' tolerance and its limits in their relations with Estonians can be assessed as being quite high.

2/3 represent the so-called tolerant types (assimilated, emphatic and pragmatic non-Estonians) who are doing relatively well in the Estonian society and are open to interaction and collaboration with Estonians. The tolerant types have a rather good notion in what kind of the state they live, what are the existing rules and requirements in this state. They accept Estonia's national priorities and it is obvious that their world outlook is becoming more Estonia-oriented.

The less-tolerant types which represent one-third of the non-Estonian population include the less-tolerant and the exclusionary types who experience great difficulties and barriers in the adaptation process into the Estonian society. They have not been able (or wanted) to learn the Estonian language or to obtain the Estonian citizenship and have very few Estonians in their social circle. Their attitude to many developments in Estonia is cautious and distrustful, they idealise Soviet Estonia. The less-tolerant types are strongly influenced by the Russian ideology because they constantly watch Russian TV programmes.

If the current integration policy is sustained in Estonia, we can predict that the ratio of tolerant types will grow at the expense of less-tolerant types.

Figure 1. Tolerance dynamics in Estonia

TYPE	Radical nationalist (19%)	Less-tolerant Estonian (28%)	Pragmatic Estonian (33%)	Emphatic Estonian (20%)	
ESTONIANS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desire that non-Estonians leave Estonia • Desire to build up and administer the state on one's own • Strong distrust of non-Estonians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciled with the idea that non-Estonians are here to stay • Minimum and aloof contacts with non-Estonians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desire to be more indulgent, to make concessions in the citizenship policy • Desire to integrate non-Estonians • Desire to open a dialogue "Estonians-aliens" (= readiness to consider non-Estonians' problems) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understanding that for Estonia to develop, the non-Estonians' potential is to be harnessed • Understanding that all barriers should be removed from the development path of non-Estonians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understanding that the role assumed by Estonians has been too dominating • Understanding that non-Estonians must shoulder the responsibility for the development of Estonia, just like Estonians
PHASES	<p>I REJECTION NEGATION Reciprocating mistrust, conflict prone ethnic relations</p>	<p>II PASSIVE TOLERANCE Neutral and indifferent attitude</p>	<p>III INTERNALISED TOLERATION Understanding and acknowledgement</p>	<p>IV ACTIVE TOLERANCE Reciprocating value attachment (respect and esteem)</p>	<p>V SOCIAL COHESION</p>
NON-ESTONIANS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unwillingness to accommodate to Estonians and Estonian society • Desire to live in isolation in their own world 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desire to learn Estonian • Formal desire to integrate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conscious desire to integrate • Awareness and interest about developments in Estonia • Loyalty, readiness to comply with the requirements posed to Estonian citizens 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formation of Estonia-centred world outlook • High appreciation of Estonians' values and aspirations • Respect to the State of Estonia and Estonians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsibility for the well-being of Estonia and Estonians • Attempt to make one's best for Estonia's progress
Type	Exclusionary non-Estonian (14%)	Less-tolerant non-Estonian (21%)	Pragmatic non-Estonian (19%)	Emphatic non-Estonian (33%)	Assimilated non-Estonian (13%)

APPENDIX 2. 1.

A TYPOLOGY OF TOLERANCE - ESTONIANS. Tables.

Table 2.1.1 Non-Estonians form one-third of the population in Estonia. What should be the ratio of non-Estonians in the following state institutions?

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
Riigikogu				
▪ At least one-fourth	19	13	12	10
▪ 10% or even less	36	43	41	38
▪ None at all	14	16	25	31
▪ Should not depend on the ratio of non-Estonians	31	28	22	21
Government				
▪ At least one-fourth	16	9	8	4
▪ 10% or even less	27	34	25	28
▪ None at all	22	29	48	46
▪ Should not depend on the ratio of non-Estonians	35	28	19	22
Local self-government				
▪ At least one-fourth	20	15	11	11
▪ 10% or even less	28	34	31	29
▪ None at all	15	19	31	36
▪ Should not depend on the ratio of non-Estonians	37	32	27	24

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.1.2 Which inhabitants in Estonia are, in your opinion, entitled to get bank loans, buy land, get the national pension etc.?
(In total 15 social, economic and political rights which are indexed into one attribute)

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic Estonian	TYPE B Pragmatic Estonian	TYPE C Less- tolerant Estonian	TYPE D Radical nationalist	TOTAL
▪ All inhabitants	42	28	15	15	100
▪ Only Estonian citizens	27	31	22	20	100
▪ Only Estonians	13	18	22	47	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.3 Is the presence of other nationalities in Estonia conducive to ... ?

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
Increased incidence of crime				
▪ Yes, strongly	49	53	54	73
Drug abuse				
▪ Yes, strongly	47	56	62	76
Prostitution				
▪ Yes, strongly	35	45	48	63

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.4 Assessment to the knowledge of Russian

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ Understanding of oral speech				
- good	58	53	28	25
- average	30	35	50	45
▪ Reading skills				
- good	47	38	25	20
- average	36	41	47	36
▪ Communication skills				
- good	47	40	23	20
- average	37	40	44	43
▪ Writing skills				
- good	31	22	19	11
- average	40	43	39	30

Source: Integration Monitoring 2002.

Table 2.1.5 Breakdown by age groups

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ 15 – 19 years old	11	8	14	8
▪ 20 – 29 years old	24	23	25	12
▪ 30 – 39 years old	18	22	14	12
▪ 40 – 49 years old	19	25	13	18
▪ 50 – 59 years old	16	13	18	10
▪ Older	12	7	16	40
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.6 Breakdown by educational background

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical Nationalist
▪ Basic education	31	28	34	49
▪ Secondary and secondary vocational	54	55	55	41
▪ Higher education	15	17	11	10
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.7 Breakdown by engagement status

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ Employee	50	56	51	33
▪ Employer (owner) or self-employed	5	9	6	2
▪ Pensioner	13	9	14	37
▪ Learner, student	16	13	15	8
▪ Unemployed	9	9	6	16
▪ Other	7	4	8	4
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.8. Breakdown by occupational profile

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ Labourer	17	10	15	20
▪ Skilled worker	20	19	23	18
▪ Service worker	12	19	11	11
▪ Office worker	3	6	9	11
▪ Professional	32	38	36	33
▪ Manager	15	7	6	7
▪ Other	1	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.9 Income per family member

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ Up to 1 000 kroons	25	21	16	18
▪ 1 001 – 2 000 kroons	38	34	38	60
▪ 2 001 – 3 500 kroons	24	26	25	15
▪ Over 3 500 kroons	13	19	21	7
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.10 Assessment to economic situation

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ Not enough money even for food	9	7	3	15
▪ Enough money for food but not for clothes	36	37	33	50
▪ Enough money for food and clothes, possible to save a little	29	28	36	24
▪ Can afford to buy expensive goods	22	25	26	10
▪ Hard to tell	4	2	2	...
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

Table 2.1.11 Place of residence

(%)

	TYPE A Emphatic	TYPE B Pragmatic	TYPE C Less- tolerant	TYPE D Radical nationalist
▪ Town	62	60	53	53
▪ Countryside	38	40	47	47
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100
▪ Tallinn	28	24	21	15
▪ Other towns	33	35	32	38
▪ Rural settlements, villages	39	41	47	47
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100

Source: Monitoring of ethnic relations 2001.

APPENDIX 2. 2.

A TYPOLOGY OF TOLERANCE - NON-ESTONIANS. Tables.

Table 2.2 1. Were you born in Estonia and how long have you lived in Estonia?

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Born in Estonia	57	48	57	49	22
▪ Have lived in Estonia up to 20 years	28	29	27	26	4
▪ Have lived in Estonia over 20 years	15	23	16	25	74
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.2 How many of the people with whom you have closer contacts are Estonians?
(Answers on the scale majority + about half in %)

	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Fellow workers or students	43	16	23	8	6
▪ Friends, good acquaintances	48	16	13	11	16
▪ Neighbours	46	27	22	17	4
▪ Business and co-operation partners	21	6	14	13	1

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2 3. Breakdown by educational background

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Basic education	31	17	23	30	33
▪ Secondary education	52	68	61	56	47
▪ Higher education	17	15	16	14	20

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.4 Breakdown by age groups.

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Up to 19 years old	17	13	13	11	4
▪ 20-29 years old	20	20	16	10	4
▪ 30-39 years old	17	25	16	21	9
▪ 40-49 years old	20	23	23	23	7
▪ 50-59 years old	19	11	23	15	17
▪ 60 years and older	7	8	9	20	59
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.5 Income per family member

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Up to 1 000 kroons	27	20	19	22	12
▪ 1 001 – 2 000 kroons	37	50	51	46	68
▪ 2 001 – 3 500 kroons	33	24	19	30	15
▪ Over 3 500 kroons	3	6	11	2	5
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.6 Assessment to economic situation

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Not enough money even for food	10	9	7	8	11
▪ Enough money for food but not for clothes	27	45	41	47	64
▪ Enough money for food and clothes, possible to save a little	34	24	38	30	16
▪ Can afford to buy expensive goods	27	19	11	15	9
▪ Hard to tell	2	...	3	1	...
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.7 Breakdown by engagement status.

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Employer	8	5	7	10	2
▪ Employee	53	46	56	47	29
▪ Pensioner	7	9	10	18	56
▪ Student, learner	17	15	18	14	5
▪ Unemployed	10	15	8	6	6
▪ Home-maker	5	10	3	5	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.8 Breakdown by occupational profile?

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Unskilled worker	19	17	8	10	15
▪ Skilled worker	4	28	49	27	36
▪ Service worker	27	12	10	12	14
▪ Office clerk	4	5	3
▪ Professional	27	30	23	32	21
▪ Manager	15	8	3	15	14
▪ Other	4	...	4	4	...
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002

Table 2.2.9 Do you know Estonian sufficiently well in order to live in Estonia?

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Sufficiently well	29	17	27	12	7
▪ More or less sufficiently	34	26	22	12	41
▪ More or less insufficiently	17	36	40	43	29
▪ Insufficiently	20	18	11	33	23
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

Table 2.2.10 Assessment to Estonian language proficiency.

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Understanding of oral speech					
- good	59	36	32	20	10
- average	27	23	20	22	18
▪ Reading skills					
- good	56	35	32	23	19
- average	25	29	31	24	10
▪ Communication skills					
- good	54	26	26	16	9
- average	22	20	15	17	14
▪ Writing skills					
- good	36	25	20	14	6
- average	42	32	24	22	17

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

Table 2.2.11 Who do you think you are living in Estonia?

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- Nary
▪ Estonian Russian	39	37	31	39	28
▪ Russian	17	30	32	23	37
▪ Estonian	11	6	3
▪ Other nationality	25	23	23	12	13
▪ Balt	29	34	22	24	14
▪ European	17	12	33	10	3
▪ Northerner	20	5	12	2	4
▪ Soviet citizen	2	4	2	16	12

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

Table 2.2.12 Do you think that your way of life and thinking is compared to Estonians ...

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Different	27	33	45	55	40
▪ Similar	71	41	47	42	40
▪ Hard to assess	2	26	8	3	20
TOTAL:	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

Table 13. Would you like Estonia to be...

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ EU member state	62	66	60	50	43
▪ NATO member state	32	18	21	17	6
▪ CIS member state	11	8	19	30	29
▪ Part of Russia	5	7	18	18	30
▪ Independent, sovereign state	87	81	86	81	73

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

Table 2.2.14 Did Estonia join the Soviet Union in 1940 voluntarily or was it occupied?

	(%)				
	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ Voluntarily	29	40	37	53	60
▪ Occupied	43	32	38	27	25
▪ Hard to tell	28	28	25	20	15
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

Table 2.2.15 Do you subscribe to the following statements about the governing regime in Estonia?

(definitely + more or less agree %)

	TYPE A Assimilated	TYPE B Emphatic	TYPE C Pragmatic	TYPE D Less- tolerant	TYPE E Exclusio- nary
▪ We should restore the socialist regime	13	12	13	19	43
▪ Estonia needs a "harsh hand" rule and power structures should be given more decision-making powers for ensuring law and order in the country	24	29	26	36	25
▪ Powers of the Riigikogu should be reduced and powers of the President increased in Estonia	56	55	65	56	53
▪ We should maintain the current regime	41	44	44	38	27

Source: Integration monitoring 2002.

WORK, INCOME AND COPING : SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF INTEGRATION

Marje Pavelson

1. Job opportunities as background system for integration

One of the essential factors for social integration are equal job opportunities and the deriving from the latter socio-economic status. Persistent disparities in income and satisfaction of basic needs fail to encourage cohesion between various ethnic groups and will inevitably create antagonism, the assessment of which may become politically tinted biased. There is no reason to believe that equality would be the ideal towards which the society that is driven by the market forces and is based on private property could and should aspire. Hence it is expedient to be aware on the general level what are the possibilities of the people to cope with life and to create an enabling environment for the development of strategies that promote personal well-being and support free self-realisation. In this respect the situation in Estonia is complicated due to the problems related to the historic origin of the ethnic groups residing here, their territorial location and traditional spheres of activity. In the changed political and economic circumstances the 10-year-old processes and structures echo back in the choices, behaviour and opinions of Estonians as well as non-Estonians. The economic situation, level of well-being or work conditions are assessed on the basis of earlier experience and solutions to one's personal problems as well as to "others" problems are sought based on the current breakdown of powers.

The economic stratification has continued to deepen in Estonia and for many people the threat of poverty is the greatest and the most frightening. Evaluation of the poverty risk among Estonians and non-Estonians enables us to say that in Estonia it is possible to talk about shared poverty rather than attainment-driven prosperity. This is caused by the difference in occupations and spheres of activities prevalent among the ethnic groups, on-going segmentation of the labour market, economic and social exclusion on the basis of the place of residence. Estonians have so far been more successful competitors for better jobs on the labour market, their success has been ensured by greater readiness for change and better adaptability to new relations and structures.

At the same time the vast majority of Russians demand from the state as an institution more functions than Estonians. More than half of the non-Estonian respondents (against 38per cent of Estonians) preferred state or municipal ownership of big enterprises. Although both groups of respondents preferred the state rather than private ownership of strategic installations or natural resources, non-Estonians seem to be more in favour of state regulation.

In addition to ownership preferences, equality aspirations are noticeable also in the on-going demand for free education and collective expectations that the state should ensure job opportunities (as a job provider). Although non-Estonians still maintain a view that the state must guarantee employment to everybody (firmly believed by almost 60per cent in comparison with 38per cent of Estonians), among these non-Estonians who have come to realise their personal responsibility and need for active participation on the labour market, this approach is not so strong any more, though five years ago it would not have found any support at all.

As earlier and current experience is a dominant factor in understanding changes, individual strategies and future visions differ. If we considered the divergence in the preference of 'ethnic Estonia', 'westernised Estonia' and 'new multicultural Estonia' (see chp.1), and took into account the nostalgia for former economic system that a certain category of non-Estonians (a fifth of respondents) maintains, it is to be expected that the issues of economic inequality and poverty risk are expressed through the rhetoric of political inequality and injustice, which in no way fosters the integration process. Therefore microsocial practices in the economic field which contain an encounter with exclusion serve as a source of constant dissatisfaction.

Hence, we have no reason to think that Estonians lack this kind of experience: unemployment and disparities in regional development, spreading of extreme forms of poverty, exclusion in rural areas due to the unfavourable place of residence and low capacity of some subjects have caused political alienation also among Estonians. This cannot be explained by the debatable ethnic origin or lack of communication skills in the Estonian language or by ethnocentrist policy of the Estonian government. Instead the arguments of potential injustice are more relevant.

The specificity of the economic situation in Estonia is related to structural changes that took place in the course of privatisation or resulted from it and which significantly reduced the volume of production in the main branches of economy - industry and agriculture - and drastically redistributed the labour force that had so far been engaged in these sectors. The urban non-Estonians and rural Estonians lost their jobs, the employment structure was quickly transformed, unemployment started to spread in towns and in the countryside, creating a situation in which both formerly employed persons and newcomers on the labour market faced the challenge of either actively competing for a shrinking number of job vacancies or creating jobs for themselves.

In these circumstances those who were better able to adapt, had better knowledge and skills or higher potential for other capabilities and readiness succeeded. As well-educated young employees who possessed various "capitals", including sufficient social capital, had an advantage, the risk groups were formed of these subjects who lacked the necessary success guarantee.

Chiefly non-Estonians, traditionally employed in industry, and Estonians with lower educational qualifications who had so far been engaged in farming or service sectors, dropped out of competition because of the lack of the above capital. Forced mobility on the labour market and a great number of unengaged persons created a situation conducive to the development of a large risk group of long-term unemployed. Also other negative parameters proved to be the weaknesses that considerably complicated the adjustment to the new circumstances. Among those - precarious job position and insufficient competitive ability, the lack of knowledge of the state language or foreign languages, insularity of the social network within separatist communities and absence of experience and tradition of private initiative in economic behaviour. Thus the phenomenon of unemployment (and of poverty risk) among non-Estonians evolved through the "cumulative disadvantage"¹: throughout the entire period after the restoration of independence the highest unemployment rates have been primarily among non-Estonians who have continuously prevailed also among the registered unemployed, indicating of persisting expectations of state interference in the creation and multiplication of jobs.

A specific feature of the unemployment structure has been a better educational level of the unemployed non-Estonians with comparison to Estonians and exceptional hardships young people have encountered in getting jobs. The cause is, first and foremost, in the content of education provided in the Russian language and especially in their scarce language skills. The findings of the first integration monitoring (IM) and monitoring of the trends of the decade corroborate the fact that the favourable educational background of the working-age non-Estonians has not found realisation in the employment. The occupational profile of the employed non-Estonians is relatively stable and the occupational differentiation between Estonians and non-Estonians continues. Throughout the years the trend has been for non-Estonians to be employed as workers and service staff whereas Estonians have been placed in the positions of specialists or managers, thus filling more white-collar jobs with Estonians and blue-collar jobs with non-Estonians.

As a reaction to the above processes, attitudes towards job opportunities have evolved: Estonians are more mobile and ready to face the challenges of the labour market, non-Estonians

¹ Richard Layte and Christopher T. Whelan (2002). Cumulative Disadvantage or Individualisation? *European Societies*, ESA, Vol.4 No2, 213.

try to keep their jobs because finding a new job is difficult. Therefore non-Estonians tend to regard work more like means of subsistence than an opportunity for self-realisation or an enabling environment for development.

2. Work and its assessment

The status of Estonians and non-Estonians in labour market remains to be different. At the same time work and changes in work organisation reflect a promising process that is likely to affect the employment structure. The segmentation of the labour market is going to decrease in conjunction with the growth of the share of professionals in labour market, process-oriented work arrangement is going to rise acutely of competencies which will lead to principal changes in the selection and training of the personnel. Application of uniform criteria and measuring of competitive abilities when recruiting people for various positions will enhance the chances of non-Estonians to progress from "everyman labour market" to the professionals' labour market; the latter already exists in enterprises which are based on foreign capital and have a greater innovation potential. At the same time the employment rate among non-Estonians has declined more than among Estonians (56.5 per cent of Estonians and 53.9 per cent of non-Estonians are employed), whereas the unemployment rate among non-Estonians is higher by more than 50 per cent compared with Estonians (16.9 and 10.4 per cent respectively). There are more inactive work-age individuals among Estonians (students, taking care of children and other family members, discouraged). For the first time the unemployment rate fell during the last decade though the unemployment breakdown by ethnicity has maintained its proportions.

In the tertiary sector the employment rate continues to grow and in agriculture to decrease. A slow rising trend in employment statistics has been observed in the processing industry, whereas the number of non-Estonians engaged in industry exceeds by almost one-third the number of all employees in this category. Non-Estonians continue to be over-represented in industry and transport but are equally represented in construction and hotel industry, education and research. In trade and service sectors there are more Estonians than non-Estonians, in banking and real estate non-Estonians are strongly under-represented, nevertheless, a slow growth trend has been observed. In public administration the share of non-Estonians has been constantly low which has deepened among non-Estonians the opinion that access to this field of activities is restricted to them. In healthcare the share of employed non-Estonians has been decreasing (Annex 3.1).

Also by **occupational division** the employment structure has remained to be relatively stable although it is disadvantageous for integration. 60 per cent of the employed non-Estonians are engaged as workers and 40 per cent as lower or higher level white-collar employees. Among Estonians this ratio is reversed (Annex 3.2). Also in trade and service sectors, where the number of new entries has been rising, non-Estonians fill lower level jobs and this is reflected in job satisfaction assessment and wage gaps.

It was also observed that in the period between the two monitoring surveys, the share of non-Estonians among managers and mid-level specialists decreased although the share of top-level professionals among the total employed non-Estonians increased slightly which demonstrates the growing impact of education and training.

The number of non-Estonians belonging to the skilled workers category and employed as plant and machine operators has increased significantly, however, at the same time much more non-Estonians than Estonians have found employment as unskilled workers and attendants. The number of unskilled worker positions seems to have grown in the general structure of jobs which from the macroeconomic perspective is unfavourable and is a reflection of the employers attempts to recruit labour as cheaply as possible.

Although according to the statistics there are more individuals with the tertiary education (secondary vocational and higher education) among the employed non-Estonians than Estonians, one would expect to see more well-educated non-Estonians in white-collar jobs. But the

representation of Estonians in job categories that require higher education continues to grow and one might assume that the competitiveness of non-Estonians for the above jobs remains to be a problem. Also job satisfaction indicators are still higher among Estonians, non-Estonians' rate their current jobs almost two times lower than Estonians. If the previous IM survey showed that among non-Estonian skilled workers the job satisfaction rate was significantly below the average, the present survey revealed that the job satisfaction rate has declined remarkably among those engaged in trade and service sectors (primarily service staff) and has risen among skilled workers.

In total, 43 per cent of non-Estonians (against 17 per cent of Estonians) are not satisfied with their jobs. A significantly deeper discontent in comparison with the results of the previous IM survey is typical to the service sector employees (68 per cent of whom are not satisfied), and unskilled workers (69 per cent), whereas Estonians who hold similar jobs appreciate them much higher. Thus 92 per cent of the Estonian service employees are satisfied with their work. Also two-thirds of the Estonian unskilled workers are more or less satisfied with their work although their wages, as shown below, are lower than the wages of non-Estonians. Job satisfaction has increased slightly in the category of skilled workers where the number of the discontent respondents has remained on the average level and the share of the content workers has grown.

The above-described changes imply the need for further research into the issues pertaining to work organisation and wage categories. As regards Russians, an unskilled worker's or caterer's job are often a forced choice and work in the service sector, as a rule, does not ensure even an average salary, low job satisfaction is justified. It is also striking that educational qualifications of the service sector employees, in their opinion as well as in reality, are considerably higher than their jobs require. But as jobs are scarce, they agree to accept the less-profitable work which soon fails to produce the expected satisfaction level. As salaries in the service sector are not very high (especially for non-Estonians), there is little cause for satisfaction. The following table shows that wages, although not the only factor, definitely affect job satisfaction ratings (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Average net income* (in kroons) of Estonians and non-Estonians with various degree of job satisfaction

Job satisfaction	Estonians	Non-Estonians
-very satisfied	4559	4402
-rather satisfied	4126	3617
-not really	3029	3108
-not at all	2253	1915
Total	3966	3497

* The indicator used here is not salary but average monthly income which, in case of the employed subjects, consists mainly of net salary (75% of all respondents indicated their salary as the main source of income).

Although the comparison of net income indicates only trends in differences and conventional salary indicators do not coincide with potentially real earnings, the content factor follows rather expressively the earnings dynamics and reflects the existing wage gaps. At the same time the income analysis of the employed subjects confirms that the difference in earned income between Estonians and non-Estonians is quite marginal. This means that the problem now is not so much in the earnings differentials but the unfavourable occupational and employment structures which are accentuated by the weight differences among the non-engaged category of the population (unemployed, pensioners, students) and the latter is often to the detriment of non-Estonians. Consequently, the situation could be improved if non-Estonians had a real chance of finding work or competing for better jobs. To date non-Estonians seem to be distressed not so much by salaries than limited choices which are contingent on their place of residence (Ida-Virumaa) as well as persisting variance between the requirements of the local labour market and the professional capacities of non-Estonian employees.

It is obvious that, if possible, Estonian employers prefer to recruit Estonians, especially if there is no real competition for a vacancy. In this case the determinant factors are the employee's social capital and whether there are enough Estonian employees with the matching qualifications to fill in specific offices. As the survey confirmed, also job security among non-Estonians is still weak: 51 per cent of non-Estonians and 17 per cent of Estonians think that currently non-Estonians face a greater risk of losing their jobs. As many as 87 per cent of non-Estonians and 52 per cent of Estonians thought that for Russians their employment status in current jobs was less stable. As finding a new job is also more problematic for non-Estonians, the great majority of the employed non-Estonians have to inevitably put up with the dissatisfactory work situation, including lower salaries.

3. Where is it most profitable for non-Estonians to work?

The comparison of average net income by fields of activity and occupation indicates that employed Estonians and non-Estonians enjoy different opportunities on the labour market. Income differentials by fields of activity also show the spheres where Estonians have occupied better positions and have banished non-Estonians to lower paid jobs or less successful enterprises.

Table 3.2. Average net income of engaged Estonians and non-Estonians by fields of activity

Sector	Estonians	Non-Estonians
-agriculture, forestry, fishery*	3053	3533
-industry	3767	3508
-energy, gas and water supply*	3954	2923
-construction	5323	4027
-transport, communications	4128	3892
-banking, insurance, real estate	5072	2750
-retail and wholesale, services	4141	3387
-other business functions*	4595	3434
- education, R&D	3305	3296
-public administration	4334	3005
- police, border guards	4158	...

* in this category there are less than 10 non-Estonian

As Table 3. 2. shows, in comparison with Estonians, financial income earned by non-Estonians is in almost all spheres of activity lower, only in the fisheries sector they are better off than these Estonians who are engaged in agriculture. Income levels are relatively equal in education and research as well as in industry and transport. With regard to industry, it is to be expected because skilled workers, plant and machine operators and technicians are either predominantly or largely non-Estonians. Income differentials are the biggest in banking and real estate sectors where non-Estonians are not numerous as well as in trade and service where Estonians have the best positions. If for Estonians it is profitable to work in banking, construction or public administration, then non-Estonians can earn more than an average income in their own language community only in construction. But even there their income level is below that of Estonians. For non-Estonians the situation is the worst in sectors that employ more Estonians: banking and other major business areas.

Income differs also by occupational profile: less in worker and lower level white-collar jobs, more in mid-level white-collar and managerial jobs. Because unskilled workers earn more in towns than in rural areas, salaries of non-Estonian unskilled workers are higher than those of Estonians in similar positions and similar differentiation is noticeable also among top managers working for the so-called "Russian businesses". However, net income of professionals (incl. top specialists) is lower than among Estonians (Table 3. 3) which can be explained by the type of enterprise they work for.

Table 3.3. Average net income of Estonians and non-Estonians by occupations

	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Elementary occupation	2295	3087
Skilled worker	3686	3038
Service worker	2788	2737
Clerk*	3221	2852
Technicians and associate professional	4234	3654
Professional (not manager)	4421	3750
Professional with subordinates	6440	4963
Company or line manager*	6271	7176

* in this category there are less than 10 non-Estonians

Major income disparities by occupations are advantageous for Estonians in white-collar groups and only in two sub-groups - the unskilled worker and manager groups - net income of non-Estonians surpasses that of Estonians. As salaries differ substantially by fields of activity and companies, one can assume that non-Estonians hold white-collar positions in companies where the salary level is by far not the highest. At the same time salary levels of service workers are relatively equal, thus the difference in job satisfaction ratings reflects greater social pressure non-Estonians experience in these walks of life.

In conclusion one can say that economic sectors (fields of activity) do not affect drastically the income level of Estonians and exhibit a weak correlation with the income level of Russians; however, Estonians' personal net income is influenced by the position they hold. In case of non-Estonians, the correlation between the position and earned income is insignificant.

For Estonians their income depends on the place of residence - it is of crucial importance whether they live in Tallinn or not. Less decisive is the fact, though still of considerable impact, whether they live and work in urban or rural areas. Also among non-Estonians the place of residence is to some degree important, although the correlation is weaker than in case of Estonians. Living and working in Tallinn does not necessarily make non-Estonians rich, on the contrary, it deepens the gap between them and Estonians and enhances the risk of unemployment and poverty because labour market requirements are tougher and living costs higher there (for example, housing costs).

4. Unemployment: disparities by ethnic groups

In 2001 there were 83 thousand unemployed in Estonia, 38 thousand of them or 46 per cent were non-Estonians.² Since the emergence of unemployment, the unemployment rate has been higher among non-Estonians than Estonians and the gap has not shrunk, but rather widened. The unemployed workers of different ethnic background vary by their educational level. If Estonian unemployed have mostly a poor educational level or poor professional qualifications and skills, then 25 per cent of non-Estonian unemployed have a tertiary level education. Among work-age non-Estonians with the above-mentioned educational background the unemployment rate is 13per cent, whereas among Estonians with the tertiary level education there are two times less jobless people and the unemployment rate in this category is only 4 per cent.

It is specific to Russian unemployment that so many educated non-Estonians have become unemployed and, as indicated above, are engaged in positions or offices requiring much lower educational qualifications.

A high unemployment rate among Estonians in rural areas is typical primarily to the basic education category, the only category where the unemployment rate is comparable to that of less-

² Labour Force 2001. Statistical Office of Estonia.. Tallinn, 2002. 120-121

educated non-Estonians (21 per cent Estonians and 22 per cent non-Estonians). Education does not guarantee employment to non-Estonians to the extent it does to Estonians.

According to the survey, Estonians and non-Estonians perceive the unemployment causes differently: if Estonians consider poor education to be the main cause of unemployment, then non-Estonians - lack of the Estonian language skills; education and professional qualifications are considered to be sufficient for getting a job.

92 per cent of the unemployed Estonians had earlier worked as labourers or service workers (according to the survey two-thirds had been labourers), among non-Estonian unemployed the share of former workers was roughly equal, but additionally they featured also former specialists, managers or office clerks. Estonians are known to be more active as job-seekers, non-Estonians as applicants for remarkably low unemployment benefits paid in Estonia (and according to the survey also as beneficiaries), and thus they are more frequently registered as the unemployed compared to the unemployed Estonians. Considerable part of them are living in rural areas, are often inert, lack qualifications, possess limited cultural capital and probably very little interest in work. Therefore long-term unemployment that is spreading in rural communities is more characteristic for Estonians, likewise desistance from job-seeking and cultivation of the lifestyle dependent on the dole. If Estonians become jobless because there is no work in their neighbourhood or their poor qualifications impede their re-entry to the labour market, then non-Estonians have an additional factor - they lose to Estonians in the competition for jobs and they are often forced to choose between not-so-good jobs. This explains more or less also the differences in attitudes towards work and having a job, becoming jobless and being unemployed.

It also shapes the orientation of the former employed individuals towards finding a new job, if for some reason they lose their current job. Compared to non-Estonians, Estonians are more hopeful about the outlook to find a new job in their neighbourhood or elsewhere in Estonia, non-Estonians perceive new job opportunities more often outside Estonia: in Russia (44%) or abroad (35%). Non-Estonians are more interested in work abroad than Estonians and, especially, these potential employees from low-income group who suffer from economic hardship would like to work abroad. Among Estonians the situation is the opposite. If an Estonian thinks it possible and necessary to go and work abroad, he is, more often than not, a well-educated person of adequate means, who, as a rule, is better informed of the job opportunities abroad.

Today's unemployed assess their situation quite objectively: mostly middle-aged Estonian men with the basic education complained that poor education restricted their job opportunities; mainly up to 30-year-old Estonians of both sexes thought that inadequate work experience is an impediment for finding work; no command of the Estonian language is a problem for unemployed non-Estonians with a relatively high educational level (secondary vocational and higher education); last but not the least, lack of other foreign language skills among younger age-groups (up to 30 years) but also among over 40 years olds.. Women are aware more often than men that lack of language skills reduces their chances to find work.

Scarcity of work experience or aptitude is not considered to be critical, but all unemployed, irrespective of nationality, stressed the crucial role of good references in securing jobs which proves the significance of social capital for all those who might need a job. Estonians and non-Estonians substantiated in a different way why the present-day unemployed have no support network: those long-term unemployed who are isolated in rural regions or communicate only with their own kind of people in towns tend to be or become socially excluded and this augments their marginal status in the society even further.

One-fifth of the unemployed non-Estonians maintained that if they had been Estonians they would be able to find a job (56 per cent disagreed) and 17 per cent considered Estonian citizenship might have a favourable and broadening impact on their options (43 per cent disagreed). This view was often expressed by the non-Estonian unemployed with a low educational level, irrespective of age, but the unemployed with higher education did not support this view.

5. Income

Less than half of the respondents defined themselves as salaried employees (47per cent Estonians and 46per cent non-Estonians). The rest - pensioners, students, other inactive groups or unemployed - were relatively equally represented in both groups, only the share of pensioners, especially non-working pensioners, was to some degree higher among non-Estonians.

The previous IM survey already indicated a deepening trend of more retirees among non-Estonians. This tendency continues and drives the average income level of non-Estonians down.

Personal income, mentioned before in connection with the employed individuals example, is here used for all respondents to measure on a much broader scale the financial capital at the disposal of both groups, which in view of the changes that have taken place in Estonia and the strong economic growth trend, is quite modest.

According to the data presented in the table, the personal income in the dominant group is 1000 ...2000 kroons, including pensioners and low-paid workers. Income by ethnic groups does not differ on the lowest end of the scale (up to 2000 kroons), but poses a problem on the upper end of the scale: there are significantly more Estonians among the higher income group, although their proportion in the core Estonian group is actually negligible. The predominant part of the monitored contingent of individuals (44 per cent) faces the danger of poverty. This fact is also corroborated by the income structure per family member which duplicates the general pattern of distribution.

Table 3. 4. Personal income structure of Estonians and non-Estonians (%)

Income in kroons (per month)	Estonians	Non-Estonians	Total
Up to 1000	12	12	12
Up to 2000	32	32	32
2001...4000	23	27	26
4001...6000	12	10	11
6001...8000	5	3	4
over 8000	6	2	4
No income	10	14	12
Total	100	100	100

Assessment of the factors that affect the personal net income structure showed that in the Estonian group the distribution was affected first by age and after that by education. The average net income varies substantially also by regions and areas of habitation.

Income levels are lower in rural and higher in urban areas, especially in Tallinn where the income differential (pay gap) between Estonians and non-Estonians is the sharpest. The distribution by age groups is as follows:

Table 3.5. Average net income of Estonians and non-Estonians by age groups (in kroons)

Age group	Estonians	Non-Estonians
15-19 years	1109	980
20-29	3489	2299
30-39	3735	3031
40-49	3364	3327
50-59	3067	2761
60-74	2056	1919

Income levels become equalised in the 40-49 group when Estonians' current earnings start to diminish in comparison with the two preceding age groups, then becoming approximately equal again in the retirement years. In the non-Estonian younger age groups the variance with Estonians is remarkable, the competitiveness in these groups is lower than among older compatriots' who consciously and rigorously try to retain their jobs. Consequently, it is true that young non-Estonians must compete both with older generation Russians as well as with Estonians of their own age, and their relatively high educational qualifications are of no help to them yet, but are likely to be in the future.

Table 3.6 shows that education as an income boosting factor is not as effective for them as it is for Estonians.

Table 3.6 Average income of Estonians and non-Estonians by education (in kroons)

Education	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Basic education and less	1782	1676
Secondary education	3025	2568
Higher education	5323	3691

The effectiveness of higher education is low for non-Estonians and it affects mostly younger workers whose entry into the labour market is doubly complicated due to competition. This is proven also by a relatively higher impact of lower educational levels on income that is reinforced by the compensatory effects of work experience and skills, first and foremost, upon when taking up a worker's job. Thus, in comparison with Estonians, individuals with vocational education (which does not provide secondary education), earn more, including those aged 40+ and employed by industry as unskilled or skilled workers (average net income in this category is 2080 kroons, for Estonians with the similar educational background 1857 kroons).

Tallinners enjoy the highest net income, the differential between Estonians and non-Estonians is approximately 25 per cent or substantially higher than elsewhere in Estonia (towns and rural municipalities) where it does not surpass 18-22 per cent in favour of Estonians. Assessing personal income gaps of Estonians and non-Estonians within Tallinn, one is likely to notice that the gap has been **decreasing** against the background of wage harmonisation and distribution of universal benefits and allowances (pension, child benefit) on equal terms, which also affects the assessed net income parameters.

In 1996 pay gaps in Tallinn were significantly bigger (by one-third) and also according to the 1999 labour force survey pay differentials were more prominent.³ In Ida-Virumaa where personal net income is the lowest, income of non-Estonians surpasses that of Estonians. Also in the countryside where poverty is most acute, the compared personal net income levels by ethnic groups are more homogeneous (Table 3.7).

The analysis of the personal net income structure shows a strong stratification among Estonians and sustained deepening of differentials between high and low income groups. Non-Estonians' income is more evenly distributed and, due to the continuing impoverishment of the poorest contingent of Estonians, has become streamlined with Estonians' income. The difference persists in comparison with a relatively small number of wealthy Estonians; the latter are by no means Estonia's "mainstream" but represent a minor elite group of people who have broken away from others and vigorously boosted their income. The share of financially well-off non-Estonians is even more limited, but it is difficult to assess their income on the basis of the respondents sample because of their small representation. One can only assume that they do not lag behind Estonians but rather outstrip them with their wealth.

³ M.Pavelson. Eesti tööturu segmenteeritus ja selle sotsiaalsed tagajärjed. TTÜ kaheksakümnes aastapäev. Tallinn, 2000: 101-106.

Table 3. 7. Average personal net income of Estonians and non-Estonians by area of habitation (in kroons)

Area of habitation	Estonians	Non-Estonians
- Tallinn	3854	2904
- Ida-Virumaa	2296	2445
- other regions in Estonia	2736	2130
- other towns (except Tallinn)	2944	2335
- rural townships, villages	2492	2048
- urban	3292	2611
- rural	2492	2048

It is likely that polarisation among Estonians will increase even more in the near future, thus creating a novel setting for socio-economic inequality of ethnic groups and its acknowledgement. The actual status of the monitored groups based on the size of their property and its market value is definitely a separate issue and there Estonians most probably outdo non-Estonians.

Income per family member (IFM) is another important indicator used to measure the socio-economic status of Estonians and non-Estonians. According to statistics, during the survey period the average income per family member in Estonia was 2000 kroons, the agreed poverty line was slightly below 1500 kroons. IFM structure was as follows:

Table 3. 8. IFM Estonians and non-Estonians (%)

Income (IFM) in kroons	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Up to 100	19	20
1001...1500	20	25
1501...2000	23	27
2001...3500	23	22
Over 3500	15	6
Total	100	100

According to the survey, IFM of 60 per cent Estonians and 70 per cent non-Estonians is below the national average and the income of 39% and 45% of the respondents, respectively, is below the poverty line. The share of the lowest IFM groups has fallen, in the highest IFM group Estonians outweigh non-Estonians by more than two times.

If we replace IFM with a more precise indicator showing net income per family that includes benefits and allowances as well, it becomes apparent that **Estonians'** earnings are, as a rule, modest in the countryside, whereas Tallinn stands out with considerably higher income levels. Better income is also characteristic to urban families; in towns there are two times less families with up to 1000 kroon IFM than in rural settlements and with over 3500 kroon IFM - 1.5 times more. Tallinn and Pärnu lead with the highest income levels, stratification is strong in all county towns, especially in Tartu.

Non-Estonian families in Narva and Sillamäe are distinguishable from the others by their significantly lower IFM, the sharpest income differentials are in Tallinn (like in personal income). For example, in Tartu nationality has no effect on IFM, strong differentiation is typical both to Estonians and non-Estonians. Leaving aside the fact that internally the proportion of high income groups is in favour of Estonians, differences in income per family member are not so big as are personal net income differentials.

Hence income per family member is an extremely sensitive index while considering the needs of families and the subjective satisfaction with their financial status. The degree of satisfaction with one's economic situation is a sufficiently exact reflection of potential changes in the socio-economic status.

36 per cent Estonians and only 26 per cent non-Estonians are more or less satisfied with their current economic situation, 63 per cent Estonians and 73 per cent non-Estonians are dissatisfied. One can deduce that compared to the previous IM survey assessment of economic situation has deteriorated.

34 per cent of the respondents said that their economic situation has improved over the last 5 years and 33 stated that it deteriorated. Also if measured on the better/worse scale, the benchmark for the assessment of economic situation being the on-going impoverishment of the poverty-stricken; the position of the average income groups has remained unchanged. In the non-Estonian group the status of poor families has improved slightly (Table 3. 9).

Table 3. 9. Assessment to economic situation 5 years ago and later

Citizenship	In 5 years economic situation has become...		5 years later economic situation will be	
	Better	Worse	Better	Worse
Estonian, Estonian citizen	39	20	41	13
Non-Estonian, Estonian citizen	22	40	31	16
Stateless	30	32	18	18
Russian citizen	18	43	16	31
All	34	33	35	15

If the previous IM survey brought out a clearly positive trend in the improved socio-economic status of non-Estonians who are Estonian citizens, then the current survey indicates an improvement in the status of Russian citizens and stateless persons. This tendency is reflected both in the growth of personal net income and subjective assessment of the families' economic situation. As the majority of skilled workers are stateless, their increased job satisfaction can be viewed in this context.

Income per family member in families satisfied or dissatisfied with their economic situation is shown in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10. Satisfaction with economic situation and average income per family member (in kroons)

Degree of satisfaction	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Completely satisfied	4159	3335
More or less satisfied	2723	2315
Not really	1828	1703
Not at all	1274	1325

According to this table, the average income of all dissatisfied families is below the general average and income disparities between the polar groups reflects significant degree of inequality (especially for Estonians). A lower and more uniform income level of non-Estonians is reflected also in their satisfaction ratings - they need less for complete satisfaction and their average earnings are at lesser variance with Estonians.

In conclusion, income per family member testifies again that among Estonians differentiation continues, but it shows also their lead over non-Estonians. This leading position is especially obvious in Tallinn where most of the well-to-do Estonians are concentrated (Table 3.11) and where non-Estonians are most stratified.

Table 3.11 Net income per family member of Estonians and non-Estonians depending on the area of habitation (in kroons)

Type of habitation	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Tallinn	2785	1933
Ida-Virumaa	1438	1443
Other regions in Estonia	1865	1680
Urban	2262	1764
Rural	1704	1352

It is obvious that the average net income per family member in non-Estonian families is everywhere below the official national average and in Ida-Virumaa, irrespective of nationality, below the agreed poverty line. Consequently, the reality is to some extent different from the official income distribution statistics.

6. Needs and possibilities

Described above income, its differentials and changes are essential, of course, but any income is a basis for the satisfaction of real needs. The spread of poverty limits possibilities and impedes choices. Discontent with the economic situation, perception of inequality and injustice are not so tightly connected with particular pay statistics or income amount as they are with possibilities to satisfy one's needs. As job opportunities for non-Estonians are worse compared to Estonians and their income levels are also modest, we tried to assess to what extent the possibilities to satisfy one's basic needs differ in the monitored groups. The purchasing value parameter that used also in the previous IM survey to measure the income purchasing power produced in this case the following results (Table 3. 12).

Table 3.12. Estimated structure of purchasing power by ethnic groups (%) and average income in kroons (IFM)

Limits and possibilities for spending	Estonians	Non-Estonians	IFM Estonians	IFM Non-Estonians
Barely enough money for food	9	9	1098	986
Enough money for food but not for clothes	39	46	1525	1527
Not enough money for costly goods (possible to save)	29	27	2258	1911
Can afford also costly goods	21	16	2863	2611
Can buy everything they desire	1	1	2424	2450
Hard to say	1	1
Total %	100	100		

* both Estonians and non-Estonians less than 10

The first group of people are definitely poverty-stricken and it is expedient for the state to support them. Unfortunately less than 50per cent in the group receive social aid (income support). Compared to the previous IM survey the weight of this group has remained stable but the income level of the group representatives displays a falling trend. Also slightly more Estonians than non-Estonians have moved into this group.

The second group is stable among non-Estonians and has diminished in size among Estonians (according to the previous survey the proportion was 46per cent).

The group who cannot afford to buy costly goods but have a savings potential is stable in case of Estonians, in the non-Estonian group it has decreased due to the increase of the succeeding group.

The group who can afford to buy costly goods has grown in both ethnic groups and the last group remains to be small, although it has slightly grown at the expense of non-Estonians.

In order to assess the realisation of needs, 17 different needs were examined and their satisfaction potential assessed on the "enough money for... not enough money for" scale, excluding these respondents to whom the specific need was not topical. As housing costs out as a priority need, the latter was included in the analysis of assessment to economic situation.¹ A new breakdown is presented in Table 3.13 which compares the status of assessment groups on the basis of the unsatisfied need index² (UNI).

Table 3.13. Estonians and non-Estonians: assessment of possibilities (%) and average UNI in assessment groups

Assessment of possibilities	Estonians n = 649	Non- Estonians n = 337	NSI Estonians	NSI Non- Estonians
Not enough money for food and housing	5	10	13,3	13,8
Not enough money for food or housing	15	22	10,3	11,5
Not enough money for buying clothes	30	28	9,2	10,2
Not enough money for buying expensive durable goods	28	23	5,5	6,4
Enough money also for expensive goods	22	17	2,5	3,0
Total	100	100	7,1	8,8

¹ hereinafter "possibilities assessment"

² the unsatisfied needs index (UNI) that shows families discontent is construed of measurable limitations (not enough money) for 17 needs on the scale ... 17. The higher the UNI is, the smaller is the chance to satisfy various needs and vice versa, lower UNI implies better possibilities for need satisfaction purposes.

The data presented in Table 3.13. shows that non-Estonians have limited possibilities to satisfy their urgent basic needs (first 3 groups). According to the possibility assessment, half of the Estonian respondents and 58 per cent of non-Estonians suffer from poverty. Unsatisfied needs volumes fluctuate within 10 points on the scale. Although Estonians have more possibilities, the gap within their ethnic group is bigger than between groups.

UNI is high if income is low, in case of non-Estonians (town-dwellers) the correlation between needs satisfaction and income is stronger than in case of Estonians.

Table 3.14. Estonians and non-Estonians: average income per family member and UNI

Income (in kroons)	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Up to 1000	10,6	12,2
1001 ... 1500	8,2	9,5
1501 ... 2000	7,5	9,0
2001 ... 3500	6,4	7,8
Over 3500	4,0	3,0

If we compare the UNI by area of habitation, it transpires that in small towns with a high UNI the structure of priority needs is different and that the pronounced difference in needs satisfaction rate between Estonians and non-Estonians is in favour of Estonians in Tallinn, however, in Narva/Sillamäe it is in favour of non-Estonians. The UNI value is relatively low in the countryside which implies that some Estonians live in economic exclusion: several needs that are critical in towns, are not even topical in the countryside. Comparing the status of Estonians and non-Estonians, it becomes apparent that Estonians have more possibilities to spend money on entertainment, travel, education of their children. Acquisition of real estate, including housing, seems to be a problem for both ethnic groups.

In addition to inevitable expenses (food, clothes, housing), Estonians can more often provide good education to their children (12% against 7% Russians), pay for entertainment (8% against 1% Russians) and travel (3% against 1% Russians). This results in a broader scale of needs to be satisfied and different weight attributed to various (secondary) needs, especially among Estonians living in towns.

CONCLUSIONS

- Inequality issues highlighted when the economic situation of Estonians and non-Estonians is compared and often interpreted as political are related to economic processes and functioning of institutions. Unemployment among Russians is largely caused by the conditions on the Estonian labour market and limited number of jobs (vacancies). Compared with 1999 the number of jobs has decreased by 40 000 that has inevitably increased competition for available jobs. This can only be resolved by the developments on the labour market and an active labour market policy which should have been developed much earlier. It is necessary to increase the unemployment benefit in order to dissuade people from giving up attempts of finding a job which is characteristic of Estonians as well as non-Estonians.
- Non-Estonians' salaries, income and financial security on the whole are lower than Estonians'. But the ever continuing stratification has led to a greater differentiation among Estonians and thus approximated the income and salary levels of the ethnic groups in the low and middle brackets.
- As these people who are financially better off and able to adjust understand rationally the need for integration, the rise in welfare promotes chiefly political integration. Currently there is no direct correlation between the economic status and integration readiness because the ethnic groups perceive the (economic) processes in a different way. Estonians have a competitive advantage in the labour market due to greater social capital. Competition for jobs in the public sector is likely to become tougher and the capacity of non-Estonians will increase thanks to the developments in education and training.
- In Estonia poverty is linked to the area of habitation, the latter affects also the status and lifestyle of non-Estonians. Expectations of economic changes and growing welfare have become assimilated among Estonian nationals of different ethnic origin, however, possibilities for the realisation of one's own strategies are more limited for non-Estonians. In the entire society the goal of personal attainment-based prosperity is gaining strength and starting to engulf more and more non-Estonians too. At the same time exclusion and poverty have become increasingly "a personal problem", with little hope to escape it with the support of the society.
- Estonians' relatively higher income allows them to suffice their other individual interests in addition to basic needs. Hence Estonians' individual strategies encompass a broader range of needs and this accounts also for the difference in lifestyles.
- In Estonian economy prices change periodically, bringing about a rise in housing costs or a decline in the availability of medical care or medicines. This hits, first and foremost, non-Estonians considering their greater share among the owners of privatised apartments, pensioners and the unemployed. Therefore it is necessary to plan and design additional national measures for the mitigation of the effects of unfavourable changes. It is not reasonable to aspire towards social and economic integration and simultaneously evoke the

"accumulation of unfavourable circumstances" for the economically most vulnerable non-Estonians.

- The one way for the enhancement of non-Estonians' work-related capacity and coping potential is the gradual transformation of the Russian language education into the integral part of Estonian educational institutions equally accessible and as comprehensive as possible.

APPENDIX 3.

Table 3.1. Employed by nationality and field of activity (%)

Field of activity	Estonians	Non-Estonians	Total
Agriculture	9	1	6
Fishing	...	1	...
Mining	...	2	1
Manufacturing	19	33	23
Energy and water supply	1	4	2
Construction	7	7	7
Trade and service	16	11	15
Hotels, restaurants	3	3	3
Transport, warehousing, communications	8	12	9
Financial mediation	1	...	1
Real estate, leasing	7	6	7
Public administration	7	3	6
Education	9	8	9
Healthcare	6	4	5
Other	6	5	6
Total	100	100	100

Source: Labour Force 2001. Statistical Office of Estonia. 2002, 68.

Table 3.2. Employed by nationality and occupation (%)

Occupation	Estonians	Non-Estonians	Total
Legislators, senior officials	14	7	12
Top specialists	15	8	13
Middle level specialists	15	11	14
Clerks	5	5	5
Service workers, shop workers	12	11	12
Skilled farm and fisheries workers	4	1	3
Craft and related trade workers	13	22	15
Plant and machine operators	11	19	14
Labourers	10	16	12
Armed forces	1
Total	100	100	100

Source: Labour Force 2001. Statistical Office of Estonia. 2002, 78.

LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE OF RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA : TRENDS AND CHANGES

Ivi Proos

The integration of non-Estonians into the Estonian society has been the issue of on-going concern. Foreign analysts watch with great attention how the Estonian society copes with the integration of the permanent residents of the State who speak other than Estonian languages. This indirect indicator is used to assess the development of democracy in Estonia.

Integration is such a complicated process that there is no one simple and universally acknowledged concept of it. There exist various interpretations, and Estonians and non-Estonians unfortunately often understand integration in a different way. It would be more accurate to say that Estonians and Russians, forming the predominant majority within the non-Estonian community, understand the priorities of integration unlikely and ascribe disparate meanings to this concept.

The variance in the perception of integration by Estonians and ethnic minorities reflects differences in their social status and related interests and expectations. On the other hand, lack of contacts between the Russian and Estonian language media, though lately starting to evolve, also contributes to the continuation of diverging interpretations. But even then publications in the Estonian language write about integration through the eyes of Estonian authors, whilst Russian publications report positions of Russian authors¹, thus consolidating collective conceptions.

Importance of language skills

Estonians' perception of the integration of non-Estonians is simple. The vast majority of them think that integration means that many non-Estonians who live in Estonia learn the Estonian language at least for communication purposes. It seems to Estonians that the more aliens living in Estonia know the Estonian language, the more integrated they are and the more easily they can cope with life in Estonia. The observance of the language requirements applicable to non-Estonians living in Estonia are under Estonians' sharp scrutiny and they are not willing to make compromises in this issue. For example, granting of the Estonian citizenship without language proficiency would very quickly induce many Estonians to form strong protest groups.

For non-Estonians integration does not have such a simple and intelligible to all meaning as for Estonians. For non-Estonians one of key problems is the persistent feeling of social injustice. Non-Estonians who had lived for many long years in Estonia were grossly disappointed that after the restoration of independence in Estonia they were not treated like Estonians, were not recognised as "our own", but were warded off as a group of people with a special status. Non-Estonians became settlers who were required to apply for residency permit and for the Estonian citizenship were they were obliged to undertake the same standard procedure that was prescribed for foreigners. Therefore non-Estonians' integration-related expectations are quite different. Non-Estonians expect from the state a show of good will, meaning the establishment of simplified procedures for the citizenship applicants.

Changes in non-Estonians' command of the Estonian language

The article describes non-Estonians' command of the Estonian language and changes over the past five years, i.e. one of the integration parameters which is of critical importance, first and foremost, for Estonians but also considered to be extremely important by most non-Estonians. In brief, changes that have taken place in the language proficiency of non-Estonians over the past five years reveal three trends:

¹ According to the year 2000 media monitoring 87% of the articles in Estonian-medium press were written by Estonian and 13% by local non-Estonian authors. For the Russian readers the tendency was *vice versa*. 86% of the articles were written by local non-Estonians and 13% by Estonians. *Estonian press and integration. Media monitoring 1999-2001*, Tartu, 2002, p.6

- Reading and writing skills in Estonian have improved among non-Estonians who are **Estonian citizens**. The improvement in communication skills in Estonian has been more modest;
- Language proficiency of **stateless** non-Estonians has improved the most. Also communication skills of stateless non-Estonians have progressed rapidly. This shows that financial support to adult language learning programs has gone to the right target group, to potential new applicants for the Estonian citizenship;
- Language proficiency of **Russian citizens** living in Estonia has over the past five years seriously deteriorated. From the very beginning there have been many pensioners (ca 50%) among Russian citizens and most of them live in Russian neighbourhoods. Therefore it is unlikely that in this group the number of Estonian language speakers will increase.

Changes in non-Estonians' language skills are described in Appendix 4 of this article.

Table 4.1. Improvement/deterioration of non-Estonians' language skills 1997 - 2002. (%)*

Language skills	Estonian citizens	Stateless	Russian citizens
- Can understand spoken Estonian	- 3	+ 11	- 34
- Can read in Estonian	+ 26	+ 48	- 37
- Can write in Estonian	+ 22	+ 34	- 54
- Can communicate in Estonian	+ 6	+ 43	- 30
- Total improvement (+) or deterioration (-) **	+ 51	+ 136	- 155

* Changes expressed in % are based on self-assessment and show how many non-Estonians rated one or another type of language skills (oral speech, reading, writing, communication) as "good" or "passable."

** The consolidated rating of the changes in language proficiency is the sum total of the changes in four types of skills.

Non-Estonians with the **Estonian citizenship** status know the Estonian language best, of course. However, still 6-10% of them are monolingual who are not able to read or communicate in Estonian nor do they understand spoken Estonian.

A part of non-Estonians have obtained the Estonian citizenship without the language examination (as holders of the so-called green card issued by the Estonian Committee or granted for outstanding services to the state). Other Russians living in Estonia have passed the language exam in order to get the Estonian citizenship. According to the survey, language skills of those Russians in Estonia who have passed the language test are better than of those non-Estonians who got the citizenship without the language exam.

Those who had passed the naturalisation language examination were later better able to cope in this language and enjoyed a considerably greater potential for communication in Estonian than those who had obtained the citizenship without the mandatory language proficiency examination.

Non-Estonians with the Estonian citizen's status rated their communication skills in Estonian as ... :

- "good" - 49 % (language exam passed) and 35 % (citizenship without the language exam)
- "average" - 19 % and 28 %
- "minimum" 27 % and 23 %
- "not able to communicate" 5 % and 14 %

The beneficial impact of the language exam is chiefly reflected in acquiring of the "good" language proficiency level. Half of non-Estonians who have passed the language examination rated their language skills as good. Also the share of monolingual non-Estonians ("not able to communicate") among those who have passed the language examination is smaller compared to those not taken examination (5 and 14 per cent respectively).

Likewise, it is a positive trend that language skills of stateless non-Estonians have in recent years progressed at high speed. This proves that financial support to adult language learning programs has gone to the right target group, to those who probably would apply for the Estonian citizenship.

According to the monitoring data, stateless Russians in Estonia can be divided into three groups depending on their plans for the future:

- **Group with sufficient language proficiency.** To this group belong 8 per cent of stateless non-Estonians who have already passed the language exam but have not yet received the Estonian citizenship;
- **Group motivated for language learning.** To this group belong 38 per cent of stateless non-Estonians who all intend to take the Estonian language exam which is a precondition for the Estonian citizenship;
- **Group not interested to learn language.** This is the most numerous group that includes 54 per cent of stateless non-Estonians. They have no intention of taking the Estonian language exam

On the basis of the monitoring results it is possible to evaluate the expected changes in the linguistic situation across the entire society. According to the population census (2000) there were 1 050 thousand people of the age 15-74 years. Non-Estonians accounted for 35 per cent in this group or 370 thousand people. The study indicated that among 15-74-year-old non-Estonians 32 per cent were stateless, in total 118 thousand people.² Proceeding from these statistics, it is possible to estimate the size of the above-described groups:

• Group with sufficient language proficiency	ca 9 000 individuals
• Group with language learning motivation	ca 45 000
• Group with no interest in language learning	ca 64 000
Total	118 000

The Estonian language skills of *Russian citizens* might improve to some extent in the future at the expense of these youngsters who are learning Estonian on the basis of the same curriculum as stateless students or Estonian citizens.

Legislation and language requirements

Legislation regulates non-Estonians' knowledge of the Estonian language from two basic aspects:

- Knowledge of the Estonian language necessary for applicants of the Estonian citizenship. This proficiency requirement corresponds to the basic or first level;
- Job-related language proficiency requirement applicable to representatives of certain professions and offices, concerning primarily civil servants. There are three categories, depending on the nature of their work: basic, intermediate and advanced levels of proficiency.

In the beginning of the year 2002 (during the survey period) there was still in force the requirement to the effect that non-Estonians whose profession/job required a certain language proficiency level must all take a new test in Estonian by July 1, 2002 (the language proficiency examination for basic, intermediate and advanced levels). The proficiency examination had to be taken also by those who had already attained a required language proficiency category under the old system (6 categories A ...F). On June 5 of the current year the Riigikogu extended the validity of the job-related Estonian language proficiency category certificates for another 18 months. The new deadline was set for 01.01.2004. Within this time period the government and relevant institutions must decide how to make the existing language proficiency certificates (more than 100,000) compatible with new regulations. It has also been acknowledged that it is necessary to better harmonise the language proficiency requirements with the actual language skills demanded in connection with various professions/positions and the character of jobs.

A task of the study was to find out whether non-Estonians had been prepared to take the Estonian language proficiency examination in time (01.07.2002) before the law was amended. Non-Estonians' assessment of their willingness to take this exam provides a sufficiently informative overview of their need and readiness to take the proficiency examination in Estonian.

² According to the census, the number of stateless persons was over 170,000. Population and housing census 2000, II,8.

Table 4.2. Non-Estonians' willingness to take the Estonian language proficiency examination and the citizenship applicant's examination (respondents' assessments %)*

		Intention to take the Estonian language proficiency examination (by July 1, 2002)			Total
		Intend	Do not intend	Do not need	
Intention to take the citizenship applicant's language exam	Intend	4	9	1	14
	Do not intend	2	13	28	43
	Exam passed	7	9	27	43
Total		13	31	56	100

* Respondents who were unable to say whether they needed to take the Estonian language proficiency examination or not, are not included in the above table.

Slightly over one-tenth (13 per cent) of non-Estonians are not disposed towards the Estonian language examination for the citizenship or proficiency purposes, despite the fact that their current job/position demands it.

Over one-fourth (27 per cent) of non-Estonians have passed the citizenship exam, but their jobs/positions do not demand them to take the proficiency examination. And only 1 per cent of non-Estonians, who do not need to take the exam for professional reasons, intended to take it for the citizenship status.

The analysis of non-Estonians' opinions indicates that the main incentive for taking the exam in Estonian is the job/professional requirement. These non-Estonians whose jobs/positions do not require from them completion of the proficiency examination, do not intend to take the exam for the citizenship status either. Or, in other words, for the vast majority of non-Estonians retention of their job or expectation of a better job is the strongest motivating factor for taking the language exam and applying for citizenship.

Table 4.3 Non-Estonians' intention to take the Estonian language proficiency examination, per cent.

		Have Estonian language proficiency requirements been established for your profession/position?		Total
		Yes	No	
Intention to take the Estonian language proficiency exam	Intend	14	5	19
	Do not intend	14	22	36
	Do not need	12	33	45
Total		40	60	100

Table 4.3 contains data about the respondents who during the survey were employed. 40 per cent of the working non-Estonians answered that the Estonian language proficiency requirements have been established for their professions/offices. As these are personal assessments and not official statistics, we can assume that not all respondents took into consideration the statutory language proficiency requirements (prescribed by the law for professions/offices). There are certainly some employers who on their own initiative require the knowledge of Estonian from their employees in order to ensure better customer services.

The controversial group of respondents (12 per cent) who thought that language requirements existed in their workplace but said that they did not have to take the proficiency examination, were most difficult to understand.

Non-Estonians' intentions in connection with the language exam indirectly show the need for language learning. Two regions where the concentration of non-Estonians is the greatest - Tallinn with Harjumaa and Ida-Virumaa - were compared.

Table 4.4. Intention to take the Estonian language proficiency examination by non-Estonians living in Tallinn, Harjumaa and Ida Virumaa (per cent)

Statement	Tallinn and Harjumaa	Ida - Virumaa
- Intend	14	8
- Do not intend, although should	26	37
- Do not need	49	50
- Hard to say	11	5
Total	100	100

The survey revealed that the portion of non-Estonians whose job/profession did not require them to pass the proficiency examination is equal in Tallinn with Harjumaa and in Ida-Virumaa. Compared with Tallinn, there are more non-Estonians in Ida-Virumaa who could be conditionally defined as protesters, i.e. whose job/profession requires them to take the exam but who had no intention of taking it before July 1 of the current year (37 and 26 per cent respectively). Naturally, it does not mean that these individuals have no intention of taking the exam some time in the future. The assessments were definitely influenced by the term and limited time for preparations for the exam. It is also possible that some employees are actually able to perform their job-related duties without the knowledge of Estonian and that some of them know the language to the extent required but are reluctant to prove it again at the exam.

Table 4.5. Intention to take the Estonian language proficiency examination by non-Estonians of different age groups, per cent.

Age group	Intention to take the Estonian language proficiency examination				
	Intend	Do not intend	Do not need	Hard to say	Total
15 – 19 years	36	23	31	10	100
20 – 29 years	10	42	38	10	100
30 – 39 years	12	38	42	8	100
40 – 49 years	20	41	34	5	100
50 – 59 years	7	18	68	7	100
60 – 74 years	...	17	79	4	100

Table 4.5. incorporates the answers of all respondents, not only those who work. Therefore this table allows to analyse chiefly the attitude and disposition of non-Estonians to the Estonian language examination.

The youngest respondents, 15 - 19 years old, have the highest motivation and 36 per cent of them were ready to take the exam. About one-third (31 per cent) of young non-Estonians were of the opinion that they did not need to take Estonian language exam. Many young non-Estonians have already passed or are going to take this exam as part of their final examinations at school.

Table 4.6. The Estonian language examination: old and new requirements

Old requirements (categories)		New requirements (levels)	
	Assessment (%)		Assessment (%)
Did not have the certificate	71	Did not have the certificate	87
Had the certificate, incl.	29	Had the certificate, incl.	13
• A	1	• basic	4
• B	4	• intermediate	8
• C	8	• advanced	1
• D	11		
• E	4		
• F	1		

The above data helps to map the impact of the mandatory state language proficiency requirements and their scope in the general linguistic area. Comparing holders of certificates that verify compliance with the old language proficiency requirements with the new, so-called proficiency level certificates, one can provisionally divide them into 3 categories:

Successfully adjusted to new requirements:

Non-Estonians who have already managed to pass the Estonian language proficiency examination under new requirements. Conditionally they can be divided into two sub-groups: 5 per cent of non-Estonians have both old and new language proficiency certificates and 8 per cent have new certificates.

Language proficiency has to be proved by ...

...25 per cent of non-Estonians. They have passed the language category examination under the old requirements but have not taken the proficiency examination under the new requirements.

Knowledge of the Estonian language is the matter of free choice ...

... for the greater part (62 per cent) of adult non-Estonians. They have never had any state language proficiency certificate at all. They have either not needed it in their job or managed to cope without examinations and official certificates.

The monitoring data showed that approximation on the basis of the language between Estonians and non-Estonians would be a long process which is influenced by many factors. The mandatory language proficiency requirements, both citizenship and job-related, can only partly transform the overall language usage. Motivation to acquire the Estonian language for cultural interaction and integration purposes will grow hand in hand with the establishment of closer personal contacts, openness and deepening of mutual respect.

APPENDIX 4

Table 4.1. Non-Estonians' knowledge of the Estonian language (per cent)

Assessment of individual language skills	Estonian citizens			Russian citizens			Stateless		
	2002	2000	1997	2002	2000	1997	2002	2000	1997
Understand oral Estonian									
• well	48	47	42	5	7	6	15	8	11
• so-so	24	32	28	16	15	26	26	29	26
• a little	22	13	24	26	39	34	43	41	41
• not at all	6	8	6	53	39	34	16	22	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Can read in Estonian									
• well	49	49	39	5	7	11	20	25	7
• so-so	29	31	23	14	17	19	26	22	24
• a little	14	13	29	26	30	24	38	29	40
• not at all	8	7	9	55	46	46	16	24	29
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Can write in Estonian									
• well	34	34	29	1	6	6	10	12	7
• so-so	32	31	25	11	12	20	29	24	22
• a little	25	26	33	23	26	22	32	31	34
• not at all	9	9	13	65	56	52	29	33	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Can communicate in Estonian									
• well	40	39	38	3	6	5	11	4	5
• so-so	26	33	24	13	10	18	22	25	18
• a little	24	18	23	23	34	37	38	37	40
• not at all	10	10	15	61	50	40	29	34	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

ABOUT FORMATION OF A COMMON FOUNDATION IN LEGAL-POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Raivo Vetik

1. Introduction

This is an analysis of one of the main elements in the integration of Estonian society: formation of a strong common foundation in the public sphere of the society. Both Estonians and non-Estonians as subjects of legal-political integration are of interest to us. In the case of non-Estonians we are, on one hand, interested in those who are already relatively well integrated into Estonian society and, on the other hand, in those for whom integration is connected with significant difficulties or who have adverse attitude towards integration. Having identified these groups, we could establish factors influencing the development of the common foundation of the legal-political sphere of society and what the state should do to strengthen it.

In the Estonian Integration Programme the integration in Estonian society has been defined through two processes: on the one hand, social *homogenisation* of society based on knowledge of the Estonian language and acquiring Estonian citizenship, and on the other, *the opportunity to preserve ethnic differences* by recognising minority cultural rights. The programme also specifies that homogenisation of society lies in the integration of both Estonians and non-Estonians around a strong common foundation in Estonian society. The common foundation creates a basis for mutually enriching communication and apprehension of common interest and also contributes to a situation in which individuals from different nationalities feel secure in Estonia.

As integration is a bilateral process, strengthening of the mutual common foundation assumes certain changes in both main groups in the society. *In the case of non-Estonians* strengthening of the common foundation assumes weakening of barriers, which currently prevent them from being competitive in Estonia's labour market, using local educational opportunities and participating in political life. These barriers are primarily connected with the lack of Estonian-language competence and insecure legal status as well as fears and prejudices arising from changes in the society. *In the case of Estonians* strengthening of the common foundation assumes that the currently relatively rebuffing attitude towards ethnic minorities will shrink alongside with the recognition of a multicultural model of society and fear of preserving national identity and cultural space will decline.

The above objectives reveal that the proposed concept of integration contains elements that under certain circumstances may be contradictory. Homogenisation and preserving differences are contradictory processes in essence. The Estonian Integration Programme specifies what kind of unification of society and preservation of which differences are considered in concrete spheres of society. In the *linguistic-communicative* sphere strengthening common foundation means reproduction of a common space of information and an Estonian-language environment in Estonian society under conditions of diversity and tolerance. In the *legal-political* sphere it means molding a population that is loyal to the Estonian state and diminishing the number of people without Estonian citizenship. In the *socio-economic* sphere strengthening common foundation means achieving better competitiveness and social mobility by minority groups.


Strong common foundation bringing together different ethnic groups involves all main spheres of integration. The following analysis will focus on formation of the common foundation in the legal-political sphere, as this is one of the central components of the public sphere of society. The most significant component of the strengthening political-legal common foundation is equalization of the legal status of all permanent residence, i.e. access to Estonian citizenship to all applicants, and the programme foresees creating favourable naturalization conditions therefor. Equal legal status and inclusion in the common space of information facilitates common state identity. In the Integration Programme objectives related to the political sphere are as follows:

- a) *Citizenship* - In Estonia a situation is being created that permits all non-Estonians who desire Estonian citizenship to fulfil the requirements for its acquisition. The naturalization process shall become more productive and effective;
- b) *Participation in political structures* - In the Estonian political landscape a similar political pluralism will develop among both Estonians and non-Estonians;
- c) *Loyalty* - non-Estonians sense that they are full and equal members of Estonian society and perceive their responsibility for the welfare of the Estonian state.

The significance of the common foundation of the public sphere is also stressed in the Estonian model of a multicultural society defined by three main attributes: *cultural pluralism, a strong common foundation* and *the preservation and development of the Estonian cultural domain*. This model is based on the discussion taking place in modern social theory about the relationship between individual and group rights. The dominant liberal theory denies the need to recognise group rights, saying that the recognition of the rights of an individual is sufficient for democratic and normal functioning of the state. However, more recent treatment within liberalism indicates that the inclusion of group rights is inevitable in the modern society.

Therefore the Estonian model of multiculturalism distinguishes between the levels of individuals and groups. The model assumes that individuals are the direct subjects of integration. The integration on the level of individuals develops a sufficiently strong common foundation in the public sphere, which rests upon the Estonian language, common social institutions (e.g. education system, governing bodies) and democratic values. However, in our model (see Figure 1) the level of the individual is the level in which the core of the political integration is born through equal and diversified public-sphere participation of citizens holding different nationalities. Integration based on the principle of individuality is supplemented by recognition of group rights belonging to ethnic groups expressed in cultural pluralism and preservation of Estonian cultural space. This is prevalingly a field in the private sphere the state does not directly interfere in but which the democratic society values. The third component belongs, on one hand, into the private sphere, as it is related to the culture of an ethnic group (Estonians) and on the other hand, also to the public sphere as the Estonian societal cultural space rests on the Estonian language.

Figure 5.1



We will analyse the other component of the model. Our goal is to study factors influencing the evolution of the common foundation in the political sphere of the society. Without exaggeration we can argue that processes related to the evolution of a sufficiently strong common foundation during the next 5-10 years should display whether a vital and coherent society will develop in Estonia or a separation as well as the potential for strong ethnic conflicts will dominate. Consequently the analysis of processes related to the evolution of the mutual common foundation has real practical value for the shaping of Estonian national integration policy and, more broadly, for ensuring the social sustainability of the society.

2. Estonian citizenship as a key component in the common foundation of the public sphere

The above goal makes us ask the following question: what factors do facilitate formation of the common foundation in the public sphere? In order to find an answer, let us first consider the following questions asked in the integration monitoring:

- a) *For what reasons have you personally not obtained Estonian citizenship yet?*
- b) *Why is it important for you personally to have/obtain Estonian citizenship?*

These questions have been asked because Estonian citizenship is the main component of the common foundation in the public sphere. The analysis of issues related to holding/not holding Estonian citizenship should significantly contribute to comprehension of processes, which influence political integration of the society.

Tables 1 and 2 list potential reasons for not holding Estonian citizenship. They could be conditionally categorized as follows:

- a) Reasons inherent to the person himself – e.g. *“Do not feel as belonging in Estonia”, “easier to travel to Russia and other CIS states”*.
- b) Bilateral reasons, connected to relations between the Estonian state and the person – e.g. *“Cannot learn the Estonian language”* (the reason could be, on one hand, requirements of the language exam imposed by the state and, on the other hand, poor learning ability of the person), *“requirements of citizenship are humiliating”, “lack of citizenship does not hinder living in Estonia”*.
- c) Reasons arising from external factors – e.g. *“I am already citizen of another country”, “easier to travel to Russia and other CIS states”*.

The more detailed analysis of the above types is significant to explain which are the target groups and what kind of policy should Estonia pursue in order to strengthen the common foundation. Tables provide the distribution of the reasons for not holding a citizenship by age and legal status of respondents. These two turned out to be the most significant factors influencing political integration.

Table 5.1 For what reasons have you personally not obtained citizenship yet? (By age groups, %)

	Age					
	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-74
Do not feel as belonging in Estonia	17	5	12	7	15	9
Wish to avoid military service in Estonian army	27	17	3	0,0	0,0	2
Cannot learn the Estonian language	33	47	56	80	62	84
Requirements of citizenship exam are humiliating	45	55	53	73	64	72
Easier to travel to Russia and other CIS states	39	32	51	53	51	62
I would be of little use to me and my family	22	14	18	24	26	50
I am already a citizen of another country	5	0,0	21	45	42	65
Estonia is too small for its citizenship to have value in the world	16	23	19	31	37	24
Lack of citizenship does not hinder living in Estonia	56	46	63	60	61	82

Table 5.2. For what reasons have you personally not obtained citizenship yet? (By citizenship, %)

	Stateless person	Russian citizen
I am already a citizen of another country		85
Cannot learn the Estonian language	61	73
Requirements of citizenship exam are humiliating	61	69
Lack of citizenship does not hinder living in Estonia	55	78
Easier to travel to Russia and other CIS states	38	72
Estonia is too small for its citizenship to have value in the world	21	34
I would be of little use to me and my family	18	44
Do not feel as belonging in Estonia	9	12
Wish to avoid military service in Estonian army	8	3

The correlation analysis singled out several statistically relevant relations between age and citizenship. The older the respondents the less they feel themselves belonging in Estonia. Contemporaneously it is important to notice that in the youngest group this is also one of the significant reasons not to hold citizenship. However, the older the respondents, the more the underlying reasons for not holding citizenship are: the inability to learn the Estonian language, requirements of citizenship exam are considered humiliating, easier to travel to Russia and the opinion that lack of citizenship does not hinder living in Estonia. Among older respondents there are also more citizens of another country. Comparing Russian citizens and stateless persons, we see that the former have much more frequently than the latter mentioned all the reasons suggested (except “wish to avoid military service in Estonian army”). This leads to a conclusion that stateless persons can integrate into Estonian society considerably more easily than Russian citizens.

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 list factors for holding or obtaining citizenship. They fall conditionally into the following groups:

- a) Pragmatic – e.g. *“possibility to get work more easily”, “possibility to travel abroad more easily”, “possibility to get better education for one’s children”.*
- b) Psychological – e.g. *“to feel as part of Estonia”, “wish to gain security to live in Estonia”.*
- c) Political – e.g. *“wish to determine one’s legal status in Estonia”, “wish to obtain franchise at Riigikogu elections”, “possibility to become successful in political and public life”.*

The following Tables characterize factors for holding or obtaining citizenship by respondents’ age and legal status.

Table 5.3. Why is it important for you personally to have/obtain Estonian citizenship? (By age groups, %)

	Age					
	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-74
To feel as part of Estonia	68	73	70	59	71	69
Wish to determine one's legal status in Estonia	93	93	89	92	83	96
Possibility to get work more easily	91	74	84	80	65	54
Wish to secure a better future for one's children in Estonia	66	62	82	79	58	64
Wish to gain security to live in Estonia	94	96	92	88,4	90	100
Possibility to travel abroad more easily	75	71	64	62	39	42
Wish to obtain franchise at Riigikogu elections	37	43	47	49	42	60
Wish to obtain franchise at local elections	37	36	38	43	40	56
Possibility to become successful in political and public life	16	7	13	11	12	4
Possibility to improve one's (family's) economic situation	72	43	53	43	35	41
Possibility to get better education for one's children	56	42	54	65	49	40
Possibility to get a job in a state institution	60	33	33	47	30	16
Possibility to serve in army	25	7	7	8	3	4

Table 5.4. Why is it important for you personally to have/obtain Estonian citizenship? (By citizenship, %)

	Stateless person	Estonian citizen, non-Estonian
Wish to gain security to live in Estonia	95	92
Wish to determine one's legal status in Estonia	88	92
Possibility to get work more easily	80	74
To feel as part of Estonia	74	66
Wish to secure a better future for one's children in Estonia	66	71
Possibility to travel abroad more easily	54	62
Possibility to get better education for one's children	50	53
Possibility to improve one's (family's) economic situation	42	49
Wish to obtain franchise at Riigikogu elections	39	48
Wish to obtain franchise at local elections	33	44
Possibility to get a job in a state institution	27	42
Possibility to serve in army	10	8
Possibility to become successful in political and public life	4	13

The analysis shows that various reasons of having/obtaining citizenship depend on age (statistically relevant connection). The younger the responders, the more important they consider citizenship in getting a job. The younger respondents associate citizenship also with the possibility to travel abroad more easily, get a job in the state institution and improve one's economic situation.

The correlation analysis about having/obtaining citizenship and legal status shows that non-Estonian Estonian citizens consider slightly more important than stateless persons determination of one's legal status in Estonia, better future and education for one's children in Estonia, possibility to travel abroad more easily and improve one's economic situation. However, Estonian citizens consider possibilities associated with social and political activity significantly more relevant in having/obtaining citizenship – to obtain franchise at Riigikogu elections, to get a job in a state institution and to become successful in political life. In brief, we can say that having citizenship is significant for non-Estonians primarily for psychological and pragmatic reasons whereas participation on social and political life is considered less relevant.

3. Political integration outlooks

Main goals of legal-political integration are diminishing the number of people without Estonian citizenship and formation of state identity common for the entire population. The above analysis shows that it is not possible to achieve all of these goals at once, as problems in this sphere have developed as a result of long-term structural processes.

Interpretation of the current results arising from legal-political integration of Estonian society and future perspectives assumes asking of a number of fundamental questions, which need additional analysis. What kind of opportunities and needs do non-Estonians have currently to participate in political and social life in Estonia? What balance does exist between their political rights and obligations? To what extent does the state-created institutional environment facilitate formation of Estonia-centred political notions and attitudes? To what extent can processes related to the non-Estonians' legal status be guided through political instruments? What is the role of Estonians in achieving goals of political integration?

There are very different opinions existing in Estonian society about these questions. Different opinions are inherent for democracy; they are not denied but solved by concrete procedures. Democratic political system assumes that all people have equal legal status, which establishes a foundation for coherent society. In case of Estonia, having a significant part of non-Estonians without Estonian citizenship, the main problem lies in slow naturalisation process. Inherent hopes have not been realised.

There are many reasons there. Finding a solution we should, first and foremost, see the socio-psychological and historic background of these issues. In understanding citizenship issues there has been a significant conceptual difference between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Most of the West European countries do not make difference between the notions "nationality" and "citizenship" and they are used as synonyms. The people holding nationality or citizenship are full-fledged citizens of the state. Nationality or citizenship is obtained through naturalisation based on a shorter or longer period of residence and a few other criteria.

The situation in several East European countries is different. An individual can be a member of a nation or an ethnic group but simultaneously also hold a citizenship of the country of residence. In this model citizenship is an agreement between a state and an individual whereas nationality is rather a feeling of belonging to one's ethnic group. Thus, acquisition of citizenship is a formal procedure, in principle available to everybody but nationality is born into.

In Estonia as a typical East European state nationality and citizenship are distinctly distinguished and therefore naturalisation issues have a specific socio-psychological background. They are often perceived primarily in an existentialist dimension and this makes the use of rational arguments more complicated.

What could we recommend to promote legal-political integration in Estonia? About a quarter of Estonia's population does not have Estonian citizenship and about a sixth has no citizenship of any country. Finding an answer to this problem is one of the key areas in the entire integration activity. A solution here would solve many problems in other fields as well. It is important for the state to establish an environment in which non-Estonians wishing to obtain citizenship can fulfil the necessary requirements pursuant to the law. In the case of non-citizenship, naturalisation assumes acceptance that Estonia as a sovereign state has established citizenship requirements, which should be met to become a citizen.

It is essential to focus also on problems related to participation in the political life. Unlike national elections, in local elections non-citizens have a right to vote. This has been a significant instrument in involving them in the local life. However, consolidation of democracy in Estonia assumes that non-Estonians will have a more significant role also in the national political life. The substantial objective could be achieving a situation in which, both in national and local political landscape, both Estonians and non-Estonians would have similar political pluralism and vote not along nationality but personal preferences (e.g. economic policy). Thus, new circumstances would evolve with nationality fading from the public sphere and assuming its natural place as a safeguard of minority culture and traditions.

Legal-political integration will advance provided that tolerance and openness towards minority groups grow. Monitoring displays that although positive shifts have taken place over the last ten years, it is still too early to talk about a tolerant society. Consequently, one of the fields of integration activities should be programmes and projects, focused on reducing ethnocentric attitudes.

A significant conclusion is that Estonians should also be target groups of integration projects. Up to now non-Estonians have been the only target group but the time is ripe for a shift. Estonians' acceptance of multicultural society means that integration is not any more equalised to assimilation but cultural diversity of minorities is accepted as a component of the entire culture of the society. As cultural diversity can be both a source of conflict and wealth, concrete integration projects should expand people's comprehension of ethnic differences as wealth, instrumental for everybody.

Apart from attitude changes in opinion polls, also changes in national policy are necessary. The Integration Programme of Estonian Society 2000-2007, adopted by the Estonian Government in March 2000, distinguishes between three spheres of integration activities and processes: linguistic-communicative, political and socio-economic. The concept of integration contains no hierarchy of the above fields and activities, i.e. all of them are considered equally important. However, the implementation of the programme has primarily focused on linguistic-communicative integration, leaving other fields more in the background.

Such an approach was justified in its time. Estonian-language competency and feeling as part of Estonia are of primary significance for successful political and socio-economic integration. We can argue that creating motivation of learning the language and acquiring linguistic competence has been remarkably successful. Whereas the actual life shows that it is increasingly important to focus on achieving goals of political integration. It is detrimental not only for non-Estonians but also for the entire state if a large part of non-Estonians is continuously left aside from the social and political life of Estonia.

Last but not least fresh ideas are needed also for conceptualising political-integration-related notions. It is natural that theoretical notions as reflections of reality develop alongside with the ambient life, its requirements and challenges. Currently there is an international trend of a new treatment evolving to associate citizenship not only with states but also with other institutions. New notions, such as "corporate citizenship", "global citizenship of states", etc. are used more frequently. As a matter of fact, citizenship may be associated not only with a state as becomes evident in the EU-introduced European citizenship, which does not replace the citizenship of the home country but rather evokes certain rights. Thus, citizenship-related issues and citizenship as a notion change in time. Consequently, promotion of legal-political integration involves also readiness for further citizenship-related discussions in Estonia.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF INTEGRATION

Klara Hallik

The main goals formulated in the state programme "Integration in Estonian Society" are: reduction of the number of persons lacking Estonian citizenship, equal participation of non-Estonians in political structures and development of the national identity based on the respect of multiculturalism in Estonia.¹ It can be concluded from these targets that prior to the getting/obtaining of citizenship an individual should participate in public discourse in such a way as to become a political subject. As we know, in practice the legal precondition for formal granting of citizenship is the passing of the naturalisation test; the permanent residence census and other requirements also do not refer to any political citizenship criteria. Naturally, it does not mean that the society is content if only formal legal requirements for citizenship have been met, including passing of the Estonian language test (or language proficiency) to which the vast majority of Estonians ascribe priority importance. The results of the current as well as the previous monitoring clearly indicate that in Estonians' perception the pillar of integration is the linguistic-communicative component with the discernible focus on assimilation.² Accordingly, citizenship and participation of minorities in political governance or "full-fledged membership" in the citizenry are seen through the prism of ethnocultural affiliation.

The minorities studied during the monitoring process, on the contrary, have an "extended" understanding of citizenship as a value which coincides with all social values, at the same time they distance themselves from the perspective of linguistic assimilation.³

As strange as it seems, the high value attributed to citizenship has not lead to a significant increase in the number of new citizens. On the contrary, the decline of the naturalisation trend continues and the share of adults and the language test completed individuals in naturalisation proceedings has been falling quicker than the average. 54 per cent of all 0-19-year-old non-Estonians have no Estonian citizenship, whereas 44 per cent have still no citizenship at all.⁴ Should these trends persist, we shall have a large group of stateless persons and Russian citizens and Estonia will remain politically unbalanced also in the years to come.

What criteria should be used for the evaluation of political integration in these circumstances? This is the key issue on which I focused in the analysis of the monitoring data. The main goal of the analysis was to identify to what extent Estonians and the minorities share common conceptions or adhere to different viewpoints in the context of political culture. I proceeded from the assumption that the political culture of the Estonian minorities does not consist of elements substantially diverging from the Estonian culture or even antithetical to it. Estonia's inhabitants of different nationalities originate from ethnic cultures that respect similar fundamental values and therefore cross-cultural borders are not impervious here. Actual belonging into one state and abiding by the laws of this state as well as the experience of long-term cohabitation must manifest themselves also in the societal culture, the elements of which include also societal views and political attitudes. The stability of the society and predictability of changes depend not only on democratic institutions and the legislation, but also on views and values people share. The quality of the political culture in the multiethnic society depends, among other things, on how the titular nation and the minorities understand the balance between their own national and common interest, their ability to work and participate in the political process together with their fellow-

¹ State Programme. Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007, 13

² *Integration of Estonian Society. Monitoring 2000*, 14,19,35

³ Ibid. 14, 28-29.

⁴ Year 2000 Population and Housing Census, II, 245.

citizens who are different from themselves In order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable.⁵

Based on the year 2000 and 2002 surveys, I undertook to find answers to the following questions: how is the relation between the citizenship institution and political rights perceived, with the stress on participation in political institutions; willingness to engage non-Estonians in power structures; subjective readiness to participate in political life; how Estonians and other ethnic groups define themselves in this political setting by comparing a) attitudes towards various systems of government and b) orientation in the Estonian party system. The assessment to the socio-economic functions of the state is as an important indicator that was used to measure attitudes towards the state as a provider of the public good.

1. Political rights and citizenship

As the participants in the integration process in Estonia - the "integrators" and those to be integrated - have a different legal status, it is important to know how people understand the existing legal environment. If the citizens' and non-citizens' perception of the rights of different groups diverge significantly, it designates a deep political rift in the society and the national policy has very little impact on it. And, on the contrary, the more homogeneous the distribution of various rights in the society is (or if such distribution is accepted), the greater the likelihood that interests of different groups can be understood, influenced and met in line with the norms recognised by the entire society and not only from the position of interests favoured by one group. The results of the survey indicated that most Estonians support, in one way or another, the idea of equal social and economic rights to all inhabitants of the country, irrespective of their citizenship status. With the exception of political rights, where only a quarter of Estonians were in favour of equal rights to everybody, regardless of the citizenship status, and 55 per cent of Estonians considered political rights strongly linked to citizenship and ethnicity. The absolute majority of the representatives of other nationalities favoured equal rights without linking them with the citizenship issue.⁶

This result set out a general attitude. It underwent transformation when the respondents were asked for a more detailed answer. The year 2000 questionnaire included six political rights, out of which five rights are according to the law the rights of the citizens only (to run for and be elected to the parliament and local governments, to work in a state agency, to belong to a political party) and one - the right to participate in the elections of local councils - is extended also to non-citizens who are permanent residents. When processing the data, I took into consideration also the fact that in exceptional cases non-citizens are allowed to work in state institutions on a fixed-term basis. The formulation of the question - "*Who of the Estonian inhabitants should in your opinion have in principle the following rights?*" - made it possible to compare the received information with the provisions of the law and see that Estonian nationals with varying citizenship status are potentially prepared to accept political equality.

⁵ Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman (1995). Return of the Citizen: A survey of the Recent Work on Citizenship Theory. In - Reiner, R. ed. *Theorizing Citizenship*. State University of New York Press, p.284.

⁶ *Integration of Estonian Society. Monitoring 2000*, 35.

Figure 6.1 Assessment to political rights by nationality, per cent

Political rights should belong to... *				Estonians	Other nationalities
As prescribed by the law				1	0.4
Citizens				20	2
Citizens	permanent residents			23	11
Citizens	permanent residents	all		19	16
	permanent residents			8	20
	permanent residents	all		6	19
			all	6	23
Estonians	citizens	permanent residents	all	4	0.3
Estonians	citizens	permanent residents		2	0.3
Estonians	citizens			5	0.2
Estonians				1.5	0.2
Did not respond				4.5	7.6


Source: Integration Monitoring 2000.

* For example, "Citizens, permanent residents, all" means that in 19% of answers given by Estonian respondents concerning work in government institutions, party affiliation, running for Riigikogu, elections to Riigikogu, running for local government, elections to local government both citizens, permanent residents as well as "all" were mentioned.

It is a controversial phenomenon. On one hand, unequivocal link between citizenship and political rights is presupposed, on the other - majority of respondents are for a much more broader approach to political rights, not limiting them to the citizens' rights only. Fig.6.1 shows that according to Estonians' opinions the "zone" of political rights not linked to citizenship could be expressed in almost 75 per cent of all rights' mixes.

Because Estonians as well as other nationalities have an extended interpretation of political rights, it becomes important to understand how these "deviations" from the actual norm are linked to more general interpretation of ethnopolitical situation. The distribution of the deviation index is shown in Figure 6.1A.

Figure 6.1A Preferred division of political rights depending on their extended or limited interpretation (index*), per cent



* The index is formed like a counting index: the discrepancies of the six political rights from the norm stipulated by the law are summed. For this purpose, the group whose assessment of the citizens' and other inhabitants' political rights conforms to the stipulations of the law was marked with 0-value, (+1) denotes assessments that considered a particular citizen's right to be everybody's right; (+2) denotes assessments that considered a particular citizen's right to be permanent residents; (+ answers are classified as inclusive, respective political rights as extended); (-1) denotes assessments that considered a particular citizen's right to be exclusively Estonians' right; (- answers are classified as exclusive, respective political rights as limited). The scale of political assessments is formed on the basis of the index value: 0 - neutral, 1 - practically neutral; 2-3 - weak; 4-5 moderate; 6-8 - strong; 9-11 - extra strong.

In case of Estonians both the extended and the limited interpretations of the citizen's rights fall into the segment close to the established "norm" (46 per cent in the "neutral" and "practically neutral" zone), 29 per cent - into the extended interpretation, non-citizens inclusive "zone", and only less than 10 per cent into non-citizens exclusive zone of rights. By the citizenship status, non-Estonian citizens are positioned closer to the attitudes of non-citizens than Estonian citizens. This indicates a great rights "deficit" that is common to all non-Estonians, regardless of their citizenship status.

This distribution shows people's orientation in the political "landscape" of citizens' rights. It can be characterised by pronounced dispersion. However, the predominant part (39 per cent) of these Estonians who are interested in becoming influential in politics, supports more often than not interested, the extension of political rights also to non-Estonians. Those who have distanced themselves from politics or are content with their role in it, see the political "playground" for non-Estonians within narrower dimensions. Thus it was possible to deduce that, first, more active engagement of Estonians in politics would enhance the potential of societal integration and, secondly, both Estonians and non-Estonians recognise the need to include considerably more inhabitants of the country in the scope of political rights than the current citizenship-based approach foresees.

2. Attitudes to non-Estonians' participation in state governance and agencies

Strategies aimed to ensure social cohesion of culturally plural democratic nation-state should try to avoid a situation when the borders between different cultural or linguistic communities do coincide with the social and political division within society. To that end it is necessary to pursue two principles: first, to create an enabling mental environment for the acceptance and development of cultural pluralism and, secondly, to ensure everybody's equal participation in society and public structures, without adherence to cultural/language community borders.

In Estonia that two levels of ethnic differentiation are intertwined - first, Estonian-dominant hierarchy in power structures and, secondly, strong ethnic segmentation of the society. Due to the first-mentioned aspect the elite of the minorities has not been able to significantly influence the elaboration of strategies crucial for the state or minorities themselves. In the general political process this elite has played more often the role of an ethnically or linguistically defined opponent and opposition and, to a lesser degree, of a political partner. This situation is inevitably reflected also in the public opinion, including the present monitoring.

2.1. About representation, in general:

Participation or non-participation of the minorities in political life will become a key issue as soon as the multicultural nature of the society is recognised. Their involvement in decision-making has become a focal issue of the minorities policies in several European states because practice has shown that socialisation of (new) minorities is hampered by their seclusion from the common affairs of the society. Granting of the right to vote and to run for local office to new settlers in number of countries, a clear shift of the citizenship policy towards the *ius soli* rules in some traditionally *ius sanguinis* countries and other steps have been taken with the assumption that changes in the ethnic composition of the population would broaden and not diminish the ground for democracy.⁷

Furthermore, exclusion of the minorities from the representative and executive power institutions leads to considerable shortfalls in communication of the institutions with certain part of population. Unless institutions undertake steps to overcome the language or cultural barrier between them and their clients, the existing prejudices and negative stereotypes will be kept alive in the society and ethnosocial stratification will continue. If minorities are prevented from participating in the shaping and execution of political decisions, the excluded group will not accept these decisions as fully legitimate, and if possible, will try to disregard them or compliance will have to be achieved by means of administrative coercion.

Although civil servants are chosen on the merits of their professional competencies and skills, one should not underestimate the importance of the employees' social background because the majority of the public services beneficiaries and applicants come, as a rule, from either risk or vulnerable categories of the population. If these customer categories are not represented in the bureaucracy, it is likely that relations between the authorities and the public are unilateral and hierarchical. The "ethnic representation" among officials is especially important when the social status and competitive advantages of ethnic or linguistic groups are for some reason unequal.⁸

This is not to say that a policy which is oriented to democratic integration of the minorities presupposes a comprehensive institutionalisation of all ethno-cultural features. On the contrary,

⁷ See: Aleinikoff, T.A. and Klusemeyer, D., eds (2002). *Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C., p.1-5.

⁸ See: Peters, B.G.(1989). *The Politics of Bureaucracy*. University of Pittsburg, Longman NY&london, 48-53.

considering that Estonia honours the principles of the liberal nation state, the multicultural aspect should be effected through the *context-sensitive* political culture and etnical rules of governance in the public sector. The focal criteria of these norms should be the principle of equal representation and equal treatment of all fellow-citizens, regardless of one's nationality.

... current situation

Non-Estonians (even if only citizens are considered) are underrepresented practically on all levels of power: non-Estonians account for 30% of the electorate to local councils, 9% of local councillors; 10% of the electorate to the parliament, 6% of the members of the parliament.* For ten years there were no cabinet ministers from among minorities. Our government agencies, including these whose primary function is to provide services to non-Estonians, have not thought it necessary to recruit officials from among other nationalities. (For example, among senior officials of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice there is not a single non-Estonian). An exception to this rule is the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 50 per cent of police officers in Tallinn and 94 per cent in Narva are non-Estonians.

2.2 Volatility of inclusive liberalism

The results of several studies have shown that Estonians' attitude to potential involvement of the non-Estonians in political power is generally negative. In the course of the present monitoring we undertook an experiment to test this attitude with concrete questions.

* The last local elections were hold on October 20. Statistical data about the ethnic composition of the local representative bodies and governments are not available yet.

Table 6.1. Distribution of answers to the question "Non-Estonians account for one-third of Estonia's population. How big should be the proportion of non-Estonians in the following government institutions and offices?", N-Est =664, N-non-Est = 342.

	Estonians	Other nationalities
Riigikogu		
- one-third and more	5	55
- one-fourth	8	9
- one-tenth or less	40	6
- no need at all	21	0
- should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	27	30
Government		
- one-third and more	11	49
- one-fourth	6	10
- one-tenth or less	28	6
- no need at all	36	1
- should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	27	34
Local government		
- one-third and more	5	52
- one-fourth	9	9
- one-tenth or less	31	4
- no need at all	25	1
- should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	30	34
Police		
- one-third and more	8	38
- one-fourth	14	10
- one-tenth or less	31	6
- no need at all	17	1
- should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	30	45
Defence force		
- one-third and more	9	34
- one-fourth	11	9
- one-tenth or less	26	7
- no need at all	21	3
- should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	33	47
Executive boards of State- owned enterprises		
- one-third and more	5	37
- one-fourth	9	9
- one-tenth or less	32	5
- no need at all	21	1
- should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	33	48

In the process of data analysis four respondent categories evolved:


Liberal - do not link participation in the institutions of power with the ratio of non-Estonians in the population; proportional - agree with the 1/3 representation; limited - agree with 25-10% representation; exclusive - deny any need of representation. The views across the entire spectrum of power are listed below.

Table 6.2 Distribution of the types of respondents by their attitude towards participation of non-Estonians' in the governance and agencies, per cent.

	Political power		Power structures		SOE executive boards		All governing structures	
	E	N-E	E	N-E	E	N-E	E	N-E
Liberal	21	26	25	39	29	44	18	22
Liberal/proportional	2	9	2	6	-	-	2	21
Proportional represent.	2	38	4	27	5	34	2	21
Limited	21	7	27	9	35	12	12	3
Limited/exclusive	19	1	10	2	-	-	20	1
Exclusive	12	-	11	-	19	1	5	-
Vague	16	12	14	11	-	-	35	27
No opinion(all unanswered)	7	7	7	6	12	9	6	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Further specification of the categories showed that there are relatively few 'pure' opinion types, especially among Estonians. Typical was the combination of a favourable attitude in one power branch and a limited or exclusive attitude in another branch. Furthermore, it is likely that under the "liberals" category fall also these who were not by all means in favour of the equal representation of non-Estonians (due to personality traits) but who were indifferent towards the issue of involvement. Figure 6.2 shows the polarisation of these attitudes, and once again confirms the difference in the perception of the political environment by the two ethnic groups.

Figure 6.2 Typology depending on attitude to non-Estonians' participation in the state and local governance, per cent



The analysis of the responses with the application of the logical regression model (See appended tables 6.1 and .6.2) which incorporates the following parameters - nationality, citizenship, education, age, place of residence and social status - showed that the probable occurrence of liberal attitudes is strongly influenced by **nationality**, both in attitudes towards participation of the non-Estonians in government institutions and power structures (B- coefficient value respectively - 2.714 and -1.998). Another strong impact factor was **citizenship**, and the probability of a liberal approach to participation in state institutions and power structures was the highest in the group of stateless persons, to be followed by Russian citizens and non-Estonian citizens in case of state institutions, and by non-Estonian citizens - in case of power structures.

On the whole, there is less tension in the attitude towards multiethnic power structures than institutions of political power which can probably be explained by the fact that both groups give priority to the participation in the representative and government structures on national level (in case of Estonians - preservation of their monopoly status).

Prediction of the potential liberal resource by other parameters is not so simple. **Education** was an important factor which influenced attitudes to the multiethnic composition of the government institutions (B= -728, statistically significant for group with basic education). However, in case of power structures this factor seemed to have little weight. **Age** - it is statistically significant to have a broader liberal platform among 30-49-year-old respondents, with regard to government institutions as well as power structures. Talking about the differentiating effect of **place of residence**, Ida-Virumaa surely stood out (compared with Tallinn and the rest of the country) as a region where the platform of liberal expectations is formed primarily by non-Estonians and stateless people (B= 1.432). In this model **social status** had a weak impact on potential liberal attitudes. Strange as it is, the weakest liberal resource was characteristic to the lower "white-collar" employees, office clerks and service workers (B= -1.059). A possible explanation to this phenomenon is that on the labour market this niche is "narrower" a bit for Estonians for non-Estonians can still successfully compete for this kind of occupation.

Estonians:

The potential of liberal attitudes was above average in Ida-Virumaa, in the 30-45-year-old respondents' group with higher education; below average - in the group of people with basic or lesser education and, especially among, low level "white collar" employees, the unemployed and respondents not actively engaged in labour market.

Other nationalities:

The place of residence as a parameter stood out as a statistically reliable factor in the assessment of the potential liberal attitudes, - i.e. living in Ida-Virumaa.

Political attitudes and value orientations are a relatively independent phenomenon and, as shown in the above analysis, can only partly be explained by one's social status and other group affiliation characteristics. As according to the above analysis *nationality* proved to be the main differentiation factor for these attitudes, the following study concentrated on the relation between the inclusive and exclusive attitudes and more general ethnic attitudes of Estonians.

2.3 Political inclusion and ethnic tolerance

For the purpose of further discussion, the characteristics describing Estonians' general attitude to the non-Estonians were chosen from the monitoring data. The aim was to discover how liberal/inclusive and exclusive orientations are related to the attitudes that are closely linked with the state power aspect as well as these that are presumed to belong to politically (more) neutral.


Table 6.3 Opinion on revocation of the language requirement for candidates running for seats in Riigikogu or municipal councils (Estonians, N=502) , per cent

	Type	
	Liberal/inclusive	Rather exclusive
- fully support	9	1
- partly support	17	20
- do not support	64	75
- difficult to say	10	4

This questions is largely related to the current politics. In addition, there is reason to believe (at least on the basis of publications in press) that the vast majority of Estonians and Russians will treat this legislative amendment as the establishment of two state languages or as a step towards it. In reality it will mean only the revocation of the mandatory precondition to the right to run for and be elected, which principle is a constituent part of the legal norms governing "free and equal" elections. The above-said shows that liberal and inclusive orientations affect to a certain degree attitudes to bilingualism which is a "threat" to the representative power and at the same time imply that insufficient concessions on the language issue from both sides, Estonians and Russians, and lack of dialogue and accord can seriously hamper democratic participation.

In the rhetoric on ethnic issues the phrase "national threat" is often used. Sometimes it is associated with historic injustice or the great number of the non-Estonians, lack of the Estonian language knowledge or competition. The psychological syndrome of the threatened nation is represented as an imperative in this kind of rhetoric and thus needs neither justification nor argumentation.


Figure 6.3 Attitude to non-Estonians' participation in government and power structures depending on the answer to the question: "Do numerous non-Estonians pose a threat to...?". Estonians, per cent



The above-said leads to several conclusions. First, it confirms that the myth of the national threat forms a general backdrop for Estonians' self-consciousness which in our context manifests itself much less in case of the non-Estonians' political inclusion attitudes. The other and most important conclusion is that the ethnic and state-identity are becoming partially competing elements of the identity. It became evident in all types of attitudes and thus provided the grounds for stating that the problems of inclusive democracy, participation and, more widely, of the minorities policy can be (not to mention, should be) discussed within societal but not within ethno-centric discourse. And finally, negative national attitudes of a more general nature do not preclude rational choices even in the context of a strongly ideologised "nation-state" concept (likewise in the citizenship policy)⁹. Although one-third of those who support non-Estonians' participation in politics perceive also a danger due to their multitude, at the same time they are willing to foster political integration. It means that integration supporters are not necessarily found among those who "do not perceive danger". It seems that the right tactics should be not in stressing the lack of threats but in focussing on positive aspects of political integration which will ultimately help to increase national security and widen the prospects of democratic development. In other words, they will increase and not decrease the outlook for Estonians' existence as a contemporary European nation.


The data of the survey confirmed that "ethnic distance" will remain to considerably influence Estonians' readiness for political integration. Furthermore, it is clear that exclusion orientations are stronger in issues pertaining to power and become weaker in issues far from politics and power. This tendency is demonstrated by the following data (Fig.6.4 and 6.5).

Figure 6.4 Attitude to non-Estonians' participation in government and power structures depending on the degree of disturbance by their lack of Estonian language skills and different behavior and lifestyle. Estonians, per cent




⁹ *Integration of Estonian Society*, 2000, 33-34.

Figure 6.5 Attitude to non-Estonians participation in government structures depending on the assessment of multiculturalism. Estonians, per cent



It corroborates once again that the non-Estonians' lack of the Estonian language knowledge is the factor that prompts Estonians to erect actual or symbolic obstacles for non-Estonians on the way to power. At the same time it is evident that supporters of the liberal approach are ready to adjust to the language barrier, assuming that, as we indicated above, they opt for general public good. On the basis of the survey it is possible to claim that liberal political attitudes are connected with above average tolerance of diverse behaviour and lifestyles. It becomes even more obvious if we compare attitudes to shared power with the subjective ethnic distance which in the present survey was measured with one's readiness to live and work/study together with other nationalities.

Figure 6.6 Attitude to non-Estonians' participation in government and power structures depending on the willingness to live or work in a multicultural environment Estonians, per cent



Short inference

1. Similarly to the year 2000 monitoring data, the perceptions of Estonians and other nationalities of the integrative function of political participation differ drastically; expectations of liberal and equitable (proportional) representation and participation are in absolute majority among non-Estonians; expectations of group-based, in other words, proportional representation are the highest with regard to Riigikogu, local self-governments and the central government.
2. Estonians' attitudes are more differentiated, both by various levels of power and institutions as well as on the liberal-exclusive scale. The most essential findings were:
 - 1/5 of Estonians are ready to support non-Estonians' participation in government structures either on the basis of liberal or proportional representation principle, including 1/4 of the respondents who support participation in the political power system, 30% in power structures and 1/3 are prepared to share also, economic power with the non-Estonians on the same grounds.
 - Estonians prefer to have major obstacles made to the non-Estonians in these spheres of life where decisions concerning the well-being of the entire society are made (especially on the government level), meaning the spheres where, according to theoretical perception, the institutional network for the development of the unified political environment and "common good" or "strong common core" of the integration process should function.
 - The study confirmed that attitudes to non-Estonians' participation in government and power structures are significantly influenced by the ethnic attitudes. Greater ethnic tolerance, openness and readiness to overcome the language barrier is more common to liberalism in the political sphere. However, this correlation is not so straightforward and supporters of the minorities' political involvement can be found also among those who are ethnically exclusive. And, on the contrary, among those who support non-Estonians' involvement, there is a considerable group of people who are closed or show intolerance on other issues of ethnic relations.

- Among assessments given by Estonians, one's attention is caught by the great number of respondents who support restrictions to non-Estonians' participation in government structures: one-fourth to one-third of the respondents (almost half of them on the issue of the parliament and 40% - other structures) (see table 6.1). On one hand, it shows that Estonians are becoming increasingly aware that it is unreasonable to continue keeping the non-Estonians' away from governance. The considerable number of those people who support the non-Estonians' "limited" inclusion (over 40%) makes it possible to open a dialogue on this issue, if there exists political will. On the other hand, these findings indicate distrust of fellow citizens of other ethnic backgrounds, or why not even egoism and favouring of national-corporate interests. The above analysis (see fig. 6.2) seems to refer to the second option because the non-Estonians' limited participation approach is quite often combined with the attitude supporting the non-Estonians' exclusion from power.
- In the light of the above described facts a more theoretical issue emerges. It concerns the definition of Estonia's minority policy "model" and projections of further developments. Notwithstanding whether the development of Estonia's minority policy is analysed on the basis of "ethnic democracy (G.Smith 1996, P-Järve 2000), "multicultural democracy" (R.Vetik 2002) or "ethnic control" (V.Pettai & k.Hallik 2002) concept, it is *a priori* acknowledged as an unbalanced ethnopolitical system. This has been considered to be detrimental to the development of democracy (A.Stepan 1994) and conducive to the discrimination of minorities (A.Semjonov 2002). Thus the question is what kind of development strategy or mass political experience the public opinion reflects? Institutionalised (weak or strong) multicultural or liberal democracy or a system of government that will ensure Estonians' unilateral political dominance?

3. The state and power...

3.1 Preference of different systems of government (2000, 2002)

The adaptation of Estonian citizens and other ethnic groups to political changes has not been synchronous. For Estonians the restoration of independence was not only a positive but also an expected event, more importantly, a fair turn in history. For new minorities in Estonia the independence meant restrictions of their existing rights, a feeling of serious deprivation and seclusion in the society. The uncertainty and unpredictability of the future came to be inevitably reflected in their general political behaviour and attitudes towards the state and government. The following analysis is supposed to show whether there is reason to assume that the category of a "good citizen" does not fully match with the citizen's legal status? The question is whether one's identification with the state, participation willingness and responsibility for Estonia's well-being are absolutely and exclusively the attributes of "full-fledged citizens" or whether they have a broader base?

We proceeded from the assumption that the respondents answered to this question without knowing exactly what the theoretical models of parliamentary and presidential republics or an authoritarian state are. Nevertheless, the results of the survey allowed us to evaluate general political orientations.

The purpose of the following analysis was to determine to what extent various preferred regimes and assessments given by Estonians and other nationalities as well as citizens and non-citizens differed. In both cases the respondents were asked to choose between the existing regime, increasing the power of the President, curbing the powers of the parliament, giving more rights to the power structures and returning to the former socialist regime.

Table 6.4 Attitude to systems of government by citizenship status, in 2000 and 2002, per cent

Citizenship status	Current regime		Increase of the power of the President		"Firm- hand" rule		Socialist regime	
	'00	'02	'00	'02	'00	'02	'00	'02
E/ER cit.	44	48	51	57	36	26	5	4
NE/ER cit	41	41	31	58	31	31	13	13
Stateless	27	37	22	57	32	30	29	16
Russian cit..	28	37	31	55	29	29	38	37
Total	39	45	42	57	33	27	13	9

Compared to the previous survey, the number of people who were unable to determine their position in the macro-political environment has decreased. The biggest shift has taken place in the category of the stateless people (in 2000 as many as one-fourth of them had been unable to choose), who now define themselves almost like Estonians and citizens. The number of supporters of the old regime has decreased considerably among the stateless.

Both those who are satisfied with the current regime as well as those who criticize or negate it can be motivated by extremely different things that have very little to do with politics. Still, the disposition of the society to support more personality-centred and "order"-ensuring regimes is remarkable although the number of the "firm hand" rule supporters has declined in two years. It is obvious that the actual political situation influences these general views. (in 2002 the survey took place after the newly-elected president and government had taken up office). The increased support to the "current regime" as well as to the presidential rule may be triggered by these events.

Alternatives to the existing arrangement display a dispersed pattern both by citizenship and by regimes. The analysis of the year 2000 monitoring data had showed that (Fig. 6.7):

- Most supporters of the stronger presidential rule are those Estonian citizens who accept the current regime (14%); among the stateless support to the stronger presidential rule is combined with the support to the former and "firm hand" rule. One can only assume that this reflects the overall uncertainty typical to this group of the respondents who by their nature seek support either from a clearly identifiable ruler or a familiar regime.
- Longing for "law and order and a "firm hand" rule does not imply, as it is often stated, the preference of the former socialist regime. In the assessments given by Estonian citizens and the stateless preferences of a stronger rule were associated with the acceptance of the existing regime and the increase of the power of the president.
- The "old" regime syndrome poses a problem mainly to non-citizens (according to the year 2002 data mostly to Russian citizens). But not so much as to tilt the weights of preferences towards a dangerous imbalance for the society. Like in the above cases, supporters of the socialist regime do not form a clearcut group, its members can be found among those who are content with the current regime as well as those who favour a stronger presidential rule and better "law and order". To date, it is difficult to say whether it is the cause or consequence of the stateless status. Most probably both.
- The above is not an exhaustive list of all potential regime alternatives. A great many respondents - one-fourth of Estonians and about 40 per cent of non-Estonians - described their attitude to the regimes as "none are good" or "none of the alternatives is suitable" (Fig. 6.8).

Figure 6.7 Assessment to systems of government by nationalities in 2000 and 2002, per cent






Figure 6.8 Preference of the system of government by nationalities in 2000 and 2002, per cent



* critical of all systems (if not, then "do not know")

The study showed that supporters of the "firm hand" and former regimes represent a marginal group on Estonia's political landscape and their estimated impact on the national policy is insignificant. Taking into account the current developments, the choices concerning the preferred regimes range between the strengthening of the presidential powers and the parliamentary system. In the context of ethnic relations it is also critical to know that the strengthening of the presidential rule is supported mostly by older Estonians (45-74 age group) and also by the social groups who represent more conservative views on the integration of the non-Estonians. (Fig. 6.9).

Figure 6.9 Supporters of the current system of government and the increase of the presidential power. Estonians, per cent, by....




There can be several reasons why the current political regime is less appreciated. But there is no grounds to interpret the gathered information as a manifestation of distrust towards the *parliamentary rule*. It is most probably due to the fact that the "current regime" is not sufficiently efficient and is inaccessible to ordinary citizens. Discontent is not caused by the parliamentary democracy as such but by the way it operates in certain situations.

3.2 The state and individuals. Who is responsible for what?

Political integration is strongly affected by the attitudes held by the members of the society towards the state as a guarantor of common benefits. The monitoring showed that, compared with Estonians, non-Estonians think that the function of the state as a provider of social benefits should be much stronger. 50 per cent of Estonians and 70 per cent of other nationalities think that employment, pension insurance and free university education are solely the state's responsibilities.


Figure 6.10 Responsibilities of the state and individuals by nationality, per cent



A trend can be derived from attitudes to various regimes, namely, that Estonians and other nationalities who support the strengthening of the presidential powers are more "state-oriented" and prefer the state's responsibility in these spheres more often than those who are satisfied with the existing, i.e. parliamentary system. Especially, for the labour market regulation. There were 35% more Estonians and 23% more non-Estonians in the respondents group who wished the state to ensure employment and supported the presidential system compared to the group of the parliamentary rule supporters. Estonians, supporters of the national pension, outnumbered others in this group by 37 per cent.

With regard to the taxation policy which has been the subject of many heated discussion in Estonia, according to the results of our study both groups displayed equally the "social democratic" approach. Estonians as well as others gave an overwhelming preference to the graduated-rate income tax (Fig. 6.11). It was also common to both groups that such modification of the taxation policy would find less supporters among the medium income category (monthly income per family member 2001-3500 kroons) as their well-being would suffer considerably. Attitudes of social groups to the taxation policy are much more differentiated than those of ethnic groups. 4-3 times more Estonian and Russian workers prefer the graduated-rate income tax to the proportional system and 2-3 times more - mid-level employees, half of the managers prefer the existing system, the other half prefers the graduated-rate system. By education, the biggest difference is between Estonians with basic education and university education, whereas in case of non-Estonians education had no impact on taxation policy preferences and was close to the average level throughout the sample.


Figure 6.11 Answers to the question "What kind of taxation system do you prefer?", per cent



Neither Estonians nor others thought that the state is a "bad master", although Estonians favour generally more often than non-Estonians private ownership or private-public partnership models. It can be partly explained through differences in specific life experiences. Most non-Estonians work in big enterprises and in the core branches of economy that are still state-owned or state-controlled. It was somewhat surprising to learn that Estonians' support to the "pure" form of private ownership is modest, even in case of land, mixed models were preferred.¹⁰

¹⁰ These attitudes seems to be rather persistent and, by the way, and differ very little from the results of the 1995 study. See *Elutingimused Eestis 1994.aasta lõpul*. ESA & Eesti Sotsiaalmajandusliku Analüüsi Instituut. Tallinn, Hansar, 1995, 160-162.

Figure 6.12 "Who should own the next property?", per cent



Estonians' preferences of ownership forms, though largely coinciding with non-Estonians' preferences are yet more differentiated. At that, these differences are also related to attitudes to governing regimes. Compared with the supporters of the current regime, among the supporters of the strong presidential rule there are more people who prefer state and municipal ownership to private ownership: - in case of big enterprises almost two times more, power plants - 22%, railways - 33%, harbours - 43%, hospitals and schools - 25% more. Such "left-wing" attitudes are obvious indicators of concern for the overall destiny of the society and dissatisfaction with the extremely liberal economic system

The development of democracy and stability of political power are largely dependent on whether the people consider the existing rule legitimate and give it their moral support or not. The above analysis of general political attitudes shows that the majority of Estonians and other nationalities define themselves in the macro-political environment more or less similarly. However, a great part of Estonian nationals (one-fourth of Estonians and two-fifths of other nationalities) have become alienated from politics and power to the extent that any mention of politics evokes but a negative reaction. Such negative distancing of oneself from the state and the power does not foster integration of the pluralistic society because it restrains the evolution of common political coordinates. Social scientists have exhaustively referred to the causes of the gap between people and authorities (the syndrome called "two Estonias"). Such extensive negativism among non-Estonians can be interpreted as subjective confirmation of the fact that this part of the society has been pushed out of the political life. Our study did not find any verification of appeal to post-modernism or views to the effect that "less state, the better". In the developed democratic countries the "less state" is compensated by the strong civil society which in Estonia is not sufficient among Estonians and, especially, non-Estonians. This explains why both ethnic groups are in their socio-economic views state-oriented. Another important conclusion of our study is that people in Estonia value highly social equality. If inequality is perceived as inequality on the grounds of ethnicity (as was proved by our study), it may lead to conflict and destabilise the society.

4. Political parties and self-determination on the political landscape

In the context of general political development and integration of the minorities in Estonia it is critical to know how people perceive their opportunities in the political system, which institutions they trust and which not. The results of the study indicated that the vast majority of Estonians and other nationalities, as a rule, do not regard political parties as organisations reflecting their interests (their opinion was asked altogether about 11 political parties). The monitoring revealed that:

- 37% Estonians and 31% non-Estonians were able to identify political parties that represent the interests of people "like you";
- compared with Estonians, non-Estonians were typically more distanced from politics on the party "landscape", only every fourth Estonian citizen and 29% of the stateless were able to identify a political party representing their interests;
- as a rule, allegiance to political parties is marginal, several different parties were said to represent their interests; according to our study Centre Party (Keskerakond) has the greatest number of firm one-party supporters (6% Estonians and 10% non-Estonian respondents).

Table 6.5 Knowledge of political parties and assessment to their ability to represents the interests of "your kind of people", per cent

	All parties*			5 major parties**		4 Russian parties	
	All	Estonians	Other	Estonians	Other	Estonians	Other
(The list) contained parties unknown to respondents, were unable to express their opinion also about some familiar parties	12	14	9	3	4	6	4
(The list) contained parties unknown to respondents, were able to express their opinion about all familiar parties	23	17	35	7	28	21	29
All parties (listed) were familiar, but were unable to express their opinion about some parties	30	32	26	31	27	29	25
All parties were familiar, were able to express their opinion about all of them	35	37	31	59	41	44	42
(The list) contained party(ies) that were considered to defend their interest	46	51	37	48	29	8	19
(The list) contained only one party that was considered to defend their interest	19	21	16	22	20	6	9

Note: * The list contained 11 political parties.

**Pro Patria, Centre Party, Moderates,, Peoples' Union and Reform Party

The above data indicates that non-Estonians are considerably less knowledgeable about parties and the political institutions than Estonians, especially about the political parties which have recently held key positions in politics. By nature they also see these parties considerably less frequently as representatives of their interests. This was to be expected because it reflects adequately the fact that non-Estonians have been the object of politics and not its active subjects. At the same time it is remarkable that almost 30% of non-Estonians considered some major political party with an Estonian profile to represent their interests, which figure is by almost 50% higher than potential support to political parties with the Russian background. (This outcome is in line with the year 2000 monitoring data when 57% of Estonian respondents and 61% of other nationalities favoured multiethnic political parties, one-fifth – sc ethnic parties and one-fifth were indifferent).

The analysis of the relation between attitudes to political parties and support to non-Estonians involvement in power, brought out the huge diffusion of opinions and also certain "lack of logic" when support to known liberal parties was combined with ethnic exclusion. Overall, party allegiance does not affect the ratio of those who are in favour of non-Estonians' inclusion in organs of power and those against. The first and the second are "in balance" in all political parties with the Estonian profile (for example, 29% of Centre Party supporters were in favour of non-Estonians' inclusion and 26% were against, Mõõdukad (Moderates) - 19% and 17% respectively etc.). Supporters of Centre Party, Mõõdukad, Reform Party and Peoples' Union (on the basis of the cluster analysis) were slightly more tolerant than others of non-Estonians involvement in power structures.

The ambivalence in the ethnopolitical attitudes that came out as the result of this study is a clear signal that political parties with the Estonian profile have failed to publicly declare their approaches to the current problems in the minority policies and the pressure of the ethnic factor on political culture has been consistently strong.

5. Willingness to engage in politics

The above analysis showed that to date the political environment and institutions do not foster equal treatment of ethnic groups in the political life of the country. One more question awaits an answer - what is Estonians' and other nationalities' subjective willingness to take part in the political life? I am going to analyse this problem with the help of two criteria: interest in politics (in Estonia, western countries, Russia) and willingness to engage in politics.

5.1 Interest in politics...

...demonstrates to a certain degree "willingness to engage in public discourse"¹¹. Interest in politics is not always driven by the desire to personally engage in it, but to be informed and to determine one's position with regard to politics. Interest in public life enables person to (more) adequately evaluate political events and actors and should presumably help to understand the interests of other fellow-citizens.

The monitoring showed that the Estonian society is, generally speaking interested in politics. Only 1/5 of the respondents took no interest in political developments in Estonia, western countries or Russia. A more detailed analysis indicated that *nationality is not* the prime differentiation factor in political interests. Main factors are education, age and gender as their influence is the strongest on the population's interest in political issues, regardless of nationality. 15-19-year-old respondents were interested the least in political information, however, the interest level was not much higher among up to 49-year-olds either. The respondents from the mature age group (older than 50) demonstrated the greatest interest in politics, they were equally well interested in what is

¹¹ Galston (1991), quotation from *Return of the Citizen* by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, p. 221

happening in their country and abroad. Consumption of political information is chiefly an attribute of social status and, according to the study, in both ethnic groups' persons with higher education and better social status showed the greatest interest in politics. Hence, interest in Estonian politics is more evenly "diffused" among social groups, the biggest disparities existing between the information needs of managers and workers. Political developments in Russia are of greater interest to managers and top professionals.

By nationality, for Estonians priority areas in politics are events in Estonia and western countries. 1/3 of Estonians (57% in case of 15-19-year-old youngsters) are not interested any more in what is happening in Russia. Non-Estonians too tend to focus on political events in Estonia but they are also interested in political developments in Russia and slightly less in western countries. About 30% of young non-Estonians (19 -25) are not interested in any of the political issues and 25-29-years old young people are two times less interested in the events in Russia than non-Estonians on the average are. As was expected, language skills also influence interest in politics. Among other factors that were analysed, the country of origin was of considerable importance for non-Estonians - those born in Russia were more interested in the events and developments there. On the average, the media consumption "geography" of Russians living in Estonia is strongly "biased" towards Russia, but it is not completely opposed to the information originating from Estonia. Both spaces are united by the Russian language; thus Russian language newspapers published in Estonia, radio and television broadcasts have the biggest unifying effect. Empirical data lead to the conclusion that the common information space in Estonia, including its Estonian language segment, should have an adequate Russia-and Russians-related niche which would help Estonians to better understand the orientation of the Russian-speaking information consumers.

5.2 Willingness to participate in politics...

Not everybody can or want to participate in politics. It is quite normal because today people have many other possibilities for self-realisation and not everybody is inclined to shoulder new responsibilities. It is also natural that not all people consider themselves competent to be actively involved in politics. At the same time one wonders what is the optimal amount of "apolitical" citizens for the society. Likewise, we should not treat with indifference the factors that cause people to turn their back on politics.

The results of the two surveys indicated that population's willingness to actively interfere in politics is at a critically low level. Only every eighth respondent wished for his/her views to be more prominent in politics and only 8% (instead of 12% in the previous survey) were satisfied with their part in the political life. "*Distancing*" attitudes prevailed - like "this is for people smarter than I" - 1/4 of the respondents, "opinions of ordinary citizens are never taken into account" - 1/5, "they can manage well enough without me" - 1/8 (so-called passive distancing); 1/5 can be defined as people knowingly avoiding politics because "this is not a fair game".

By nationality these opinions do not differ significantly and they have changed little since the previous survey.

By age groups it is noteworthy that half of 40-49 years old Estonians distance themselves from politics for two reasons - due to their incompetence or the dishonest nature of politics. 70% of up to 50-years-old non-Estonians distanced themselves from politics because they consider it unethical.

Those who were satisfied with their part in politics and those who wished to be more influential can be defined as "activists". According to the survey, approximately one-fifth (22%) of the interviewed Estonians and 15% of non-Estonians belong to this category. The "activists" are much more liberally-minded about the involvement of non-Estonians in organs of power than those who have distanced themselves from politics. The last-mentioned group had 1.4 times more opponents to non-Estonians' involvement than supporters, whilst in the passive distancing group this multiplier was 2.3 and the active distancing group 2.6.

CONCLUSIONS.

One of the goals of the political decisions adopted ten years ago and the restitutorial citizenship law that derived from these decisions was to deprive the new-settlers of the Soviet era from the right to decide key issues related to the country's development. In the opinion of several analysts the political consolidation of Estonians on the national identity grounds and their monopoly over political power during the transition period accelerated the reform process and ensured necessary stability for their implementation.¹² Due to the interaction of several factors, this strategy has so far performed without major modifications and the fundamentals of the legislative environment that regulates political engagement of non-Estonians have remained the same. Therefore the realisation of several tasks outlined in the State Integration Programme has been complicated due to serious contradictions between the defined goals and the institutional means enabling political integration. This conflict is reflected also in the public opinion to be monitored. In this article we have analysed how Estonians and representatives of ethnic minorities define themselves in relation to the state and the political environment on the whole, proceeding from the assumption that such general self-determination is an essential component of the political development.

The current marginal status of *non-Estonians* and their exclusion from political power is reflected, first of all, in their greater alienation from the state and, secondly, in their overall feeling of the "deficit" of rights. Accordingly, it is characteristic of them to have higher expectations to be treated equally in all spheres of public life and to be represented in the political power institutions.

The monopolistic status of *Estonians* in political institutions gives no reason to state (according to the results of our study) that, namely, this fact has notably (compared with non-Estonians) contributed to the consolidation of democratic and liberal values. The ethnic groups were sufficiently alike in their attitudes to the systems of government, willingness to participate in politics and apolitical motives to allow us to talk about the common part of the political culture. In principle, also the views of Estonians and non-Estonians on the socio-economic functions of the state and its duty to ensure social benefits were close.

Estonians and other nationalities do not significantly differ in their assessment to the effectiveness of the state and democracy. They are extremely critical and dissatisfied with the policies, however, the options preferred by the two groups are not mutually exclusive (with the exception of the Russian citizens marginal group whose attitudes are shaped by a different interpretation of the recent past). The alienation of both ethnic communities from the state may seriously destabilise the existing regime.

Another general conclusion is that more active engagement of Estonians and non-Estonians in politics will enhance the integration potential of the society. The monitoring data confirmed that the vast majority of Estonians recognise the need for extending political rights to a considerably larger group of inhabitants of the country than the current citizenship-based system foresees.

Still, the difference in Estonians' and other nationalities' vision of the integrative role of political participation is paramount, although Estonians do not completely preclude the involvement of non-Estonians in politics. Estonians have become increasingly more aware of the inexpediency of keeping non-Estonians away from governance. The sizeable part of the population that supports the involvement of non-Estonians in organs of power, -either on the liberal, proportional or (mostly) "limited" representation principle - makes it possible, if there is political will, to take steps for the multicultural nature of the society to become an element of the democratic rule.

¹² Steen, A.(ed).(1997). *Ethnicity and Politics in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. Research Report, 02/97.Oslo:University of Oslo: 2,3. Smith,G. et al. (1998). *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 95. Lauristin,M. & Vihalemm,P., eds (1997). *Return to the Western World*. Tartu University Press: 99-112..

The study showed that ethnic attitudes and stereotypes influence considerably opinions about the non-Estonians' participation in government and power structures. Greater ethnic tolerance, openness and willingness to overcome the language barrier are more common to liberalism in the political sphere. Estonians' political and ethno-cultural attitudes towards non-Estonians came out in this study as partly competing identity elements. This is an indication of a growing need and possibility to focus in the integration policy on the societal components which can enhance cohesion in the society.

APPENDIX 6

Table 6. 1. Factors that influence liberal attitudes (B-coefficient values)

	Participation of non-Estonians in organs of power		Participation of non-Estonians in power structures	
	Estonians	Non-Estonians	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Education ¹³				
Basic education and less	-0,88**	-0,13	-0,51*	0,48
Secondary education	-0,17	-0,44	-0,11	0,64
Place of residence ¹⁴				
Tallinn	0,13	0,56	0,46**	0,45
Ida-Viirumaa	1,36***	1,80***	1,24***	1,72***
Age ¹⁵				
15-29	0,05	0,45	0,08	0,27
30-49	0,22	0,54	0,35	0,50
Social status ¹⁶				
Workers	-0,39	-0,79	-0,54*	-6,39
Lower level employees	-1,49***	-0,43	-1,56***	-6,29
Mid-level specialists	-0,40	-0,19	-0,37	-6,03
Unemployed	-0,78	6,40	-0,83*	-5,58
Non actively engaged	-0,60	-0,67	-0,51*	-6,87

*** significant level $p < 0,01$

** significant level $0,01 \leq p < 0,05$

* significant level $0,05 \leq p < 0,15$

¹³ Reference group: higher education

¹⁴ Reference group: other towns and rural regions

¹⁵ Reference group: 50-74 years old

¹⁶ Reference group: managers and top specialists

Table 6.2. Factors that influence liberal attitudes (B-coefficient values)

	Participation of non-Estonians in organs of power	Participation of non-Estonians in power structures
Nationality and citizenship¹⁷		
Non-Estonians, Estonian citizens	2,36***	1,99***
Non-Estonians, stateless	3,58***	2,28***
Non-Estonians, Russian citizens	2,76***	1,70***
Non-Estonians, citizens of other countries	2,58**	1,14
Education¹⁸		
Basic education and less	-0,73**	-0,31
Secondary education	-0,23	0,05
Place of residence¹⁹		
Tallinn	0,23	0,45**
Ida-Viirumaa	1,46***	1,43***
Age²⁰		
15-29	0,13	0,08
30-49	0,29	0,36*
Social status²¹		
Workers	-0,54	-0,70**
Lower level employees	-1,29***	-1,51***
Mid-level specialists	-0,38	-0,48
Unemployed	-0,57	-0,78*
Not actively engaged	-0,64*	-0,79**

*** significant level $p < 0,01$

** significant level $0,01 \leq p < 0,05$

* significant level $0,05 \leq p < 0,10$

¹⁷ Reference group: Estonians

¹⁸ Reference group: higher education

¹⁹ Reference group: other towns and rural regions

²⁰ Reference group: 50-74 years old

²¹ Reference group: managers and top specialists

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